Decolonising the Informal: Discourse, Everyday Life, and the Politics of Urbanisation in Windhoek, Namibia by Luehl, P. & Luehl, P.
WestminsterResearch
http://www.westminster.ac.uk/westminsterresearch
Decolonising the Informal: Discourse, Everyday Life, and the 
Politics of Urbanisation in Windhoek, Namibia
Luehl, P.
This is an electronic version of a PhD thesis awarded by the University of Westminster. 
© Mr Phillip Luehl, 2020.
The WestminsterResearch online digital archive at the University of Westminster aims to 
make the research output of the University available to a wider audience. Copyright and 





DECOLONISING THE INFORMAL 
Discourse, Everyday Life, and the Politics of  




Thesis presented in partial fulfilment for the requirements 
of the degree of Doctor of Philosophy 

















To my father Hans-Peter – who passed the baton seemingly too soon – with gratitude 







In contemporary post-colonial Namibia, the concept of informality is widely applied 
with reference to the ‘informal economy’ and ‘informal settlements’, which are 
rapidly overtaking formal urbanisation processes inherited from colonial times. All 
the while, conventional professional spatial practices remain structurally elitist and 
seem ineffectual in settings of ‘urban informality’, which largely overlap with the 
lived experience of the black urban poor. Urban theory continues to reinforce a 
binary conceptualisation in which ‘informality’ remains framed as the non-formal, 
emphasising what it is not rather than providing a conceptual framework for what it 
is. This study is threefold: firstly, I investigate understandings of ‘informality’ through 
in-depth interviews with professional spatial practitioners in the governmental, NGO 
and private sectors. Secondly, I reconceptualise ‘informality’ as everyday spatial 
practice based on participant observation at the “Herero Mall” ‘informal market’ in 
Windhoek. Thirdly, I give account of my involvement in a co-productive spatial 
intervention at the Herero Mall with local traders. Through these three approaches, 
I found that the temporal overlap between Namibia’s decolonisation (from the late 
1970s until Independence in 1990) and the mainstreaming of the concept of 
‘informality’ in urban theory provided the conditions of emergence for ‘informality’ 
to become a discursive practice. By discursively constructing the world of the 
‘informal’ as the binary opposite of what is considered formal and legitimate, its 
actors and practices are delegitimised and thus continue to be structurally 
excluded. At the same time, I argue that the ‘informal’ everyday spatial and 
economic practices of the subaltern is a form of resistance to formal enclosure, 
weaving together fragments of colonial urbanisation into a decolonising urbanism. 
I argue that this form of alter-urbanisation provides a point of departure for an 
alternative professional spatial practice, the outlines of which I trace through 
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CHAPTER 1 SITUATING THE THESIS 
The philosophers have only interpreted the world, in various ways. The point, 
however, is to change it. 
Karl Marx, Theses on Feuerbach (Engels, 2009 [1886]) 
This doctoral research emerged from my personal academic and professional 
engagements concerning issues of urbanisation in Namibia generally, and my 
home-base Windhoek in particular. Over the last 10 years my work has taken 
various forms: from academic exercises with undergraduate architecture students 
at the university where I teach; public art projects and debates on the state of the 
city; advocacy and support for community-based organisations; to architectural 
consulting work for local and central government authorities. The latter refers 
specifically to a feasibility study (Delgado and Lühl, 2014) commissioned by the 
City of Windhoek (CoW) in 2014, for the formalisation of the “Herero Mall”1 informal 
market in central Katutura,2 Windhoek’s apartheid-era black3 township. This work 
exposed me to the inadequacy of the prevalent regulatory, planning and 
professional practice paradigm in engaging meaningfully within conditions of 
‘informal’4 urbanisation. Rooted in colonial and modernist approaches to urban 
planning and development, this paradigm is yet to be challenged in views of 
increasing ‘informalisation’ – both economically and spatially. These developments 
 
 
1  Herero is the colloquial term for Ovaherero, one of the minority ethnic groups in contemporary Namibia. 
2  Katutura is an Otjiherero word for “the place where we do not want to live”, reflecting inhabitants’ 
resistance to forced relocation to this black-only township in the 1960s. 
3  Throughout this thesis, racial terminology is used reflecting the historical context. Where such 
classifications appear discriminatory, they are not used in the affirmative, but to support the analysis of 
ongoing and long-standing patterns of oppression. 
4  Conceptualisations of informal urbanisation and informal economy largely revolve around being 
unregulated. For now, I am putting the words informal and informality in scare quotes, as they serve as 
placeholders until I will develop more suitable conceptualisations below.  
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happen on the foundations of the segregated and highly unequal apartheid 
geographies Namibia inherited at independence, which continue to marginalise a 
majority of urban dwellers. This, in turn, reveals the inherent political dimension of 
space and raises questions around the complicity of spatial practice in the 
reproduction of such uneven geographical development (Harvey, 2006). While 
deeply critical of this reality, I am acutely aware of my own privileged position within 
this setting: a white, male Namibian of German descent, having studied in Europe, 
living in a central, affluent (former white) suburb, being employed at a major public 
university, and registered as a professional architect (one of only about 140 in the 
country). In other words: inhabiting a different ‘planet’ than the vast majority of 
urban dwellers who live only a few kilometres away in the ‘informal settlements’ of 
Windhoek.  
 
Through the feasibility study mentioned above I became immersed in this 
seemingly other world, and exposed first-hand to the field of socio-spatial power 
relations in which my own position was never neutral. Informal traders5 contravene 
zoning and trading regulations, health and safety procedures, and other 
established regulatory provisions. By occupying municipal land, they effectively 
challenge the paradigm of property. Yet in the near-absence of credible 
alternatives of formal employment, it is clear that such livelihood strategies are 
socially legitimate and should be supported to thrive. Having had the opportunity 
of entering such a paradigmatic field, I decided to use the market as a case study 
for my doctoral research with the following threefold aim: (1) understanding better 
the lived experience of that world which is typically labelled as ‘informal’; (2) 
 
 
5  The term ‘informal traders’ is widely used in everyday practice, including by the people who conduct 
various economic activities at the Herero Mall, and have named their representative association the 
Herero Mall Traders’ Committee (HMTC). Throughout this thesis I will use the term ‘traders’ to indicate 
business operators and those who are informally employed at the mall. 
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developing insights into what could constitute meaningful intervention in this 
context; and (3) contrasting this knowledge with the prevailing discourse on 
‘informality’ to critically review conceptualisations of our urban future. All three aims 
infer my personal participation and a first-person voice is the linking thread 
throughout this dissertation. 
1.1 How did I get here?  
Responding to a call for a tender by the City of Windhoek to undertake a feasibility 
study for the re-development of the Herero Mall ‘informal market’ in 2013, I 
submitted a proposal together with my partner and fellow architect and urbanist 
Guillermo Delgado. He was working at the Labour Resource and Research Institute 
(LaRRI), an independent research institute affiliated with the National Union of 
Namibian Workers, Namibia’s largest trade union federation. We were 
commissioned to undertake the study and were expected to conduct the work in 
two months, during March and April 2014. Without delving into the details of the 
process that ensued, which is elaborated in detail below, a brief overview is 
provided here for context. 
 
We established a research team including my 4th year architecture students and 
local field researchers and an ambitious research plan was developed. The first 
hurdle we encountered was that the traders’ committee would not engage us as 
they felt that the municipality had acted unilaterally in appointing us. It quickly 
transpired that relations between traders and the municipality were fraught and we 
found ourselves caught unawares in the midst of these dynamics, despite affirming 
our independence. The differences could not be resolved during the 2 months 
duration of the study and we had to rely on secondary sources regarding socio-
economic realities at the mall. When we presented our draft study – which 
recommended that the development of the market be based on principles of 
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autonomous self-management by traders and supported by the local authority – to 
the traders’ committee, we were told that they did not endorse the study even 
though they were generally in agreement with our recommendations. At the same 
time, the proposed trader self-management and the fact that we recommended 
allowing both the sale of alcohol and light industrial activities on the site, which is 
contrary to municipal zoning and market regulations, did not sit well with city 
councillors and officials. We had entered the field of urban politics. 
 
Our final report to the municipality was submitted in June 2014 and is still under 
consideration; meanwhile little has changed on site. The frustration amongst 
traders and the committee at this lack of progress is easily imaginable. This 
experience taught me that the conventional processes for the production of space 
are not conducive in the context of ‘urban informality’ and require re-thinking. My 
continued involvement at the Herero Mall provided an exemplary socio-spatial 
context to pursue more fundamental reflections through my doctoral research and 
led to my inquiry of ‘urban informality’ and – to a lesser extent – spatial co-
production as the central themes of this study. 
1.2 Research objectives 
The general research aims stated above range from the personal – i.e. developing 
a better understanding of a socio-spatial reality in which I find myself as an outsider; 
to practice – i.e. searching for meaningful methods of intervention as a spatial 
practitioner; to theory – i.e. aiming to challenge and shape conceptualisations of 
‘informality’. Here, the objective is to re-conceptualise ‘urban informality’ as socio-
spatial practice and – paraphrasing Brenner (2012) – as a site to excavate latent 
possibilities for more socially-just cities. Revealing discursive manipulations of the 
‘informality’ label and how it is reproduced and subverted in everyday spatial 
practice will contribute, I argue, to re-politicising the production of space in 
  
5 
Namibia. To achieve this, my practical objective was to bridge the distance 
between myself as spatial practitioner and ‘informal’ traders and to immerse myself 
deeply into the reality of the site to gain knowledge, while simultaneously engaging 
traders in the co-production of spatial interventions. These two objectives 
interacted dialectically; in other words, the one allowed me to advance the other. 
In this way I aim to make both a contribution to critical urban theory that is 
empirically situated in the Global South (Kloß, 2017),6 as well as to a critical spatial 
practice that is able to meaningfully engage with what I will continue to call ‘urban 
informality’ for now. 
1.3 Research questions 
The research undertaken for this PhD was framed by the following questions: 
 
How is the discourse on ‘informality’ constructed through the language and 
practices of activists, professionals, state officials, the media and other actors in 
spatial production in Namibia? This question was formulated to reveal ideological 
underpinnings of the continued use of the term ‘informal' in urban discourse, the 
power relations that are at play in it and its implications for a post-colonial urban 
politics in Namibia. 
 
How do people inhabit the Herero Mall socially, spatially, and economically? This 
question aimed to provide an account of everyday life at the site as a way of 
countering the formal – informal binary. It frames a way of accounting, in 
 
 
6  Following Kloß, my use of the term Global South does not delineate a merely geographic location but 
rather a condition of sub-alternisation within global networks of power. 
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ethnographic detail, the spatial characteristics, economic relationships and social 
dynamics at the case study site that cut across this ostensible dichotomy. 
 
What are the potentials and limitations of spatial co-production methods for design 
in the context of colonial socio-spatial legacies and the discourse of urban 
informality? This question informed my direct intervention at the site in collaboration 
with traders and other stakeholders. It also allowed me to reflect on my involvement 
at the Herero Mall prior to this research and leads to the final question that will 
frame the conclusion of this thesis: What are the implications of co-production for 
professional spatial practice in such contexts more generally? 
1.4 Theoretical framework 
Critical theory has no specific influence on its side, except concern for the 
abolition of social injustice.  
Max Horkheimer in  
Critical Theory: selected essays (Horkheimer, 2002, p242) 
Following Brenner, in this thesis, I identify with a critical approach to urbanism that 
“emphasizes the politically and ideologically mediated, socially contested and 
therefore malleable character of urban space - that is, continual (re)construction as 
a site, medium, and outcome of historically specific relations of social power” 
(Brenner, 2012, p11). Such framing should make sense to anyone who has 
experienced Southern African cities and the lasting legacies of colonial and 
apartheid policies and planning on contemporary social, economic and spatial 
dynamics. I aim to show that the Herero Mall is an exemplary case to study socio-
spatial power relations in the case of Windhoek, how they were historically 
produced, and how they are continually re-produced and subverted. What Brenner 
calls critical urban theory, sets itself apart from mainstream urban theory that 
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accepts the status quo as “transhistorical” (2012, p13), i.e. aiming to stabilise 
existing relations of power. Critical urban theory, he contends, combines a “critique 
of ideology” and a “critique of power” (2012, p13). He holds that critical theory 
“emphasizes the disjuncture between what is actual and what is possible” and 
focuses the search for such potential towards the “emancipatory possibilities that 
are embedded within, yet simultaneously suppressed by” capitalism (2012, p17). 
Brenner conceptualises these possibilities as “alter-urbanization” or the “collective 
imagination and radically democratic appropriation of the ‘right to the city’” 
(Brenner, 2017, p16). It is essential to note that he does not propose this as the 
pursuit of “alternative models of spatial organization” but instead as “alternative 
processes for the common appropriation and transformation” of the urban (2017, 
p17–18, original emphasis).  
 
He ascribes this epistemological angle to the “dialectical approach to radical 
socio-spatial transformation” developed in the 1970s by Lefebvre in his Production 
of Space (2009) and elaborated by Harvey in Spaces of Global Capitalism (2006), 
amongst others. Arguing that conceptualising the nature of space has been largely 
missing within the Marxian tradition, Harvey (2006, p141–142) constructs a matrix 
relating Lefebvre’s three spatialities – experienced, conceptualised and lived 
space – to his own tripartite categorisation of absolute, relative and relational space 
(see Table 1). Harvey argues that in both cases, space is not reducible to any of 
the three categories, but can become “one or all simultaneously”, the 
conceptualisation of which is “resolved through human practice” (2006, p125–
126). This dialectical understanding of space is critical to my doctoral research as 
I aim to transcend the understanding of apartheid and colonial spatial legacies that 
are too often framed primarily in terms of the absolute or material space of the 
segregated city (in the case of Namibia see Friedman, 2000; Simon, 1996; 




Conceptualising critical theory together with Adorno in the 1930s, Horkheimer 
contrasts it to “traditional theory,” which continues to be driven by disciplinary 
autonomy rather than social relevance (Horkheimer, 2002, p197). He argues:  
If, however, the theoretician and his specific object are seen as forming a 
dynamic unity with the oppressed class, so that his presentation of societal 
contradictions is not merely an expression of the concrete historical situation 
but also a force within it to stimulate change, then his real function emerges 
(2002, p215). 
Horkheimer goes on to state that in critical theory “constructive thinking, then plays 
a more important role than empirical verification” (2002, p221). The sought-after 
change, it must be noted, is not to be confused with a positivist outlook where 
research is aimed at finding normative solutions to problems. Rather, central to a 
critical theory is a forceful criticism of the pursuit of “instrumental rationality” 
(Kincheloe and McLaren, 2005, p305), which is considered to be at the core of 
positivist science and implicated in the stabilisation of the status quo. Brenner 
elaborates that “reflexive approaches emphasise their mutual constitution, 
practical interdependence and ongoing transformation through social relations, 






 Material Space 
(experienced space) 
Representations of Space 
(conceptualized space) 










walls, bridges, doors, 
stairways, floors, ceilings, 
streets, buildings, cities, 
mountains, continents, 
bodies of water, territorial 
markers, physical 
boundaries and barriers, 
gated communities… 
 
cadastral and administrative 
maps; Euclidean geometry; 
landscape description; 
metaphors of confinement, open 
space, location, placement and 
positionality; (command and 
control relatively easy) – Newton 
and Descartes 
 
feelings of contentment 
around the hearth; sense 
of security or incarceration 
from enclosure; sense of 
power from ownership, 
command and domination 
over space; fear of others 












circulation and flows of 
energy, water, air, 
commodities, peoples, 
information, money, 
capital; accelerations and 
diminutions in the frictions 
of distance…  
 
thematic and topological maps 
(e.g. London tube system); non-
Euclidean geometries and 
topology; perspectival 
drawings; metaphors of situated 
knowledges, of motion, mobility, 
displacement, acceleration, 
time-space compression and 
distanciation; (command and 
control difficult requiring 
sophisticated techniques) – 
Einstein and Riemann 
 
anxiety of not getting to 
class on time; thrill of 
moving into the unknown; 
frustration in a traffic jam; 
tensions or exhilarations of 
time-space compression, 














flows and fields; social 





odours and sensations 




cyberspace, metaphors of 
internalization of forces and 
powers; (command and control 
extremely difficult – chaos 
theory, dialectics, internal 
relations, quantum 
mathematics) – Leibniz, 
Whitehead, Deleuze, Benjamin 
 
visions, fantasies, desires, 
frustrations, memories, 
dreams, phantasms, 








Contesting ideology, while not new in the Marxian tradition, becomes ever more 
urgent as we understand, after Gramsci, that “dominant power in the 20th century 
was not always exercised simply by physical force but also was expressed through 
social psychological attempts to win people’s consent to domination through 
cultural institutions such as the media, the schools, the family, and the church” 
(Kincheloe and McLaren, 2005, p308). In his One Dimensional Man, Herbert 
Marcuse develops the tenets of critical theory in the 1960s context of Western 
consumerist society (Marcuse, 2002 [1964]). He argues that both the bourgeoisie 
and the proletariat, the “two great classes” of the industrial period observed by 
Marx, have ceased to be “agents of historical transformation”, requiring critique to 
be taken to a “high level of abstraction” (2002 [1964], pxiii). In his introduction to 
the second edition of the book, Kellner argues that the continued relevance of this 
work is that “critical and dialectical social theory should analyse containment and 
stabilisation as well as contestation and struggle” (Kellner, 2002, pxxxiv). In other 
words, while power continuously reproduces itself it is unceasingly resisted by 
countless other forces, which equally need to be accounted for. 
 
Yet social transformation is not inherently progressive and Frankfurt School 
theoreticians have been criticised for failing to escape an inherent eurocentrism, 
by Said amongst others, who accused them of a “motivated silence” on racism, 
colonialism and resistance within empire (Allen, 2016, p1). Allen argues that this is 
due to a belief in “historical progress” (2016), in other words, a successive 
progression towards a universal modernity emerging out of European 
enlightenment, which underlies much of contemporary Frankfurt School critical 
theory. To decolonise critical theory, she urges us to re-think the relationship 
between history and normativity (2016, p25), drawing on the work of the first-
generation Frankfurt School thinkers such as Benjamin and Adorno, as well as 
Foucault, who rejected the idea of historical progress as a “metaphysical illusion” 
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(2016, p164). According to Allen these thinkers envision social transformation not 
only as the “fuller realization” of existing normative ideals, such as democracy, 
inclusion and egalitarianism, but also allow the possibility of those normative ideals 
to be radically transformed, without pre-judging the outcome of such transformation 
(2016, p188). She argues that this requires that one reveal one’s own “historically 
situated” point of view by showing how it has been contingently made up and how 
this in turn is entangled with relations of power (2016, p190). Scheurich and 
McKenzie similarly argue that Foucault’s method of archaeology “decentres the 
modernist subject” (Scheurich and McKenzie, 2005, p848) by rejecting the idea 
that humans create history in a logical, rational and continuous manner, as the 
proponents of a history of progress argue. 
 
Another critique of (critical) social theory is formulated by Latour, who argues that 
it had for too long firmly held onto a false society / nature dichotomy, the first 
assembling all humans and the second assembling all non-humans (Latour, 2005, 
p164), both conceived as autonomous spheres. In following the natural sciences, 
Latour contends, social theory concluded prematurely on the existence of “social 
ties” as the all-structuring forces behind human activity (2005, p64). Instead, he 
suggests a “sociology of associations” – also known as actor-network-theory (ANT) 
or assemblage theory – which maintains that: 
Power, like society, is the final result of a process and not a reservoir, a stock, 
or a capital that will automatically provide an explanation. Power and 
domination have to be produced, made up, composed (2005, p64). 
ANT then does not assume a pre-existing ‘society’ structuring all else, but rather 
understands it as the whole of all relations (or translations) between things and 
humans, to both of which it assigns the role of actors (2005, p70). Including objects 
into the realm of understanding the continuous (re)production power relations 
resonates with Harvey’s conceptualisation of space (see p7), which combines 
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physical and non-physical aspects of spatiality. It is especially the possible 
designation of space as an agent in this reproduction – not just in its physical form, 
but also in its representations and as representation – that interested me here. 
Those who are much better versed in the theoretical debates might frown at this 
eclectic fusion7 of theoretical traditions that seem to be at each other’s throats.8 But 
for the purpose of my study, a political orientation provided by critical urban theory, 
combined with a Foucauldian understanding of discourse and methodological and 
analytical insights from actor-network-theory, is a useful mix as I will argue below. 
1.5 Methodological strategy 
Men of good will want to draw conclusions for political action from the critical 
theory. Yet there is no fixed method for doing this; the only universal 
prescription is that one must have insight into one's own responsibility.  
Max Horkheimer in the introduction to  
Critical Theory: Selected Essays (Horkheimer, 2002 [1968], pv) 
My research objectives and the theoretical framework imply that I aim not only to 
better understand existing urban socio-spatial dynamics that are often categorised 
under the catch-all label of urban ‘informality’, but also to co-produce some 
transformation of those dynamics. The research questions place my study squarely 
in the qualitative realm, and require a crafted methodological strategy that is 
critical, ethnographic, self-reflexive and in part participatory. While the aims of 
critical urban theory have been outlined above, its methods are less obvious. 
Though some authors choose to highlight the divides between Frankfurt School 
 
 
7  Fusion is meant here as it is used in haute cuisine, as the mixing up of distinct culinary traditions. 
8  According to Latour, ANT has been criticised to be “so indifferent to inequalities and power struggles 
that it offers no critical leverage” (Latour, 2005: 251), while throughout the book he claims repeatedly 
that critical social theory prioritises political relevance over scientific rigour. 
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critical theory and Foucault (Wandel, 2001, p368), I deem Foucault’s 
archaeological and genealogical methods useful to pursue parts of the critical 
investigation that I envision here. For Foucault, archaeology, rather than a 
discipline, is a “domain of research” that distinguishes between knowledge as 
savoir, an “implicit knowledge” specific to a certain society that is enabled through 
philosophical ideas, institutions, commercial practice, police activity and everyday 
life, and connaissance, which are formal or disciplinary “bodies of learning” found 
in scientific, philosophical and religious publications (Foucault and Faubion, 1998, 
p261). Savoir provides the often seemingly messy and irrational “conditions of 
possibility” for the emergence of formal knowledge or connaissance (1998, p262).  
 
A similar distinction could explain the tension between ‘informality’ and ‘the formal’, 
as different types of knowledge. As I set out to do, re-conceptualising urban 
‘informality’ understood as not formal requires one to first understand what ‘formal’ 
means in relation to urban: for now, in the context of Namibia the premise is that it 
is closely related to colonialism. Following Foucault, I studied the conditions of 
emergence of colonial spatial development, which – here is another hypothesis – 
has become what he would call a “false self-evidence” (Foucault, 1991, p75). In 
other words, something has become so ordinary that it seems to be self-evident, 
and hence remains unquestioned. In drawing from ANT, I am deploying the various 
agencies that made a difference, produced transformation, left traces and entered 
into accounts (Latour, 2005, p53) of urbanisation in Namibia. 
 
Foucault’s second method, genealogy, aims to analyse “power relations and their 
technologies” (Scheurich and McKenzie, 2005, p850), which is especially relevant 
to my inquiry as it is in space where inequalities are most explicitly produced and 
reproduced, as Brenner (2012) suggests. More importantly, in his seminal book 
Discipline and Punish: The Birth of the Prison, Foucault reconceptualised power 
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not just as the dispensation of domination – its most obvious function – but also as 
having what he termed “positive effects” ([1975] 1995, p23). Here, positive is not 
to be construed as the binary opposite of negative, or good versus bad, but rather 
an understanding of power as a social function, a creative force that produces 
something outside of the oppression it administers. To elaborate this view Foucault 
explores the history of the penal system and argues that it did not only administer 
punishment to the convicted, but also produced “correct behaviour” in the wider 
society (Scheurich and McKenzie, 2005, p854), which has much further-reaching 
and longer-lasting implications.  
 
Having first established the historical conditions of emergence of the ‘formal’, I 
investigated further the notion of ‘informality’ as a discursive practice, its inherent 
power relations and technologies, as well as how these are enabled by the positive 
effects of the formal – in other words, its power to normalise behaviour. This part of 
the inquiry thus deals mainly with aspects of what Kellner (2002) calls containment 
and stabilisation (see p10) or the re-production of dominant power, its sites and 
agencies. I approached contestation and struggle, the second aspect of necessary 
inquiry according to Kellner (see p10) as everyday resistance to the incessant re-
production of power and normativity, or what Brenner referred to as latent 
emancipatory possibilities (see p7). Returning to my aim of re-conceptualising 
‘informality’, I undertook an ethnographic study of the Herero Mall which, as I have 
outlined above (see p3), is conventionally designated an ‘informal market’ within a 
‘formal’ neighbourhood, and which embodies many of the socio-spatial legacies of 
Namibia’s colonial past. My own experience of being involved in a feasibility study 
for the formalisation of the mall has exposed me to the emptiness of the ‘informal’ 
designator, while being overwhelmed at the multiplicity of activities, relationships 
and spatial transformations occurring every day. As a mainstay of qualitative 
inquiry, ethnography provided me with suitable methods to better understand this 
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setting in its everyday life. In their introduction to the SAGE Handbook of Qualitative 
Research Denzin and Lincoln (2005) offer the following definition of qualitative 
research, which I found instructive:  
Qualitative research is a situated activity that locates the observer in the world. 
It consists of a set of interpretive, material practices that make the world visible. 
These practices transform the world. […] At this level, qualitative research 
involves an interpretive, naturalistic approach to the world. This means that 
qualitative researchers study things in their natural settings, attempting to make 
sense of, or interpret, phenomena in terms of the meanings people bring to 
them (2005, p3).  
This definition aligns with ANT in as far as it positions the researcher as an actor in 
the field (or network) – which was certainly true in my case – though Latour insists 
that the interpretation should be left to the actors, rather than the analyst (Latour, 
2005, p30). This is particularly important as my professional and cultural 
background simultaneously and continuously exposed me as an ‘outsider’ in this 
particular context.9 My presence at the Herero Mall was not too far removed from 
Denzin and Lincoln’s description of the traditional “lone ethnographer,” the white 
male researcher who studies the “native in a distant land” (Denzin and Lincoln, 
2005, p15). Yet, this land is only mentally distant: after all it is the city where I live 
and its inhabitants (including myself) that were at the centre of my interest. 
Furthermore, I had become an actor in the field long before this study commenced. 
The research thus has – by necessity – an autoethnographic subtext as I make 
sense of my own agency in this context and the power relations implicit in my 
interactions. Holman Jones contends that autoethnographic writing requires 
“demanding attention and participation. Implicating all involved. Refusing closure 
 
 
9  My particular background as Namibian citizen of German ancestry often stirred suspicions, 
unwarranted expectations or other sentiments that impact the interactions with traders and visitors of 
the market as will become clear from all that follows below. The lingering colonial history, especially the 
Genocide of Ovaherero and Nama by German colonial troops, which is currently at the centre of public 
debate in Namibia, affects inter-cultural dialogue. 
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or categorization” (Holman Jones, 2005, p767). This seems to overlap with Latour’s 
understanding of the researcher – through the act of writing – as mediator amongst 
other mediators (Latour, 2005, p39). But self-reflexivity was certainly never my 
foremost aim. Only through the process of engaging and reflecting on my 
involvement at the site did I become aware of this aspect of the work and began 
embracing its implications. Consequently, the ‘participatory’ aspect of the 
research, which was central to my original research proposal, transformed as I 
began to understand myself as an active agent in the setting. I was already 
participating. Yet, in order to overcome the strangeness of my presence at the site, 
to ‘pay’ for having access, and to fulfil my desire for producing transformation – this 
seems to be the innermost drive of an architect – I pursued a spatial intervention at 
the site in collaboration with the traders’ committee, or in other words building as 
method. This direct involvement allowed me to literally construct a – perhaps 
insignificant – assemblage, allowing a glimpse into what might constitute an 
emergent alter-urbanisation, and the potential for a critical spatial practice. 
 
As mentioned at the end of the previous section, this study was methodologically 
eclectic. I combined critical urban theory with Foucauldian discourse analysis, 
features of actor-network-theory and architectural practice. Figure 1 below 
synthesises the overall strategy through which the various methodological aspects 
of archaeology, genealogy, (auto)ethnography and spatial practice are brought 
into relation with each other, the questions that each raises and possible overlaps 
between them. This was done without the explicit desire to reconcile these 
seemingly incongruent methodologies as it was not my aim to pursue theoretical 
feuds. Instead, as part of the conclusion of the thesis, I aim to offer a reflection on 




Figure 1: Diagram of the methodological strategy of this research, which is also reflected in 
the structure of the four major chapters of the dissertation (Chapters 4-7). 
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1.6 Research design 
Informed by the theoretical framework and the methodological strategy, I 
approached the research project through a mix of qualitative methods in a single 
case study site that, as I have argued, embodies latent potential for different 
processes of urbanisation, and in which I was already embedded prior to this study. 
I conducted an extensive review of two major strands of literature to situate my 
study: firstly, debates on ‘informality’ from the definitions of the ‘informal sector’, to 
informalisation and ‘urban informality’; and secondly debates on spatial co-
production and its implications for architectural and spatial practice more widely, 
as well as its political dimension. These debates provided a set of coordinates for 
my empirical work and allowed higher abstraction of what was experienced on the 
ground. In addition, pointers from these debates informed the literature review on 
theory, methodological considerations and qualitative research methods 
presented in the previous section. I further conducted literature review to explore 
the historical production of space and power in the case of the Herero Mall in 
relation to Namibia’s and Windhoek’s particular socio-spatial development. This 
aimed to crystallise the Foucauldian conditions of emergence of the contemporary 
discourse of ‘urban informality’. 
 
In my empirical work I explored two spheres of inquiry that are investigated with 
different methods of data collection and analysis as laid out below: (1) the 
construction of discourse of ‘informality’ by professional spatial practitioners10 in 
the private, non-governmental and government sectors which are concerned with 
urban development; (2) the socio-spatial lived experience of the case study site as 
 
 
10  Throughout this thesis I use ‘professional spatial practitioners’ as a collective term for those who are 
professionally involved in the production of space, to distinguish them from all those who through their 
everyday activities are equally involved in producing and transforming space. 
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an actor-network. These two spheres are woven together, in autoethnographic 
fashion, by my own experience of the co-production of a spatial intervention with 
traders at the site, as a direct actor within an assemblage. Throughout the research, 
the methods remained preliminary, as they continued to be adapted, subject to the 
contingencies of the ongoing research dynamic. Methods included participant 
observation including conversations with traders and visitors at the site; semi-
structured interviews and spatial mapping with business operators at the site; in-
depth interviews with professional spatial practitioners; and construction of an 
architectural intervention at the site. As researcher I thus took up a role of 
methodological negotiator as well as mediator of differences, both between myself 
and traders, between traders individually, as well as collectively vis-a-vis ‘informal’ 
and established institutions including the HMTC, NGOs, the Windhoek municipality, 
and funders amongst others. I do recognise, however, that owing to the parameters 
of the doctoral research programme, I am here presenting the work under my sole 
authorship, with all the implications regarding representativity that this entails. 
1.7 Methods of data collection 
1.7.1 Participant observation 
Throughout the research I pursued extensive participant observation at the case 
study site. This allowed me to spend substantial time at the mall and interact with 
traders and visitors without always having a predefined agenda. I attempted as 
much as possible to cover different times of day, days of the week and months of 
the year. To deepen my understanding of the space, activities, as well as my own 
presence, I kept a detailed diary throughout the process. I do not speak 
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Otjiherero,11 the local lingua franca, so I was unable to follow most conversations 
that I was not involved in. Instead, I relied on English as the official language in 
Namibia, Afrikaans, which remains widely spoken, and surprisingly enough, 
German, which happens to be my mother tongue. Where translation was provided 
from Otjiherero to English or Afrikaans it would often seem partial, judged by the 
discrepancy between the extent of the original conversation and the brevity of the 
translation. This allowed people to determine the depth of information shared with 
me, requiring me to follow the traces of associations (Latour, 2005, p5) that I could 
perceive with more intent. Usually my presence raised interest, especially amongst 
visitors who do not expect ‘foreigners’ to spend time at the mall. I often had to 
explain that I am Namibian, and that I am collaborating with the traders’ committee 
on the development of the mall. That usually served well as an introduction, elicited 
the acknowledgment that I am indeed “from here”, and allowed conversations to 
flow more easily from there. As I took notes of the conversations as thoroughly as 
possible in my diary I also noted down my own observations on aspects of the 
surrounding context, including spatial distributions, material assemblages, 
activities, weather, soundscape, time of day, amongst others. These aspects thus 
relate largely to absolute space in Harvey’s matrix (see Table 1).  
1.7.2 Semi-structured interviews and spatial mapping with traders 
Secondly, I investigated the case of the Herero Mall with specific emphasis on its 
economic circulations, social relations and spatial dimensions. The chosen method 
here was a semi-structured interview with business operators at the mall, which 
combined quantitative with qualitative aspects. More conversational exchanges 
with traders, in addition to the interviews, were captured through participant 
 
 
11  Otjiherero is one of the multiple indigenous languages in Namibia spoken by the Ovaherero people. 
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observation, outlined above. I formally approached the traders’ committee to 
request its collaboration in the research and access to a sample of business 
operators at the mall. These included: food vendors; restaurants; shebeens;12 hair 
salons; shops; a car wash; a shoemaker / repairs; meat cutting / butchery. I 
selected the sample of operators partly through connections I had built up over 
time, especially with members of the traders’ committee, as well as snowball 
sampling based on suggestions by traders, or simply approaching a certain 
business with the request for it to participate in the research. The interview guide 
(see Appendices, p296) was largely informed by the literature on informal 
economies presented in the Literature Review below, as well as by conventional 
methods of architectural analysis including mapping and drawing of scaled, 
annotated, two-dimensional drawings. It was structured to cover aspects of 
demographics, economic activity, social relations, and spatial aspects of the 
business itself, as well as in relation to other businesses, the neighbourhood and 
other geographical sites and scales. Where applicable, I enquired how buildings 
were adapted over time. In addition to these questions, I asked permission to 
photograph the structure, which was not always granted. Finally, I asked 
respondents to draw up a timeline of their activities during the day to understand 
temporal rhythms. 
 
It was often difficult to keep to agreed times for interviews as business operators 
are very mobile and have to change plans on the go. This required flexibility on my 
part, and times of waiting were useful to pursue participant observation. The semi-
structured nature of the interview allowed me to generate somewhat comparable 
 
 
12  Shebeen is the popular name for (often unlicensed) bars. The word derives originally from the Irish 
language and is widely used in Southern Africa. Usually shebeens are to be found in former black 
townships, where they historically emerged as illicit alcohol outlets in residential houses to avoid colonial 
control of alcohol consumption. 
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data, though in practice the interview guide was not followed mechanically. Instead 
I allowed conversations to flow organically. The interviews generally took place at 
the business venue, and the interview guide allowed for interruptions as often 
operators had to attend to business activities. Research aims were explained to 
interviewees, emphasising the aspect of anonymity and protection of their data. 
Consent was sought verbally and noted on the interview guide. Conversations were 
conducted in English or Afrikaans, and often both, and were not recorded as that 
tended to raise some discomfort in this setting. Instead, I took notes on the spaces 
provided in the interview guide.  
 
In addition to the survey and documentation of a sample of individual businesses I 
mapped the larger area of Herero Mall. The aspects I mapped included built 
structures; spatial distributions and linkages; circulation and barriers; construction 
methods; institutional, economic and social linkages; shared infrastructure; and 
informal governance; amongst others. In terms of Harvey’s matrix, these mappings 
combine aspects of absolute space combined with aspects of relative space (see 
Table 1). I initially mapped these aspects in the form of two-dimensional sketches 
and in some instances involved traders at the field office to draw over and 
collectively improve the maps that I had developed, allowing us to refine the maps 
together. 
1.7.3 In-depth interviews with spatial practitioners 
To investigate the prevailing discourse on ‘urban informality’ I undertook in-depth 
interviews with practitioners, including two town planners, an architect, a housing 
advocate, a labour expert, an informal sector organiser, a municipal officer, a 
former local constituency councillor, and the former Mayor of the City of Windhoek.  
I was able to identify interviewees purposively – given the relatively small spatial 
practice field – selecting those who had been involved in participatory 
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development processes or had been working within settings of ‘informality’ in 
general or at the Herero Mall in particular. The interview guide (see Appendices, 
p299) was developed in relation to the relevant research question. Interviewees 
were first requested to share their personal background to help appreciate their 
professional rationalities, ethics and value systems. The questions that followed 
were slightly differentiated between those for spatial practitioners such as 
architects, town planners and housing advocates, and those of labour experts, 
informal sector activists, government officials and public office bearers, depending 
on their practice. 
 
Built environment practitioners were asked to describe their professional practice 
and the design process with a focus on projects for non-private clients, of a 
participatory nature or those involving sites of ‘informality’. Interviewees were also 
requested to reflect on what would need to change in the Namibian architectural 
and urban practice to facilitate engagement with such sites. Government officials 
and public office bearers were prompted on definitions of ‘informality’ and its 
perception amongst authorities and decision makers. They were asked to share 
examples where informal workers were accommodated in development processes 
and were questioned on the major challenges faced in their own work. Labour 
experts and informal sector activists were asked additional questions on how 
informal workers could strengthen their position within the politics of urban space, 
and what forms of organisation would be required. The interviews, most of which 
took between one and two hours, were conducted in English and recorded, while I 
took notes for later cross-checking. I transcribed the interviews verbatim and sent 
them to interviewees for verification. A participant information sheet (see 
Appendices, p294) and a consent form (see Appendices, p295) were signed and 
filed for reference. 
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1.7.4 Co-production of a spatial intervention at the site 
The fourth method can be best described as an architectural practice13 that aimed 
to co-produce a strategic spatial intervention with traders at the site. It was 
originally intended to develop self-built sanitation facilities at the mall, but in the 
meantime the municipality had installed a number of pre-cast concrete toilets, 
making this initiative redundant though enlightening, nonetheless. At the same 
time, to enable the practice of co-production, I aimed to have a permanent 
presence at the site by renting a vacant structure as my field office, where I had 
intended to spend much time working on the spatial intervention, as well as to use 
it as a meeting space and office for the traders’ committee. In 2017 I had received 
a GBP 2,000 (N$ 38,000)14 grant from the University of Westminster 125 Fund, 
which I had applied for to buy furniture and equipment for the office, which would 
later be transferred to the traders’ committee. As the structure was rented from one 
individual it became a bone of contention amongst traders, and the lease was 
cancelled. The proposal was changed to co-design and build an office and 
meeting space for the traders’ committee, which I could also use as field office 
during my research. I thus proposed to use the 125 Fund grant for buying building 
materials, while traders would contribute their labour. 
 
The practice of spatial co-production includes a broad spectrum of methods, 
including participatory mapping, meetings with committee members, two- and 
three-dimensional drawing, physical and virtual model building, on-site 
discussions on spatial design and construction methods, fund raising, mediation 
 
 
13  Architectural practice is here used in the sense that it has as a basic outlook the transformation of spatial 
and social realities. 
14  For comparative purposes I use the historical exchange rate of 1 GBP = 19 N$ (as of 1 December 2019) 
throughout this dissertation. Source: XE.com, accessed 08.03.2020 
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with local and governmental authorities, and external stakeholders, arranging 
workshops with resource persons, acquiring building materials, assisting during 
construction work, ad-hoc problem solving, archival research, letter writing and 
minute taking at committee meetings, availing technical expertise, drawing on my 
professional networks, and mobilising university students, amongst others. In other 
words, these activities could be traced as an actor-network and included my own 
agency as mediator of all these instances of practice. The documentation of the 
traces and assemblies is based on notes and document review from my personal 
archive of the process. 
1.8 Methods of data analysis 
As varied as my methods of data collection are the methods of analysis. Transcripts 
of in-depth interviews were processed using the HyperRESEARCH™ Qualitative 
Analysis Tool software in a process of open coding, grouping original quotes from 
the interviews arranged by their codes into two overall sections based on my 
research design: (A) understandings of ‘informality’; and (B) practices of co-
production. I proceeded to analyse quotes in terms of the way interviewees framed 
their understanding, how they related their practice, the explanations they provided 
and the references they used. Through an iterative process of re-reading, re-
writing, and cross-referencing with official statistics, media reports, policy 
frameworks and aspects of my literature review, I thus aimed to uncover 
conceptualisations of ‘informality’, inherent relations of power and their re-
production as discourse. 
 
Mappings and notes from participant observation, traders’ committee meetings, 
and conversations with committee members were transcribed and digitally coded 
to organise the data. Data gathered through semi-structured interviews with 
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business operators were processed by crafting a series of visual diagrams and 
maps that reflect spatial and economic logics, temporality, social relations, and 
aesthetic codes of individual businesses in relation to the mall, and wider territorial 
scales. This allowed me to visually construct the associations I was aiming to trace. 
My personal archive of the Herero Mall project from its initial beginning as 
professional consultancy was mined for additional data, including specifically my 
correspondence with the municipality on behalf of the traders’ committee, 
workshops with traders, and presentations to city officials and council members. 
Documentation of the design process and the construction of the traders’ 
committee office and meeting space was based on diary entries, design sketches 
and drawings, project-related documents and photographic documentation. In 
addition, I drew from memory, media reports and relevant literature to complement 
the data.  
 
Using this vast archive of traces, I used principles of actor-network-theory, and 
especially Latour’s understanding of “textual accounts” (Latour, 2005, p124) to 
develop a “thick description” (Patton, 2002, p437–40) – as ethnographers would 
have it – of associations between sites, mediators, intermediaries, agencies and 
scales. Latour criticises the distinction between description and explanation as 
another deceptive binary and instead calls for accounts that fully deploy – through 
text – the “networks that make possible a state of affairs” (Latour, 2005: 137). These 
textual accounts of the networks of associations have been iteratively reworked to 
slowly develop an alternative reading of ‘informality’ through lived experience and 
spatial practice. In a final step, ‘informality’ as discourse and as lived experience 
have been put into critical dialogue with each other to reveal the political 
implications for a post-colonial (alter)urbanisation in Namibia. 
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1.9 Ethical Considerations 
Ethical clearance for this study was obtained by the University of Westminster 
Architecture and the Built Environment Research Ethics Committee in June 2016 
and there have been no significant protocol changes during the project since then. 
The research was considered a Class 2 Application in terms of the University of 
Westminster Code of Practice Governing the Ethical Conduct of Research 2015-
2016. By definition Class 2 research might cause harm to participants, who in this 
particular case involve groups who are considered “vulnerable due to their social 
and economic situations” (University of Westminster, 2015). This is so because the 
Herero Mall is strictly speaking an illegal occupation of municipal land. Exposing 
the underlying socio-spatial dynamics through this research, and thereby making 
them visible to authorities, amongst others, could jeopardise people’s livelihoods. 
At the same time, most traders are registered with the municipality and have a 
representative committee that is acknowledged by the city council, which 
essentially confirms the intention of the municipal authorities to acknowledge 
traders as official stakeholders.  
 
My research participants included traders at the mall, represented by and 
contacted through HMTC, as well as other stakeholders identified during the 
feasibility study I had previously been involved in. They also included professional 
spatial practitioners in the private and public sector, many of whom I have 
professionally worked with in the past. In all cases informed consent was obtained 
through providing participants with a participant information sheet and a consent 
form. Consent was obtained either in writing by signing the form, or by providing 
verbal consent which was noted on the interview guides. Processing and storing 
of data were done mindful of the need to comply with the UK Data Protection Act 
of 1998. In writing this thesis I aimed to ensure strict anonymity to reduce the risk 
of negative impacts for individuals. To this end names have either been substituted 
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or interviewees are mentioned by their profession or role. In some cases, personal 
information about participants has been provided, but only where it was necessary 
to contextualise their social or professional background. Furthermore, care was 
taken not to disclose any information that could prove harmful or disadvantageous 
to participants in any way. Finally, as I made use of images and maps from the 
National Archives of Namibia, I am expected to make a copy of this thesis available 
to the Archives upon its publication.  
1.10 Structure of the dissertation 
The dissertation is structured in eight chapters. In Chapter 1 I introduced the 
rationale and central aims and research questions of the thesis; I situated the 
research theoretically and laid out the methodological considerations that inform 
the methods of data collection and analysis. I argue that critical urban theory 
provides a useful framing for this particular qualitative and action-oriented inquiry 
and outline its implications for the empirical work that follows.  
 
In Chapter 2 I present a reading of the literature on ‘urban informality’ and spatial 
co-production, which have emerged as the central themes of the study. I argue 
that while conceptualisations of ‘informality’ continue developing and gaining 
depth, they remain inadequate for understanding contexts such as the one I have 
been investigating. Similarly, I argue why spatial co-production, for all its 
democratic values, continues to conceal uneven power-relations in the urban realm 




15  I follow here Allen’s conceptualisation of emancipation as “minimization of relations of domination” 
instead of “a social world without or beyond power relations” (Allen, 2016: xiv). 
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In Chapter 3 I introduce the Herero Mall. I argue why I consider the mall a 
paradigmatic case for understanding dynamics of contemporary urbanisation in 
Windhoek and Namibia more generally. 
 
In Chapter 4 I outline the conditions of emergence of the ‘informal’ as discourse 
that is rooted in the unequal development of the colonial project, both spatially and 
socially. Departing from a territorial analysis I focus on Windhoek’s urban 
development and the emergence of ‘informal’ urbanisation during the process of 
decolonisation, as well as the dominant policy response. I argue that inherited 
colonial spatial logic is re-produced and entrenched and position professional 
spatial practice within this process. 
 
In Chapter 5 I investigate the ‘informal’ as discursive practice. Here I aim to expose 
how professional spatial practitioners construct discourse on ‘informality’ to lay 
bare its inherent power relations and technologies. I argue that in Namibia the 
discourse of ‘informality’ has taken on the particular function of delegitimising and 
marginalising the urban poor – the largely black majority of urban residents. 
 
In Chapter 6 I return to the field to excavate notions of ‘informality’ as lived 
experience. A thick description of everyday life at the Herero Mall allows us to 
overcome binary conceptualisations of formality vs ‘informality’ that I have argued 
are not only imprecise as concepts, but also reproduce unequal power relations 
within the socio-spatial development of the city. I argue that the world of the 
‘informal’ and its everyday practices can be understood as a form of resistance 
against the capitalist and neo-colonialist enclosure of all spheres of life. 
 
In Chapter 7 I trace my own professional involvement in a process of co-production 
of a spatial intervention at the site over the past seven years. I reflect on my 
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changing role within the network of actors at the mall on the potential and limitations 
of a critical spatial practice in a context of uneven development.  
 
In Chapter 8 I conclude on my contribution to critical urban theory and spatial 
practice in answering the research questions. I reflect on the relationship between 
the discourse of ‘informality’ and everyday practices of resistance in the context of 
post-colonial urbanisation in Namibia and consider the opportunities and 
constraints that this context offers to the practice of architecture. Finally, I outline 




CHAPTER 2 LITERATURE REVIEW 
2.1 The problematique of informality16 
2.1.1 Informal sector: a contentious label 
The concept of the “informal sector” emerged in the early 1970s (Chen, 2012; 
Skinner, 2008; AlSayyad, 2004; Meagher, 1995; Simon, 1984). According to Chen 
(2012) it was believed in the 1950s and 60s that the development of the economy 
would eventually absorb traditional low-income economies by generating sufficient 
formal jobs. Meagher contends that this “marginalist” view of the informal sector, 
both in neoliberal and Marxist writings, was based on three basic assumptions: that 
the informal sector would be transitory and that development would lead to a 
modern, capitalist economy; that it would provide only subsistence-level activities; 
and that it would be primarily a feature of peripheral economies. This view was 
challenged in the 1970s as firstly state-led development failed to generate a 
growing and efficient modern sector; and secondly as informal activities were on 
the increase throughout developing and developed countries, which suggested 
potential for economic dynamism in an environment of formal sector recession and 
disintegration (Meagher, 1995, p261). It appeared that instead of an increase in 
formal employment, what took place was a rise in unemployment and under-
employment in developing countries.  
 
In a seminal anthropological study on low-income activities in Accra, Ghana, Keith 
Hart coined the term “informal sector”. He made a distinction between the formal 
 
 
16  In the literature review chapter, I suspend the use of scare quotes for informal and informality as these 
terms are widely used in the literature that is presented here. 
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and informal sectors based on types of employment (i.e. wage-earning or self-
employment respectively). He described how the urban poor often engaged in 
petty capitalism as a substitute for formal wage employment which was 
inaccessible (Hart, 1973). By 1972 the Kenya Employment Mission of the 
International Labour Organisation (ILO) had adopted the term and found the 
informal sector produced profitable and efficient economies (Chen, 2012, p5). This 
shift of focus to forms of production within informal settings popularised by the ILO 
gained widespread traction because it offered the possibility of “helping the poor 
without a major threat to the rich” (Bromley, 1979, p1036). This suited the context 
of global neo-liberal reform of the 1970 and 1980s and its promise of a de-
politicised, inclusive development. Castells and Portes, rejecting marginalist 
notions, offered the following definition of the informal economy: 
[…] it is unregulated by the institutions of society, in a legal and social 
environment in which similar activities are regulated […] by which we 
understand the explicit, active intervention of the state in the process and 
outcome of income-generating activities, on the basis of a set of enforceable 
legal rules (Castells and Portes, 1989, p12–13). 
Chen (2012) formulates four main schools of thought with regard to informal 
economies: Firstly, the “dualist school”, which postulates that the informal sector is 
composed of marginal activities that are separated or weakly linked to the formal 
sector and providing income and a fall-back for the poor in times of hardship. This 
school proposes that governments create more jobs and lend business support to 
the informal sector. Secondly, the “structuralist school”, which argues that the 
informal sector is inherent to the late capitalist development in an overall process 
of precarisation of labour to reduce labour costs, benefitting large capitalist 
economic players. This proposes that governments address the uneven 
relationship between big businesses and smaller producers by regulating 
commercial and employment relationships. Thirdly, the “legalist school”, which 
puts forward the idea that small traders choose to engage in the informal sector to 
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avoid costs, time and formal registration. This view maintains that a 
streamlined/simplified bureaucratic system and granting of property rights would 
incorporate workers into the formal sector. Finally, the “voluntarist school” also 
holds that the decision to operate within the informal sector is indeed voluntary, but 
it does not attribute this to prohibitive registration procedures. It suggests that 
informal enterprises be formalised in order to increase the tax base and reduce 
competition to formal businesses (2012, p4–6). Chen further argues that although 
there is merit to all the above perspectives, the “informal economy as a whole is 
more heterogeneous and complex than the sum of these perspectives would 
suggest” (2012, p6). Skinner (2008) calls on us to understand how the different 
perspectives add to a better understanding of informality. According to her, while 
the structuralists remind us how those working in the informal sector are integrally 
linked to the overall economy, the legalists focus on how the mechanisms of the 
state impact on the sector (2008, p4). 
 
While the structuralist analysis of informality sees the informal as part of the wider 
capitalist development, its crisis and reincarnations, it perpetuates a conceptual 
duality. Such a binary understanding remains problematic as it does not 
correspond with the lived experience in my own work at the Herero Mall. 
Boundaries between informal traders, owners of informal businesses, some of 
whom are employed in the formal economy, registered traders and formal 
enterprises supplying informal ones are blurry and cannot account sufficiently for 
what is going on. On first sight formal and informal seem to be easily 
distinguishable, especially on a visual level, but once one scratches the surface 




2.1.2 Informalisation: from sector to process 
Early on, scholars insisted that understanding informality as an independent sector 
is not very insightful. Meagher (1995) criticised the two neoliberal perspectives 
(legalist and dualist) of the 1970s: one treated the informal sector as victim of 
excessive state intervention, while the other, favoured by the ILO, stressed that 
besides prohibitive state intervention, the weaknesses within the sector itself, 
including low incomes, low productivity and limited skills and technology, narrowed 
its growth irrespective of deregulation. The ILO prescription thus called for “more 
rather than less state intervention” (1995, p262). According to Meagher both these 
views lack an understanding of the operation and impact of linkages with the formal 
sector as well as an analysis of class relations within the informal sector (1995, 
p263). She positions the structuralist “informalisation” perspective as a theoretical 
framework for better understanding the informal sector, instead of reducing it to a 
marginalised economic activity. This essentially amounts to a shift in focus from 
“informality as a sector to informalisation as a process” (1995, p260), which 
requires analysis in terms of its historical socio-economic and political aspects. She 
further contends that informality should not be analysed as a result of inadequate 
state policy, but rather in light of shifting possibilities for accumulation – and I would 
add dispossession – within a context of global economic crisis (1995, p261).  
 
This notion of informality as a way to deal with a crisis of capitalist accumulation is 
echoed by others, like Hart (2015), who more recently revisited his earlier stance 
on the informal economy as the formal economy’s other, which had originally 
established the idea of a formal and informal duality. Forty years later he holds that 
the neoliberal revolution of the 1970s and 1980s saw the entire world economy 
becoming informal in the sense that there is no more political control over the 
money economy, as was the case in the period of what he calls “national 
capitalism” (2015, p39). He argues that deregulation caused the rapid expansion 
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of the informal economy, now embedded everywhere from informal street vending 
to multinational corporate tax evasion (2015, p39). Neoliberal deregulation had a 
large impact in Africa. Under the so-called Washington Consensus, emerging 
African states were required to undergo Structural Adjustment Programmes (SAPs) 
in return for accessing foreign debt. These prescribed the devaluation of 
currencies, privatisation of state entities, elimination of import controls and food 
subsidies, cost-recovery in health and education and radical shrinking of the public 
sector (Davis, 2007, p153). However, contrasting the predictions of increasing 
growth, SAPs increased poverty and inequality and thus the need for people to find 
alternative livelihoods. This liberalisation of African economies also led to 
increasing imports of consumer goods, many of which were sold through informal 
traders (Skinner, 2008, p6). This in part explains why, unlike in Latin America and 
more industrialised countries where subcontracting to informal enterprises 
occurred, informal economies in Africa were generally subsistence-level activities 
(Meagher, 1995, p266). Instead of depending largely on local raw materials, as 
was commonly believed, the informal sector often heavily relies on supplies from 
the formal sector and is thus subject to the global economy as a whole (1995, 
p276). 
 
However, understanding the linkages between informal and formal are more 
complex than simply tracing supply chains. In the early 2000s the definition of the 
“informal sector” was expanded to include “informal employment” – non-regulated 
and non-socially protected labour relations – in addition to the (lack of) legal 
regulation of the enterprise. Two main categories of informal employment exist: 
informal self-employment and informal wage employment (Chen, 2012: 7–9). The 
Women in Informal Employment: Globalizing and Organizing (WIEGO) network 
defines six employment statuses: informal employers; informal employees; own 
account operators; casual wage workers; industrial outworkers / subcontracted 
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homeworkers; and unpaid family workers. This is visualised by distinguishing these 
categories according to average earnings, poverty risk and sex (Figure 2). On the 
basis of these considerations Chen offers the following definition of the informal 
economy: 
The informal sector refers to the production and employment that takes place 
in unincorporated small or unregistered enterprises; informal employment 
refers to employment without legal and social protection–both inside and 
outside of the informal sector; and informal economy refers to all units, 
activities, and workers so defined and the output from them (2012, p8). 
Such classifications help to avoid, as Meagher cautions, the misleading tendency 
to view the informal sector as an undifferentiated pool of entrepreneurs, rather than 
understanding the inherent social stratifications. Genuine entrepreneurs, she 
argues, only make up about 20 percent of African informal economies. Only those 
who have access to a minimum level of skills and capital hold the potential for 
accumulation. These social, physical and financial resources are usually available 
to the employed, thus further challenging the assumption that the informal sector 
provides a launch pad for the unemployed to prosper (Meagher, 1995, p268). 
 












Informal wage workers: casual






Others argue that even these expanded classifications are limited by their implicit 
perpetuation of the formal as the universal yardstick of development. Ferguson and 
Li (2018) argue that the concept of “the proper job” has lost currency as the 
culmination of the grand development narrative, which is steeped in “transition 
thinking” that imagines everyone to ultimately transition into formal economic and 
social formations. Yet while transition narratives have been widely discredited in 
academic literature, and the likelihood of obtaining formal employment in many 
parts of the world is rapidly diminishing due to neoliberal restructuring, the 
globalisation of production and distribution processes, as well as mechanisation 
and automation, amongst other phenomena. They note that the broad term 
“precarity”, aiming to capture everything besides formal employment, all too often 
tends to rely on negative analytical categories focusing on what something is not: 
“unemployment, informal economy, non-standard employment, instability, 
insecurity” (2018, p1–2, original emphasis). 
 
Instead, Ferguson and Li propose a list of questions for inquiry based on a political-
economic analytical framework that “foregrounds unequal access to resources, 
and attends to how socially-situated subjects sustain, navigate and transform 
power-laden meanings and practices in diverse and dynamic ways” (2018, p19). 
These questions include transforming dynamics of work, uses of land, access to 
livelihood resources, forms of social membership and the politics that emerge out 
of all those. This thinking emerges from ethnographic work undertaken in Southern 
Africa, and it requires, according to Ferguson (2015), emphasising the role of 
“distribution” in addition to “production”, which most Marxist analyses continue to 
prioritise over all else. According to him, common sense linkages of production and 
spatial and social organisation are increasingly coming under strain. His central 
argument is that people that are no longer integrated into systems of production 
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are increasingly busy with advancing systems of distribution and making claims on 
the income of others (2015, p89). 
 
With the effects of neoliberal global reforms, increasing deregulation and the retreat 
of the state becoming more visible in the 1980s and 90s, scepticism regarding the 
independence of the informal sector as a marginal economic activity grew. 
Evidence suggested that the informal economy was growing despite formal 
economic growth in more developed countries, while in many sub-Saharan African 
countries induced economic liberalisation and downsizing of the public sector led 
to the dramatic rise of the informal economy to fill the increasing income gap. These 
on-going dynamics, linkages to the formal economy, the role of the state and 
internal social stratifications amongst informal workers were studied increasingly 
as process rather than as a sector. Clearer distinctions in informal employment 
allowed the debunking of optimistic views that the informal economy would allow a 
surge of entrepreneurialism that would lift people out of poverty. 
2.1.3 Urban informality: from exclusion to inclusion and back 
Only towards the end of the 20th century have the spatial dimensions of informality 
been more widely discussed. Al Sayyad (2004) defines urban informality at the 
beginning of the 21st century as set of “practices” that have emerged in response 
to global economic liberalisation in various third world contexts (2004, p8). He 
argues that informality should be seen as a “mode of urbanism” which resembles 
patterns of urban behaviour and exchange of the middle ages, “made of 
segregated enclaves, […] dominated by militarisation, religious ideologies, and the 
maintenance of political structures that govern through patronage, division, and 
economic oppression” (2004, p27). He states: 
Perhaps it is time, then, to come to terms with the idea that formality may be 
the ‘new’ mode — that it was introduced to organise urban society only in the 
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nineteenth century. In this regard, many features of the formal / informal 
dichotomy may owe their origin to unresolved issues in this historical process 
(2004, p25). 
Watson describes how modernist ideology, aiming to rationally design social order 
in ways that matched positivist natural science, developed with the emergence of 
early modern statecraft in western societies. This ideology was subsequently 
applied in colonial and postcolonial territories, where “development and 
modernisation came to mean the same thing” (Watson, 2003, p396). Ferguson and 
Li (2018) have argued how in this process “the proper job” has become a “widely 
shared social ideal and expectation” influencing everything from social structures, 
the organisation of time and space, formal education, values of respectability and 
virtue, as well as contribution to the nation (2018, p1). 
 
Skinner elaborates that colonial urban planning approaches are often very 
persistent as they are deeply engrained in legislation, regulatory frameworks and 
everyday practice. Most African cities, she holds, inherited patterns of spatial 
segregation between the rich and the poor and many perceive informality as the 
representation of under-development. This fosters strong “anti-informality 
sentiments” at national and local government level, and the disappearance of 
informality is equated with progress (Skinner, 2008, p11). Similar to AlSayyad, 
Simone characterises modernisation of African cities as a “truncated process” 
which “has never fully consolidated apparatuses of definition capable of enforcing 
specific and consistent territorial organisations of the city” (Simone, 2004, p409). 
At times, national states have established punitive systems of control over informal 
trade. In apartheid South Africa, and by extension in Namibia, the state established 
a complex web of national and local laws effectively banning street trading and 
other informal activities (Skinner, 2008; Simon, 1984). Similarly, in socialist Tanzania 
a penal code was enacted in the 1980s “that branded all self-employed people as 
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unproductive, idle and disorderly” (Skinner, 2008, p9). But forced removals of 
informal traders are also a recurring aspect of most postcolonial African cities, 
ranging from large-scale evictions to perpetual harassment, and extraction of 
police bribes and other forms of corruption. The latter aspect highlights the 
systemic problem of often underpaid local officials in many African cities (2008, 
p10). Skinner reminds us that besides making a considerable economic 
contribution to local economies, it should be appreciated from a planning 
perspective that informal trade contributes to the functioning of cities that often lack 
appropriate services in the poorest areas (2008, p17). 
 
Exactly how this contribution looks in its most extreme form becomes evident in 
Koolhaas et al.’s investigations on Lagos (2000). They attest that the city has a 
“near-complete absence of those infrastructures, systems, organizations, and 
amenities that define the word city in terms of Western planning methodology” 
(2000, p652). This void has been filled with alternative systems that defy the notion 
of order, yet in the words of the author produce “large-scale efficacy” and thus turn 
Lagos into the representation of “a city at the forefront of globalizing modernity” 
(2000, p653). They sketch how spatial boundaries remain constantly in flux and 
property lines are subject to continuous re-negotiation based on overlaps of “land 
laws, taxes, claims, and interests” (2000, p661). In this scenario, public space and 
decaying modernist urban infrastructure are appropriated in various ways for 
entrepreneurial and industrial activities. What modernist rationality would deem 
inefficient, such as the “go-slow” or perpetual traffic jam, and various infrastructural 
“bottlenecks”, is here presented as economic opportunity (2000, p685). Such 
rather journalistic accounts of urban informality, always on the search for the 
spectacular, stimulate a rethinking of the way we understand the city itself. They 
do not, however, add to the understanding of that which is deemed to be ‘new’. 
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Nevertheless, the notion of informality as emerging practice resonates with 
Simone’s understanding of “people as infrastructure” (2004). He notes that 
infrastructure is usually understood in physical terms “as reticulated systems of 
highways, pipes, wires, or cables” (2004, p407). This is essentially a modernist 
view of how the city is efficiently structured, reproduced and its inhabitants, 
resources and spaces are partitioned, and accounted for. Based on ethnographic 
work in inner-city Johannesburg, he proposes extending the notion of infrastructure 
to include that which provides a platform for the reproduction of city life: “the ability 
of residents to engage complex combinations of objects, spaces, persons, and 
practices” (2004, p407). He claims that an “experience of regularity capable of 
anchoring the livelihoods of residents and their transactions with one another is 
consolidated precisely because the outcomes of residents’ reciprocal efforts are 
radically open, flexible, and provisional” (2004, p408). Again, Simone’s reflections 
destabilise and offer a negative critique to the dominant discourse, but they remain 
largely silent on what this might mean for an urban politics. 
 
Yet, expanding the boundaries of what is knowable has its own function within 
capitalist development. Roy (2015) observes the increasing global inclusion of the 
poor, or what she calls “the bottom billion”, into modes of capitalist accumulation 
based on their entrepreneurialism. Financialisation, through ubiquitous micro-
finance loans is one means through which the poor are integrated as new untapped 
markets. The second means is based on the legalist school of thought represented 
by de Soto who asserts that the poor already hold assets, which only need to be 
legalised in order for them to enable the poor’s participation in property markets. 
This is most commonly achieved through land titling to secure residents’ tenure 
rights in informal settlements, the efficacy of which remains contested (2015, p65). 
Roy further argues that for capitalism to expand in such ways requires poverty to 
be made visible and accessible first. This, according to her, is often achieved with 
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the help of urbanists and architects like Rem Koolhaas who see “great potential” in 
the experimental, creative and even emancipatory appropriations of the informal 
city and make this potential visible (2015, p65). 
 
Given the tensions between mental conceptions of what is modern and backward, 
local authority approaches to urban informality vary widely, especially with regards 
to informal trade in streets and public spaces. Generally, authorities either attempt 
to rid cities of such informal activities through law enforcement, or they tolerate 
them implicitly (Bromley, 2000). Both stances expose informal workers to 
uncertainty, harassment and possible victimisation and only a few cities have 
coherent policies that safeguard the interests of informal workers (Chen, 2012, 
p14). Bromley also points to the fact that there is often a large discrepancy between 
high-level aims of administrators and politicians, and street-level implementation. 
The complexity of regulating and supporting street vendors is staggering, not least 
by the vast number of actors involved, while the function of undertaking these tasks 
is often delegated to the lowest ranks of officials. He further raises the issue of the 
complex sets of regulations that are neither fully known to vendors nor inspectors 
and police at street level, often leading to ad hoc enforcement (Bromley, 2000, 
p17–20). Skinner further points to the aspect of decentralisation and frequent 
personnel changes in local authorities: often a tough response to informality is a 
popular way to “impress the public” (Skinner, 2008, p9).  
 
However, despite the high levels of informality in many cities in the Global South, 
urban development cannot be seen as simply beyond state control. Meagher 
stresses that ambiguous or incoherent policy mixed with partial or no enforcement 
is partly to blame for informalisation (Meagher, 1995, p277). Roy goes much further, 
and distinguishes between lack of order, and suspension of order, in that:  
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[…] the planning and legal apparatus of the state has the power to determine 
when to enact this suspension [of order], to determine what is informal and 
what is not, and to determine which forms of informality will thrive and which 
will disappear (Roy, 2005, p149).  
In Windhoek this observation holds true though it is not agricultural land that turns 
into informal settlements, but rather municipal land that was planned as reception 
areas or public open spaces, where informal settlement is tolerated whilst awaiting 
future upgrading. So, although the municipal authority in Windhoek has a wide-
ranging regulatory framework, and stringent byelaws, it selectively suspends such 
apparatuses in capitulation before the huge task (and expense) of instituting order. 
 
A typical policy response to street vending, which both aims to promote and 
regulate the sector, is to move traders into off-street dedicated markets (Bromley, 
2000, p18). This is also the case in Namibia including in Windhoek where a number 
of municipal markets have been developed over the years, as well as in other 
localities such as Oshakati, Ondangwa, and Tsumeb. However, often land availed 
for markets is not situated where informal trade would naturally occur and neglects 
the importance of pedestrian traffic through the area, which is widely regarded as 
crucial for informal trade (Mati, 2012; Skinner, 2008; Bromley, 2000). When traders 
are moved into the new premises, other informal traders appropriate their original 
space in the city. More sensitive approaches deal with informality where it exists. 
Following Skinner, trader-supporting infrastructure as a minimum should provide 
shelter, storage space and ablution facilities. The right to operate, through licences, 
further secures traders’ livelihoods and allows them to invest in their trading areas 
and is this a central requirement for improving the management of public spaces 
(Skinner, 2008, p12). Related to this Bénit-Gbaffou (2015) describes recent 
legislation in India which requires authorities to register all existing traders and 
adhere to the notion of “natural markets” i.e. to develop markets where there is 
already a concentration of traders (2015, p30). 
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Despite the various views provided above, urban informality continues to defy clear 
definition, classification and consensus. What Castells and Portes argued more 
than 30 years ago holds true: it is far more clear what informality is not (1989, p12). 
More clarity exists around the state response to informality, which swings between 
the outer poles of the exclusion-inclusion continuum. In a fractured field of enduring 
modernist and colonial idioms, partial state formation, conflicting policy 
landscapes, differentiated implementation and economic globalisation, urban 
residents are taking matters into their own hands, appropriating various forms of 
commons in the process. Often, well-meant responses of creating dedicated 
markets are counter-productive, and the notion of natural markets, pioneered in 
India, is one step to acknowledge residents’ inherent agency in the making of cities. 
2.1.4 Informality: an ideological representation 
The ways in which societies compose and invent themselves in the present 
(the creativity of practice) is always ahead of knowledge produced about them 
Mbembe and Nuttall (2004, p349). 
The above shows that it remains futile to define informality as a condition, and that 
for it to be re-conceptualised, as I aim to do using a critical urban theory lens, 
requires a critique of ideology (see Brenner, p7). This deserves a detour into the 
discussion of the city as concept. Wachsmuth (2014) revealed how the “city as self-
contained system”, one among three tropes of the traditional concept of the city 
with provenance in northern theory, continues to exist as an “ideological 
representation” in urban studies and the everyday lives of citizens, long after it has 
lost its power as analytical framework (2014, p81). He expands on how the concept 
of the city benefits capitalist elites and thus reveals their political dimension. Critical 
geography, in his view, should aim at exposing how these concepts are used to 
exploit and marginalise the majority of urban citizens. In respect of workers, whom 
  
45 
he claims know why and how they are exploited in the factory, a similar clarity of 
dynamics of exploitation does not exist in popular understandings of the city. 
Wachsmuth here points to an important disjuncture between a “category of 
analysis” and “category of practice” (2014, p76). In other words, a disjuncture 
between understanding urbanisation, and its lived experience. In relation to the 
topic of this thesis this means that while informality is commonly perceived to be a 
condition, it does not follow from this that it can be analysed only as condition. 
 
Negri (2008) maintains that indeed the metropolis, not the city – which he deems a 
rear-guard vision of a false identarianism – has today become a “source of 
production: the organized, inhabited, and traversed territory, has become a 
productive element, just as worked land once was” (2008, p35–36). He argues that 
from this arises the possibility of a “common”, which is neither the “private” of 
capitalism, nor the “public” or monopolised state ownership of socialism, but which 
is about “communal management” of public goods (2008, p38). Negri asserts that 
the left, however, is entirely unable to engage positively with these emergent 
realities as they go beyond established tropes of working-class struggle rooted in 
industrial capitalism and wage labour. He argues that a metropolitan politics will 
increasingly be linked to common services, housing and other issues to do with 
social reproduction (2008, p219). The notion of a metropolitan or urban production 
requires us to question the role of ‘informality’ within this overall production. 
 
According to Ferguson (2015), who is another voice calling for revisiting ossified 
theoretical conceptualisations in the light of contemporary urbanisation, Africa’s 
rapidly expanding cities are largely characterised by inhabitants “who lack both 
land and formal-sector jobs and who improvise complex and contingent livelihoods 
through a combination of petty trade, hustling, casual labor, smuggling, 
prostitution, begging, theft, seeking help from relatives or lovers, and so on” (2015, 
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p91). Much of these miscellaneous livelihood strategies are being captured under 
the label informal, while according to him their pervasiveness makes such a label 
increasingly redundant as it offers little insight into what is happening, rather than 
what is not happening. What emerges from ethnographic research across the 
Southern African region is that these livelihoods are generally very precarious and 
require constant “flexible improvisation” (2015, p93), and thus suit the 
understanding of survivalist strategies rather than entrepreneurial manoeuvres. 
However, he argues that more than about producing things for sale, such survival 
is often more about “securing distributive outcomes” (2015, p94). He shows how in 
Southern Africa anyone who receives an income in money will likely be faced with 
legitimate claims on that money from others, whether family or not. This explains, 
according to him, how so many people without any visible income are able to 
survive through what he calls “relations of dependence”. However, the ability to 
make such distributive claims requires “social labour” to build and sustain social 
relationships that provide the basis for the legitimacy of such claims: this he calls 
“distributive labour” (2015, p97). This definition does neither align with idealisations 
of teeming entrepreneurialism on the right nor with imaginations of a shared class 
consciousness on the left. He contends that just like production, distribution is not 
just about quantitative distribution of resources, but involves social processes, 
social relations and institutions. In Southern Africa incomes are distributed in such 
ways through vast geographical and social spaces through “petty reciprocities” 
(2015, p100–103). The question then arises why such practices are conventionally 
labelled as informal. 
 
The hypothesis I would like to advance here, following Wachsmuth (2014), is that 
‘informality’, widely perceived to be the modern (formal) city’s ‘other’, is a pseudo 
concept that endures as an ideological representation – i.e. the negation of the 
formal – while it has little purchase as an analytical framework. The concept 
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remains too invested in negative connotations about physical environments – in 
other words emphasising the condition of informality (Marx and Kelling, 2019) – 
drawing on Victorian definitions of slums, poverty and disease as many suggest 
(Varley, 2013; Mbembe and Nuttall, 2004). If, according to Brenner, critical urban 
theory aims to “excavate possibilities for alternative, radically emancipatory forms 
of urbanism that are latent, yet systematically suppressed” within contemporary 
cities (Brenner, 2012, p19), perhaps shifting the focus towards dynamics of 
distribution, as Ferguson (2015) is suggesting, will allow us to gain deeper 
understandings of what is at play.  
2.1.5 Conclusion: a binary that isn’t 
In this section I sketched the emergence of informality as a concept in urban theory 
and aimed to expose its inherent limitations. Most scholars continue to reinforce its 
opposition to the formal, with its positive connotations of order, modernity, and 
progress, however partial and uneven these have materialised in different parts of 
the world. The rise of the informal economy is often related to the evolution of late 
capitalism, feted by some as opening up new frontiers of economic growth. Others 
laud the ingenuity of people to survive in the face of poverty, underdevelopment 
and state repression. But the concept does not hold water in the face of the lived 
experience of cities in the Global South and North alike: it has not yet enabled 
theorisation beyond what it is not.  
 
This raises the question of who benefits from the perpetuation of this muddle. The 
hypothesis I advance here is that the informal is a seemingly de-politicised 
category that is useful to perpetuate colonial legacies of inequality while promising 
its eventual disappearance once all developmental plans and visions have been 
successfully implemented. It allows inclusion and exclusion – in other words to 
govern – without upsetting capital accumulation to continue unabated. I will deal 
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with this aspect in CHAPTER 5 of this dissertation. The second question that arises 
is how the processes and conditions described as informal could be 
conceptualised differently, without setting them apart from that which is knowable, 
measurable and thus formal. This will be the focus of CHAPTER 6. 
2.2 Positioning spatial co-production 
2.2.1 Architecture, participation and the false notion of consensus 
Cohen claims that the 20th century more generally saw the democratisation of 
architecture through the modernist project, though clearly this assessment is based 
on a global north experience. Certainly, the “field has expanded” (Cohen, 2012, 
p10) and architects have worked for wider social groups than ever before, 
especially through large-scale housing and public infrastructure developments of 
some parts of the industrialised and developing world. However, the explosion of 
architectural production during the 20th century, especially in welfare state 
contexts, has also firmly established the distinction between the expert or 
professional, and the common inhabitant, whose influence in the shaping of their 
urban surroundings decreased by the increasing scale and pace of development. 
Blundell-Jones et al. argue that modernisation has meant “removing people from 
decisions” and lead to their alienation. Furthermore, the representation of 
architecture in mass media exacerbates the general public's engagement with 
architecture on the aesthetic dimension which renders them passive consumers 
rather than what the authors call “active doers and makers” (Blundell-Jones, 
Petrescu and Till, 2005, pxiii–xvii). 
 
This divergence ultimately led to the widespread critique of modernism in the West. 
De Carlo ([1970] 2005) succinctly synthesised this in his seminal text Architecture's 
Public, pointing to the alignment of architects with the worldview of those in power 
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because of its dependence on money, land and authority to pursue their practice. 
This, he argues, permitted architects to solely deal with the “problems of how”, 
while leaving the “problems of why” unanswered ([1970] 2005, p5). According to 
him the Modernist Movement with all its formal commitment to the cause of the 
largest number did not overcome this inherent contradiction and propagated elite 
cultural and aesthetic codes. Modern architects were simply providing answers to 
pressing questions or capitalist development by developing ever more 
(cost)efficient solutions to urbanisation and housing ([1970] 2005, p6–8). More 
recently and in another context, Roy is of the view that planners tend to focus on 
utilitarian questions of where things belong, while disregarding the question of to 
whom things belong. She offers Lefebvre’s “right to the city” as a useful way to think 
about informality, emphasising use value over exchange value (Roy, 2005, p155). 
 
Participation, a seeming tautology in a democratic system, has since made its 
inroads in local governance from municipal budgeting to urban development, 
largely in order to achieve legitimacy in developmental projects (Mayer, 2010). 
However, participation and democracy are not necessarily the same and the need 
to define progressive participatory development - working with rather than for the 
citizenry - is critical. According to Blundell-Jones et al. participation is often 
accepted uncritically, based on idealised notions of consensus. These authors 
denote the important difference between the demands of clients (those with money 
and power) and usually represented by architects and other professionals, and the 
desires of users that conventionally have little influence on the spatial surroundings 
they find themselves in (Blundell-Jones, Petrescu and Till, 2005, pxiv: xiv). Till 
argues that conventional architectural practice resigns itself to an idealised notion, 
best represented by the Vitruvian triad - commodity, firmness and delight - the 
purity of which is “threatened” by the disorderliness of user participation. 
According to him, participation brings forward the “moment of reality” into the 
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design process and thus threatens normative architectural culture (Till, 2005, p29–
30). He proposes that architects “must project themselves into the spatial context, 
physical and social, of the user” (2005, p31–33) or become organic intellectuals in 
the way Gramsci defined it. Participation thus opens up a political space of 
negotiation of the individual with the collective – or the personal with the social – to 
collectively define a better vision. 
 
The reluctance of architects to deal with the political dimension of space and the 
urban persists until today. Cruz and Forman propose that “at this moment, it is not 
buildings, but the fundamental reorganization of socio-economic relations that 
must ground the expansion of democratization and urbanization” (2015, p209). For 
architectural practice this means to redirect architectural culture and its inherent 
value systems that are biased against the messy reality of politics (Blundell-Jones, 
Petrescu and Till, 2005, pxv) and have their own, professionally coded language 
and representation which generally obscure the design process to outsiders (Till, 
2005, p28). For de Carlo participation transforms architectural planning from an 
authoritarian act into a process that begins with the identification of users’ needs, 
through the formulation of organisational hypotheses and then the phase of use, 
which, unlike in conventional architectural practice, becomes part of a cyclical 
design process ([1970] 2005, p16–17). Discovery of the users’ real needs 
according to him means acknowledging their right to express themselves and 
question all preconceived value systems that were built on non-participation. 
Organisational hypotheses are then developed through the interaction between 
those real needs and “images of spatial configurations”. Each hypothesis enlarges 
the possibilities of previous hypotheses in a sequential manner. The planner's role 
here is to expand this sequence of hypotheses and enlarge it beyond the margins 
set out by the client, to expose to the users the difference between what could be 
possible and what authoritarian planning offers them. He goes as far as arguing 
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that the planner's role is to “re-establish the terms of class struggle” ([1970] 2005, 
p20). 
 
The Atelier d'Architecture Autogérée approaches participation as appropriation 
and transformation of temporarily available and underused spaces through urban 
actions. Petrescu (2005) describes her practice as a process of “assembling a 
collective economy of desire” and “creating space for liberated speech”, which will 
in turn liberate space. As such, she argues, “participation should be understood 
as a progressive and evolving process that constructs itself inferentially, by both 
integrating and adjusting its aims according to the newly created situations” (2005, 
p53). Knowledge and space are thus produced at the same time and use is no 
longer separated from the design process. The focus on the temporary 
appropriation and leftover spaces is because these are outside of the planned city 
and resist homogenous and stable appropriation. Instead of the object or place, 
the process becomes sustainable (2005, p58). 
 
The above theories and practices of participation are necessary steps for the 
future, ranging from establishing some form of counterculture in the interstitial 
spaces of capitalist urbanisation to calling for outright class struggle as the basis 
of re-directing practice and socio-spatial relations. While the former could be seen 
as a form of liberal realpolitik, the latter calls for the spatial practitioner to take a 
stand and position herself politically before advancing. However, this political 
position can only form the basis of the process; the process itself has to be 
envisaged in ways that allow those that participate to engage in meaningful 
negotiations. The main questions then – who defines the parameters for those 




2.2.2 Spatial practice: between normativity and negotiation of difference 
Recently urban scholars and architects have shown more interest in the social and 
spatial dimensions of urban informality as “places of social interaction, fostering 
cultures of different values and alternate relations” (Mörtenböck et al., 2015, p7). 
However, the shortcomings of conventional architectural practice have been 
alluded to, deriving largely from discipline-specific and wider class-based value 
systems that are untenable in the face of large-scale urban informality. But also 
planning theory continues to struggle with tensions between acknowledging the 
specific challenges of urban informality and the “desire to produce normative 
theoretical positions (relating to both procedure and product) which can be of 
generalized use to planners in practice” (Watson, 2003, p396). Yet, there are 
examples of approaches that are of relevance to informal markets, in that they 
suggest ways of co-production between the users, authorities and spatial 
practitioners, some of which I will present in this section.  
 
Sissoko (2012) describes the lessons learnt from delegating market management 
to informal traders in Bamako. Mali has only introduced local government structures 
since the advent of full democracy in 1991, in a context where 94 percent of 
employment was informal. The need for new local governments to raise revenue 
led to the delegation of market management to increase tax collection and improve 
the working conditions of informal traders. This approach has been implemented 
in Commune I, one of the six municipalities that make up Bamako, since 2005. The 
delegation requires independent entities to be established, usually in the form of 
cooperatives, which sign a contract with the local authority with a clear list of 
objectives, outcomes, obligations and responsibilities of each party. The process 
of setting up cooperatives is supported through educational material and training 
sessions, both for traders and for municipal staff. To determine the market potential, 
a taxpayers’ census was undertaken in collaboration with traders. Finally, a 
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monitoring and evaluation system was implemented to assist learning and 
improvements of services (2012, p35–41). Sissoko concludes that consolidation of 
traders’ cooperatives made them more effective partners of the municipality in the 
local development, improved tax collection by nearly 100 percent by ensuring that 
parts of the proceeds would be spent on improving the market, and encouraged 
traders to become directly involved in the operation and maintenance of sanitary 
facilities, waste collection and water provision (2012, p42).  
 
Skinner (2008) shows how after years of confrontation, Dar es Salaam in Tanzania 
started licensing street traders in the 1990s. Design solutions that allowed better 
display of goods, especially food, improved health and safety as well as the 
cleaning of streets and public space. Similarly, the last years of white minority rule 
in South Africa were marked by a more tolerant approach to the informal economy. 
The 1991 Business Act specifically banned restrictions on street trading, allowing 
for dramatic increases of informal activities in South African towns and cities (2008, 
p10). She also draws attention to forms of organising amongst street traders in 
African cities. The research suggests that the level of traders organised in 
associations is relatively low and the role of traditional labour unions, where they 
have incorporated the concerns of informal traders into their programmes, is 
becoming more important. Self-help schemes such as community-based savings 
groups play an important role in the absence of other financial services. The role 
of women is further indicative of the level of inclusion. Leaders of trader 
organisations are often men, while women provide the majority of the membership. 
Low levels of participation and accountability, as well as undemocratic election of 
leadership are some of the concerns (2008, p14–16).  
 
The municipality of eThekwini (Durban) became paradigmatic for its inclusion of 
the informal economy in its policy frameworks. In 1996 the Durban city council 
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embarked on an area-based urban renewal project for one of its more notorious 
inner-city areas: the Warwick triangle. On the edge of the CBD, this area comprises 
commuter train stations, markets, bus and taxi ranks, highway flyovers and a 
cemetery. In careful consultation with thousands of street traders over more than 
20 years, relatively small-scale infrastructural improvements were developed, often 
on a sector-by sector basis. At the same time urban management was improved 
through a coalition of the area-based local authority staff, technical support by Non-
Governmental Organisations and organised traders’ associations (Dobson et al., 
2009; Skinner, 2008; Lund and Skinner, 2004). In Warwick Junction participation 
was central to the project’s success. Dobson et al. (2009) argue that consultation 
helped to dispel conflict, ensured that interventions were based on user needs and 
led to an increased sense of ownership by traders in the area. The latter had a 
positive impact on improved urban management. Skinner calls this “planning by 
negotiation and contract” (Skinner, 2008, p12). 
 
Expanding beyond the dimension of Warwick’s spatial transformation, Lund and 
Skinner (2004) describe the consultative policy development process to integrate 
the informal economy into urban planning and governance in Durban. They 
describe the context of post 1994 transformation and the growing 
acknowledgement that the informal economy would become a lasting aspect of the 
city, reaching a point in which this is seen as part of economic development rather 
than welfare. This refers specifically to the newly-established policy task force 
engaged with informal traders as “workers”, rather than an abstract notion of “civil 
society”. The consultative processes had to deal not only with external 
stakeholders, but also with municipal staff who had to be re-directed to work in 
interdepartmental ways towards the formulation of the policy. As external advisers, 
the authors were the link to research and international advocacy groups. One of 
the major challenges was the issue of representativity of traders during the process 
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and entrenched hierarchies within municipal staff, which made it difficult for lower 
level civil servants to engage fully (2004). While only producing a policy document, 
which in itself does not guarantee material transformation, they highlight an 
important shift in the mind-set of authorities to see informality as ordinary, not as 
the unknown other that requires taming or formalisation. The Durban policy mind-
shift seems to have been a critical basis for the widely praised urban transformation 
of the Warwick Junction. 
 
Another central aspect of the success of the Durban approach was due to the 
empowerment of informal workers through advocacy and technical support. 
Conley (2015) lays out how Asiye eTafuleni (AeT), the NGO that supports informal 
workers at Warwick Junction, established a practice of supporting informal workers 
who operate in public space. The organisation works in direct consultation with 
traders to develop innovative design interventions, and continuously engages the 
public and government to legitimise the informal economy and advocate for more 
inclusive urban development (2015, p3–4). AeT argues that one of the critical 
aspects in its work is the inclusion of practitioners with professional experience in 
design, architecture, urban planning, law enforcement, research, facilitation and 
law as “active and essential agents of change” (2015, p5). AeT operates from a 
space within the Warwick area, which ensures its easy accessibility for traders and 
can be used as meeting space for traders independently. Besides this direct 
interaction, AeT engages continuously to sensitise architecture, urban planning, 
and built-environment professionals to the realities and needs of informal workers 
in urban settings. It also represents informal workers at various public fora and 
supports them by providing technical arguments to assist traders “to engage with 
power structures” (2015, p6). However, AeT admitted that one shortcoming of its 




Castells and Portes (1989) warning that informalisation goes hand in hand with the 
demise of the ability of organised labour unions to represent the working class 
raises the question of representativity. Where classic labour organisation 
happened within the confines of the factory, easily enabling organisation, informal 
labour by its dispersed nature and complex relations of dependence often lacks 
collective bargaining power. Instead, the absence of organised collective 
formations is swept under the carpet by insisting on uncritical concepts of 
‘community’. The idea that planning decisions can be reached through processes 
that allow all stakeholders to participate in fair and equal ways, contains the 
underlying assumption that consensus is possible in the face of real political 
divisions and conflicting interests (Watson, 2003, p398). 
 
Exemplifying such misguided notions, Bremner (1994) discusses the underlying 
aspects that caused a well-intentioned and ambitious programme of integrated 
development to falter in the context of pre-1994 violence in South Africa. She 
argues that its failure was caused by “inadequate conceptualization of 
development within the highly volatile political context” presupposing a “stable and 
cohesive community” (1994, p23). The prospect of introducing developmental 
resources into a context of extreme precariousness further increased existing 
tensions. While this is a case within a highly specific, volatile political context, it 
nevertheless points to one of the major misconceptions within much of the 
development discourse, the unquestioned existence of a community, usually 
implying progressive connotations. 
 
Where such imaginary stable collectivity does not exist, the impulse is to create it 
through “community building” (Simone, 2004). Simone criticises that this is often 
perceived as peripheral and distracting from residents’ actual needs to navigate 
ever-changing constellations of social collaboration. As such, community building 
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programmes aim to stabilise a broad range of political and economic relationships 
so that public safety is restored, and enterprise can thrive. However, according to 
Simone, such approaches are ineffective, as survival requires “not only 
opportunism but precisely the ability to hide one’s intentions and abilities within 
complex relationships of mutual dependence” (2004, p420). Simone elaborates 
that the drive to install normative behaviour in residents establishes an urban 
politics that does not allow for dialogue and mediation of difference, but rather 
measures residents against their ability to conform (2004, p420).  
 
At the Herero Mall the assumptions about community and coherence were quickly 
dispelled as I will elaborate later. Yet, participatory procedures to define the future 
development of the market were expected to produce a general consensus on how 
to proceed. This consensus, once formulated and voted on by the community, or 
that part of the community that actually attended the meeting, then enters the realm 
of rhetoric, used to give legitimacy to the project going forward. The concept of 
community is often glossed over in developmental discourse. It is problematic 
exactly because it de-politicises development as inherently positive and in 
everybody's best interest. Spatial practice can no longer remain neutral in this 
context, even in its well-intentioned versions. Rather than seeking out the cracks in 
the system and spatially transforming those in more or less ephemeral ways (as 
many architectural and artistic practices, certainly in the global North, have done), 
spatial practice needs to identify the critical moments within processes of 
urbanisation that require to be altered to enable radical socio-spatial 
transformation. Those few instances of spatial practice that co-produce space 
together with users are often driven by activist practitioners who engage with users 
at the place of transformation. Such engagements usually require such users to be 
legitimised in the eyes of authorities, which in many contexts leads to unreflexive 
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and problematic concepts of community and consensus being imposed on sites 
of relative complexity, and thereby de-politicising the production of space.  
2.2.3 Participation versus the proper political 
In Every Form of Art has a Political Dimension, Mouffe (2001) follows Schmitt to 
distinguish between “the political” (antagonism, friend/enemy distinction), able to 
arise out of any kind of relationship, and “politics”, an “ensemble of discourses and 
practices, institutional or even artistic practices, that contribute to and reproduce a 
certain order” (2001, p99). “Politics is always about the establishment, the 
reproduction, or the deconstruction of hegemony...” and because any form of 
artistic practice either contributes to the given common sense or its deconstruction, 
it is always political. According to her, politics, by defining a "demos” (populace), 
cannot do without a certain type of exclusion, defining who belongs and who does 
not. She contrasts this with liberalism that tries to replace political concepts with 
non-political ones such as “humanity” or “population” – and I would add – 
community. This tendency, according to her, defines the tension intrinsic to 
democratic liberalism (2001, p104), but also opens up a space within which 
pluralistic democracy emerges. She elaborates that while democracy tends 
towards the totalitarian, it is kept in check by liberalism's reference to humanity. 
While the liberal logic is one of assertion of rights, only through being a democratic 
citizen one can exercise rights (2001, p107). Mouffe thus argues for the 
establishment of a public sphere that allows for an “agonistic pluralism” which 
allows for people to negotiate their interests with those of others through 
democratic means. In that sense they would not seek consensus but rather 
agonistic confrontation that still contains a common allegiance to liberal democracy 




Reminding of Harvey's Spaces of Hope, Swyngedouw (2016) critiques utopias of 
form - the arena of modernist architectural fictions - as either foreclosing “agonistic 
encounter” (the political) and pretending to “consensual but illusionary inclusion of 
all in liberal participatory governance of the givens” or generating the distinction 
between friends and enemies, i.e. “insiders and outsiders” (2016, p6), which 
ultimately leads to antagonistic conflict. He contrasts this with utopias of time that 
live by the promise of an inclusive future, but “disavow the perversities of the 
actually existing present”. Swyngedouw again draws on Harvey, who proposes a 
dialectical spatio-temporal utopianism as a way out, “nurturing radical openness 
while recognizing the inevitability of temporary spatial closure” (2016, p7). This 
raises the question of whether architecture, or rather the co-production of space, 
would be able to perform a similar role.  
 
In his critique of participation Miessen (2006) defines cities as “social and spatial 
conflict zones, re-negotiating their limits though constant transformation”. Rejecting 
notions of harmony and solidarity that are often implied in understandings of 
community or marginalised groups, he suggests that future spatial practitioners 
could enter such zones as outsiders, and instead of aiming to create and sustain 
consensus, start catalysing conflict between separate fields of knowledge 
(Miessen, 2010b). Such understanding of creative conflict opens up ways of 
thinking about the political dimension of space. Yet it does not point to the ways in 
which that conflict is turned into socio-spatial transformation that goes beyond the 
performative moment of an ephemeral intervention.  
 
Swyngedouw (2016) explores the possibilities of an “emancipatory politics” and 
the role of “insurgent architects” within it. He holds that architecture cannot be 
emancipatory in itself, but architects as practitioners can “co-animate political 
events and inscribe themselves in emancipatory political sequences”. Tellingly, he 
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positions “politics” as architectural practice as it aims at “intervention” or the re-
ordering of the given (2016, p3). Emancipatory politics, according to him, thus has 
to be “a practice, a set of affective and sequential acts”, similar to the definition of 
communism in Marx and Engels’s German Ideology, revolving “around the notions 
of equality, freedom, solidarity, and the ega-libertarian management of the socio-
ecological commons of life” (2016, p4). This position puts it in direct conflict with 
those who embrace capitalist enclosure of the commons in all its forms. He further 
spells out how emancipatory architects can go beyond their disciplinary limitations 
by engaging “with the political moments that already brew in the interstices of 
actually existing urban practices” (2016, p8). He suggests that the inability of 
critical theory to engage with insurgent architects of the various global urban 
occupations of the past years left the door open to nationalist, identitarian and 
antidemocratic politics to gain purchase. The mostly socio-spatial analyses of 
critical theory of the past decades failed to engage on the ground, continuing to 
situate the intellectual at the helm of radical urban politics (2016, p14). 
Emancipatory politicisation thus requires re-framing the political by articulating 
“dissent and rupture” (2016, p17). According to him, work needs to be done to 
spatialise and universalise the insurrectional moments of urban struggle, which re-
kindled a sensibility for “the polis as a democratic and potentially democratizing 
space” (2016, p19). At the same time, he argues that the violence inscribed in any 
spatial intervention that necessarily closes down certain possibilities – “the 
autocratic moment, or temporary suspension of the democratic” – must be fully 
endorsed including the possibility to “fail again” (2016, p21). 
 
The political dimension of space will undoubtedly delineate a progressive spatial 
practice from other forms of practice. Much of the developmental discourse in 
Namibia lives by elusive promises of ‘development’ (whatever that means) while 
shying away from asking fundamental questions about the distribution of resources 
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and opportunities in such a highly unequal context. Because the production of 
space is by definition political in that it both provides the arena for political 
encounter and a process of negotiating the distribution of resources, it is critical for 
the progressive spatial practitioner to align herself with those that are ordinarily not 
in a position of power. 
2.2.4 Conclusion: exposing urban politics 
In this section I reviewed literature that in various ways positioned spatial co-
production as a key sphere of urban politics as Mouffe (2001) understands it. I 
elaborated on the role of architecture and planning within this field. Historically 
these professions have been at the service of power and have contributed to the 
production and reproduction of hegemony, especially in the colonial setting as I 
will expand on in CHAPTER 4 below. But there are and always have been spatial 
practices that seek, sometimes ostensibly, to undermine dominant power. These 
often take the form of co-productive practices that range from conciliatory and de-
politicising interventions to legitimise the status quo, to radical disruptions of the 
established order. 
 
A progressive spatial practice needs to be conceptualised not merely as practice 
that alters space and therefore will alter the distribution of resources, but as a 
practice that needs to engage on multiple levels, and most critically negotiating the 
political dimensions of that which it seeks to change. It needs to question 
conventional notions of community, consensus, participation and of de-politicised, 
positivist visions of ‘development’ that dominate not only developmental discourse 
but also popular imaginaries. As Wachsmuth (2014) suggests, besides exposing 
the citizenry to the dynamics of their exploitation within the capitalist urban order, 
critical theory needs to be embedded within spatial practice to enable bridging the 
gap between theory and lived experience. It needs to be an agile practice that can 
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operate on various playing fields, navigate political spaces and dialectically weave 
such engagements into an on-going process of catalysing transformation. In this 
research project I aimed to explore how such a practice could take shape in the 
context of post-colonial Namibia. This will be the subject of the remainder of this 




CHAPTER 3 INTRODUCTION TO THE CASE STUDY 
Herero Mall is the popular name for an ‘informal’ market in central Katutura. It is 
situated on two adjacent plots of land at the heart of a residential area: a ca. 7132m2 
municipal plot (Erf R/6296) and a 1300m2 plot owned by the Ovaherero Traditional 
Authority (OTA). The previously vacant plots, reserved for future institutional use,17 
had originally been appropriated around 2005 by ‘informal’ traders, and today 
features food outlets, shebeens, a car wash, auto mechanics and welding services, 
hair salons, meat cutting services and small convenience shops amongst others. 
These businesses are housed in self-built steel and corrugated iron structures, re-
used shipping containers or discarded car bodies loosely arranged along two main 
vehicle thoroughfares traversing the site. Until late 2017 there was no sanitary 
provision at the site, electricity remains distributed through precarious networks, 
and storm water management is near to absent. 
 
Over the years the number of businesses has fluctuated, and it is difficult if not futile 
to determine. Many visitors frequent the place regularly, sometimes on a daily basis 
and weekends are considerably busier. Patrons from within the neighbourhood 
come for entertainment, some for traditional food, a chat and a drink; farmers from 
hundreds of kilometres away buy cattle feed-troughs from local welders; others rent 
a trailer to transport cattle over the weekend; while others need to get their car 
repaired or washed while they wait and socialise. Some come from wealthier 
neighbourhoods across the city to get meat cut to size and others just want to play 
some pool accompanied by local music.  
 
 
17  On a municipal map dated 30.05.1980, Erf R/6296 is indicated as “Old Age Home” and neighbouring 




Figure 3: Map of the “tribal” division of Katutura by the apartheid administration, 1976, 
showing areas for Ovaherero residents in orange. The site, marked with a X, was allocated 
for the purposes of a “park” and “pre-primary school”. Source: National Archives of 
Namibia. 
The neighbourhood had originally been designated “Herero Location” by apartheid 
urban planners in the 1960s (see Figure 3). Subsequent sale of municipal houses 
to tenants in the 1980s and 90s, which was meant to empower residents to become 
homeowners, fixed this ethnic segregation in space, leading to an enduring 
dominance of Ovaherero culture in the area today. Three major institutions border 
the market (see Figure 4): (B) the “Commando No 2” multi-purpose community hall 
that falls under the auspices of the Ovaherero Traditional Authority (OTA); (C) the 
Oruuano church;18 and (D) the headquarters of the OTA and official residence of 
the Paramount Chief of the Ovaherero. Furthermore, a number of small political 
 
 
18  The Oruuano church was founded in 1955 as a Herero-dominated break-away church from the Rheinish 
Mission Society (RMS) that had its origin in Germany and remained under white leadership. Together 
with the African Methodist Episcopal (AME) Church, which had seceded from the RMS in 1946, the 
Oruuano was amongst the first independent black churches in the country (Tjibeba, 2003). 
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opposition party headquarters, some of which are considered to be largely 
composed of Ovaherero groups, are either situated at or in close vicinity of Herero 
Mall. The site has thus gained major significance not only in the everyday life of the 
neighbourhood but specifically in the cultural, political and religious life of the 
Ovaherero (see Figure 6) both in Windhoek and extending into far-away villages 
and farms, as well as in the diaspora, as I will elaborate below. 
 
Figure 4: The Herero Mall (A) along Clemence Kapuuo Street within the “Herero Location” 
neighbourhood in Katutura. Institutions neighbouring the mall: (B) Commando Hall, (C) 
Oruuano Church and (D) Ovaherero Traditional Authority (OTA) Headquarters. Notice the 
encampment in the OTA yard. Source: Google Earth.	
Despite the civic potential of the site, and the fact that municipal service 
infrastructure such as water, electricity and sewer mains are available, the market 
remained without any sanitary provisions or other public amenities until late 2017. 
This resulted in traders and patrons using open spaces between structures for their 
sanitary needs. This critical sanitary challenge has been compounded by the fact 
that since 2016 the backyard of the OTA headquarters (see Figure 4) has 
transformed into a dense encampment of hundreds Ovahimba petitioners from the 
rural, far north-western Kunene Region. The chairperson of the traders’ committee 
told me that they had assisted the South African army to fight SWAPO ‘terrorists’. 















government for compensation of these veterans who are now petitioning to receive 
that money. According to him they would not return to their rural homes until they 
get an answer from government.19 In order to suppress the stench of urine, old 
motor oil was spilled onto the ground, creating yet another environmental hazard 
as the site forms the beginning of a seasonal river system which drains stormwater 
to the nearby Goreangab dam. The site thus performs a major public function within 
the neighbourhood and wider afield, yet it lacks the most basic infrastructure to do 
so. 
 
The current situation has divided public opinion. For some, the Herero Mall is an 
eye sore and the representation of underdevelopment and social decay. In a 
popular English daily, a well-known political analyst described it as “a symptom of 
our failure 17 years after Independence, notably our half-hearted attempts at 
nation-building and innovative city planning” and called for the City of Windhoek to 
tear down the market and replace it with something that would offer a proper place 
of entertainment, especially for the youth (Hengari, 2007). His somewhat misguided 
comparison of the Herero Mall with a famous entertainment area in Tokyo, Japan, 
exposed his elite vantage point and sparked a fierce public debate in the print 
media over the meaning and identity of the Herero Mall: while some stressed its 
role as an enabler of livelihoods and a hub of cultural identity and social interaction 
(Tjirera, 2013), others saw it as a direct challenge to law and order (The Namibian, 
2011). Nevertheless, most commentators called for its development rather than its 
closure. I undertook a detailed media review of the period form 2007-2014 as part 
 
 
19  The encampment has been demolished a week before submission of this thesis under the state of 
emergency declared in response to Covid-19, while the residents were temporarily accommodated in 
tented camps elsewhere to prevent the spread of the pandemic (Mutanga, 2020). 
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of the feasibility study (Delgado and Lühl, 2014) which I include here for reference 
(see Appendices, p292). 
 
Since the initial controversy in 2007, the city council has been undecided on what 
to do with this particular plot of land occupied by about 300 informal traders at the 
time. One considered option was to offer it for sale to the OTA, which would have 
probably prevented the development of an open market and thus put livelihoods in 
jeopardy. In the wake of increasing complaints by surrounding residents about 
deteriorating conditions including crime, alcohol abuse, and noise pollution in and 
around the Mall, in July 2011 the city council resolved to restrict trading hours to 
07:00-19:00 instead of the conventional 07:00-22:00 applicable to trading sites and 
municipal markets elsewhere in the city. A subsequent dispute between the local 
constituency councillor and a shebeen operator in August 2011 led to the Namibian 
Police and City Police moving in on the Mall to enforce the operating hours, facing 
stiff opposition from traders and visitors. On two occasions police used teargas to 
disperse the crowd, and in the event not only affected traders and visitors, but also 
surrounding residents including children, who had to flee their homes to avoid 
being affected (Allgemeine Zeitung, 2011; Die Republikein, 2011). This 
unprecedented harsh public policing response drew wide public criticism and 
accusations of racial discrimination of Ovaherero by the authorities that are alleged 
to be Aawambo-dominated.20 The various Aawambo ethnic groups represent about 
half of Namibia's population, while the Ovaherero account for about seven 
percent.21 Other entertainment hot-spots in Windhoek with similar characteristics 
 
 
20  The Aawambo are the majority ethnic group in Namibia, comprising about half of the country’s 
population. 
21  Some argue that current resentment amongst the Ovaherero relies not only on the original trauma 
inflicted by the German colonial regime during the 1904-07 genocide and its socio-economic legacies, 
but also in the fact that the genocide greatly diminished the Ovaherero’s political weight in post-colonial 
Namibia. From personal conversation with a Herero Mall visitor on 27.1.2019. 
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that are Aawambo-dominated were not subject to restrictions and police violence, 
seemingly confirming allegations of tribalism.  
 
Allegations of unfair treatment of the Herero Mall traders by the municipality and 
City Police continued through 2012, and it was claimed that over 40 businesses 
had to close down owing to restrictive trading hours (Kangootui, 2012). Reacting 
to the confrontations, Windhoek’s CEO had already announced the development 
of the Mall into a formal municipal market (Kisting, 2011). However, the city council 
resolved that in future the sale of alcohol and light industrial activities would not be 
allowed, in line with municipal regulations for public markets. As a direct 
consequence of these measures, a large majority of traders would have had to re-
locate or change their business to conform with regulations. In April 2013 the 
Namibia Informal Sector Organisation (NISO) launched a feasibility study for the 
development of Herero Mall, sponsored by a German development foundation. 
Amongst the study’s major recommendations was the re-zoning of the land to 
“business” in line with the CoW's policy for business corridors,22 and to sell the land 
to NISO for further development as a mixed-use market. The city council rejected 
the study, claiming it had been undertaken without council’s input in defining its 
terms of reference. These developments ultimately led City of Windhoek to 
commission an independent feasibility study for the re-development of the Herero 
Mall into a formalised municipal market in 2014, which I will elaborate in CHAPTER 
7 below. I was part of the team responsible for the study and this doctoral research 
emerged out of my frustration with that process and my interest to continue to 
engage professionally within this context. 
 
 
22  The CoW business corridor policy was established in 2008 to incentivise the re-zoning of residential 
properties along selected “high streets”, including Clemence Kapuuo Street adjacent to the mall (Figure 
4). For further discussion of this policy and its effects see (Charman et al., 2017) below.  
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I argue in this dissertation that the Herero Mall embodies the full complexity of 
Namibia’s post-colonial urban landscape. On the one hand it presents a rupture 
with inherited spatial patters of the apartheid city, on the other it is a space where 
many social legacies of colonialism are re-produced. As an ‘informal’ market within 
a formal neighbourhood it is technically illegal yet practically tolerated by municipal 
authorities, though not enough to provide basic services to affirm its existence, 
suspending traders in ambiguity for years. It is a unique local space of difference, 
imbued with meaning far beyond the scale of the neighbourhood and the city, 
which split public opinion about the nature of post-colonial urban development. 
From my own perspective it laid bare the failure of professional spatial practice to 
engage within such a context. But to read the many layers of significance that the 
Herero Mall embodies requires us to first trace the country’s socio-spatial context 
and its historical development. 
 
Figure 5: Patrons at a shebeen at the Herero Mall on a Saturday afternoon. Photo by author.  
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CHAPTER 4 THE PRODUCTION OF INEQUALITY 
I have shown in the literature review that conceptualisations of ‘informality’ rely to a 
large extent on binary oppositions to that which is formal, regulated, legitimate and 
measurable. As suggested by AlSayyad (2004), from a historical perspective it is 
not the ‘informal’ but the formal that is the new phenomenon – worldwide – and its 
specific development in particular local contexts is contingent. This is true 
especially in countries that were colonised, where foreign ways of organising 
relations of production were forcefully imposed on existing social, cultural, 
economic and political structures. In the previous chapter I outlined why for 
Namibia the Herero Mall provides an instructive case to study the “truncated 
process” of modernisation as Simone (2004) calls it. Following Foucault, in this 
chapter I will aim to establish the conditions of emergence for the ‘informal’ 
discourse in Namibia as I outlined in the Methodological strategy (see p13).  
 
The major question I aim to answer here is how the formal / informal binary could 
come to be seen as self-evident in everyday practice, even though most literature 
on ‘informality’ casts this binary as limiting a better understanding of what is at 
stake. To achieve this, I will construct an archaeology, inspired by Foucault’s 
method (see p13), which traces the historical production of inequality through the 
colonial project as the setting that allowed such binary understandings to emerge. 
I start from an investigation of territorial socio-spatial dynamics under colonialism, 
followed by a closer look at Windhoek’s historical development, and the shifts and 
continuities experienced during the process of nominal decolonisation.23 I then turn 
 
 
23  I use the adjective nominal here because much of the argument of this thesis is that while Namibia was 
officially decolonised, i.e. became independent of South Africa in 1990, many of the colonial legacies 
persist and are re-produced. Wherever I suggest the need to decolonise in this thesis, this does not 
refer to the formal notion of decolonisation mentioned above, but rather to undo colonial legacies. 
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to the emergence of the ‘informal economy’ and the dominant policy response 
before highlighting the position of professional spatial practice within this context. 
The chapter is primarily based on a literature review, but I also draw on in-depth 
interviews, public statutes and media reports amongst others. 
4.1 Namibia – geographies of settler colonialism 
The existence of contemporary ‘urban informality’ in Namibia cannot be understood 
in isolation from the country’s colonial past. In Namibia, a major apparatus to 
establish settler control over the colonial territory was the introduction of private 
property that had hitherto not existed. Backed-up by a powerful colonial army after 
the official establishment of the German protectorate South West Africa (SWA) in 
1884, major land dispossession of indigenous populations in the central and 
southern parts of the territory was accomplished in a relatively short period. The 
major rupture in this process was the Ovaherero and Nama24 uprising against the 
German occupation of 1904-07, culminating in the first genocide of the 20th century. 
During the war with the “Schutztruppe” (German colonial army), thousands of 
Ovaherero and Nama were killed, following Lieutenant-General Lothar von Trotha’s 
infamous “Vernichtungsbefehl” (extermination order). Prisoners of war were 
interned in concentration camps in Windhoek, Swakopmund and Lüderitz, where 
captives were subjected to forced labour, and thousands succumbed to the 
inhumane conditions. The ensuing collective trauma, and the loss of ancestral land 
and livestock mainly affected Ovaherero and Nama communities who inhabited the 
central and southern regions and lingers as an unresolved and highly charged 
 
 
24  The Nama are one of the minority ethnic groups in Namibia, making up 4.5 percent of the population, 




political issue in contemporary Namibia.25 By 1921, free-hold tenured settler farms 
occupied most of the central and southern parts of the territory (Surveyor General, 
1921). In the same year South Africa was mandated to administer the territory for 
the League of Nations after Germany’s defeat in the First World War (Wallace and 
Kinahan, 2011). 
 
Figure 6: Protest march along Clemence Kapuuo Street by Ovaherero groups demanding 
reparations from Germany for the 1904-07 genocide, February 2016. Photo by Guillermo 
Delgado.	
This enclosure of a de facto commons by external force rendered former 
pastoralists landless and forced many to seek employment in the nascent colonial 
industries and settler farms. Similar to other Southern African countries, the mining 
sector and its demand for cheap labour significantly encouraged this 
 
 
25  At the time of writing this dissertation formal negotiations between the Namibian and German 
governments about possible reparations for the genocide are in progress. 
  
73 
transformation (Ferguson, 2015). This was institutionalised in the notorious contract 
labour system that started in the mid-1920s. Through this system the colonial 
administration recruited young black males from the northern territories – later to 
become native homelands under apartheid – to work on two-year labour contracts 
in the urban industries, mines or farms of central and southern Namibia – in the so-
called Police Zone – including as far as the gold mines of Johannesburg and other 
industrial centres in South Africa. According to Ferguson, keeping labour in a state 
of migration helped avoid the rise of political demands on behalf of workers, while 
at the same time the costs of social reproduction were off-loaded onto the 
impoverished rural areas (2015, p10). 
 
In the 1950s and 60s South Africa consolidated apartheid policies across the entire 
SWA territory, especially through the implementation of the so-called Odendaal 
Plan of 1964, 26  building on foundations laid by the earlier German colonial 
occupation. Municipalities and corporations were held liable to provide housing for 
their urban labour force and a system of urban influx control policed through 
infamous pass laws kept unemployed blacks away from urban centres. This 
ensured the outward appearance of well-planned, civic and modern cities 
(Wallace, 1997). As migrant labourers were solely valued in terms of their labour 
power they were efficiently housed in ‘labour compounds’ away from the city proper 
(Gordon, 1977; Beyerly, 2012, p34–35).27 The flipside of this deceptive urban order, 
formally planned along modernist principles though racially perverted (Frayne, 
2000; Friedman, 2000), was the underdevelopment (Rodney, 1981) of the rural 
 
 
26  The Commission of Enquiry into South West Africa Affairs, or Odendaal Commission, named after the 
lead Commissioner, was established by the South African government to promote the closer integration 
of the territory into the political and economic structure of apartheid South Africa. 
27  “Labour compounds” were migrant worker hostels established for male contract workers, which came 
to represent the oppressive nature of the contract labour system.  
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native reserves called homelands or bantustans (see Figure 7).28 The majority black 
population was relegated to ten such homelands comprising just 40 percent of the 
land area, often with the poorest conditions for agriculture and livestock rearing, 
while the best 43 percent were reserved for white farmers (Frayne, 2000, p53). 
Homelands were essentially reserves of surplus black labour, where pre-colonial 
and pre-capitalist modes of life co-existed with attempts at synthesising tribal 
administrations that further extended the apartheid administration’s influence over 
those areas.  
 
Rodney defined development at the level of social groups as “an increasing 
capacity to regulate both internal and external relationships” (Rodney, 1981, p3). 
He posits underdevelopment firstly as a comparative measure of economic 
conditions – in other words not in terms of mental, physical or moral aspects – 
between historical periods in one country or between countries at a given point in 
time. Underdevelopment in his conceptualisation can be observed most readily in 
terms of quantitative indicators such as statistics on consumption, levels of 
nutrition, access to social services, life expectancy, child mortality and literacy and 
education levels amongst others (1981, p13–17). More importantly for his own 
analysis and for my thesis, is his contention that underdevelopment is in essence 
a “relationship of exploitation” between countries, with specific reference to 
countries in Africa and certain developed countries predominantly in Western 
Europe and the United States (1981, p21). The latter countries were able to 
dominate relationships with the former countries to such an extent that their own 
 
 
28  Bantustans were “pseudo-national homelands” demarcated by the South African apartheid 
administration for various constructed ethnic and linguistic groups (The Editors of Encyclopaedia 
Britannica, 2019). The Odendaal Plan expanded this principle to SWA. 
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development would be to large extent premised on the exploitation and 
consequently the underdevelopment of the former. 
 
Figure 7: Map of 10 ethnic Homelands after implementation of the recommendations of the 
Odendaal Commission in the 1960s. Source: National Archives of Namibia. 
In the case of the settler colony of SWA relationships of exploitation were 
established not only in relation to Germany and later South Africa, but also within 
the territory, creating unequal development between industrialising and 
modernising urban areas as well as commercial landholdings for settlers and the 
underdevelopment of the native homelands. The resulting asymmetries had to be 
reconciled and made palatable within the same space. Spatial planning and 
architecture played a central role in establishing geographies of inequality and 
deprivation both on a territorial scale as well as within urban areas, which I will 
elaborate in the next section. The deeply asymmetric patterns of 
(dis)empowerment, loss of land, ethnic delimitations – real and imposed – and 
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social development continue to haunt contemporary politics. Ongoing bilateral 
negotiations between the Namibian and German governments for reparations to 
compensate for the losses inflicted during the genocide, and the recent rise of both 
urban- and rural-based social movements calling for land restitution, amongst 
others, are part of those dynamics. 
4.2 Windhoek – a diagram of an apartheid city 
Urban apartheid geographies have been well documented as has the instrumental 
relationship between colonial and apartheid urban planning and modernist 
planning ideology, propagating scientific rationalism through which a system of 
total order and control could be established, often disguised as ‘development’ 
(Heynen, 2005; Friedman, 2000; Wallace, 1997; Pendleton, 1974). Windhoek’s ‘Old 
Location’ has a special place in history in this respect. It was established as the 
‘Main Location’ under German rule in 1912 to the immediate west of the town 
(Wallace, 1997, p66) and was soon subjected to the Natives’ (Urban Areas) 
Proclamation of 1924, an extension of the notorious South African Natives’ (Urban 
Areas) Act of 1923. This proclamation notably facilitated residential segregation in 
urban areas, established pass laws for black males, and compelled local 
authorities to improve conditions in the native locations. It also led to the 
establishment of a location police force and an Advisory Board of nominated and 





Figure 8: The Old Location in 1954 after its re-organisation into a grid. Clearly visible is the 
central cluster of public amenities including the social halls, as well as the link to the white 
part of the city in the top right corner. Source Surveyor General 
Residents had to pay ‘hut tax’ to the local authority for occupying a plot of land, 
while the largely self-constructed houses remained their private property. The 
location was rigorously re-organised into a regular grid pattern of streets from 1932 
onwards (see Figure 8) largely based on public health concerns (1997, p319–330) 
that became increasingly central in urban planning. Houses were relocated to suit 
the new urban plan, and a municipal Beer Hall and a “Bantu Welfare Hall” were 
established in 1936-37. Some markets, communal bathhouses and street lighting 
followed, though they remained utterly inadequate. Residence in the location was 
controlled through the issuing of permits (or passes) to employed, non-contract 
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workers and their dependent family members, as well as to some recognised self-
employed traders or shop owners (Melber, 2016, p7–8).  
 
Figure 9: Dance event at the Sybil Bowker Hall at the Old Location, 1950s. Source: National 
Archives of Namibia 
Like Sophiatown in Johannesburg and District Six in Cape Town – and despite the 
gross deprivation in terms of service provision and institutionalised inequality – the 
Old Location nurtured an emerging urban culture, transcending the increasingly 
separate ethnic identities of the native homelands. Social life revolved around 
dancing (see Figure 9), beauty contests and cinema screenings at the Sybil 
Bowker Hall, as the Bantu Welfare Hall had been renamed after the location 
superintendent’s wife. Sports, including football, tennis and horse racing, as well 
as a variety of churches provided further opportunity for social interaction, though 
especially team sports enabled tribal identification (2016, p15).  
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In the 1950s plans to re-locate black and coloured residents of the Old Location to 
new townships29  farther to the north-west of Windhoek took shape in line with 
apartheid planning practices in South Africa. While the removal was primarily 
argued on the basis of unsanitary conditions and substandard housing in the Old 
Location, the pressure of opening up land for expansion of white suburbs that had 
grown close to the Old Location was a major underlying consideration (Pendleton, 
1974, p27–28). In 1959, the year of the beginning of forced relocations to the newly 
established townships of Katutura and Khomasdal, Windhoek was estimated to 
have 20,000 white, 18,000 African and 1,500 so-called Coloured or Baster 
residents. This marked a turning point from whites outnumbering other groups in 
the town. At the time only 108 black and coloured Windhoek residents held trade 
and business licences for their own economic activities (Melber, 2016, p9–10). With 
the administration advancing to relocate residents voluntarily, resistance grew. 
Residents refused to relocate for a number of reasons including prohibition of 
ownership of housing in the new townships, high rental costs for municipal houses, 
and bus fares required for commuting to town. Boycotts and protests followed, 
culminating in the “Old Location Massacre” on 10 December 1959, when eleven 
people were killed and many wounded as the municipal police force tried to contain 
a women-led protest against forced relocations. 30  Some claim that this event 
provided a turning point “in the consolidation of political organizations, and 
especially the formation of the South-West Africa People’s Organisation (SWAPO)” 
(2016, p4), which later advanced to form the country’s first democratically elected 
government after independence and remains the ruling party to this day. However, 
 
 
29  “Township” is the terminology used for urban extensions in planning legislation until the recent 
enactment of the Urban and Regional Planning Act of 2018. However, as a colloquial term it usually 
refers to the black residential areas under apartheid racial segregation laws. 
30  In Namibia 10 December is annually celebrated as Women’s Day, in remembrance of the predominant 
role of women during this historic event.  
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authorities continued to coerce residents to relocate over a period of nine years 
and by 1968 the Old Location was finally closed down, erased from the face of the 
earth to be re-developed as the white suburb of Hochland Park. Simon summed 
up the consolidation of urban apartheid as follows: 
Namibian apartheid legislation was modelled closely on that of South Africa, 
although implemented principally by proclamation. […] the notorious Group 
Areas Act was never applied to colonial South West Africa, although other 
legislation, particularly the 1951 Natives (Urban Areas) Proclamation coupled 
with municipal bylaws, town planning practices and social custom achieved 
extremely high levels of residential segregation (aside from domestic workers 
on employers' premises). By 1968 Windhoek and other Namibian towns 
complied with the requirements of the apartheid city model (Simon, 1996, p52). 
The reorganisation of Windhoek to fit the apartheid city model is visualised in Figure 
12. White neighbourhoods to the east and south of the city were shielded from the 
black and coloured townships through various means: a north-south axis of 
industrial areas and the central business district (CBD), the Western Bypass 
highway, and large open greenbelts that acted as buffer zones. The urban design 
of the townships was informed by military strategies with single access roads 
controlled by police amongst other measures. The Old Location, an integral and 
diverse part of the city despite being spatially segregated, had been replaced with 




Figure 10: View of central Windhoek with the Old Location in the background, ca. 1932. 
Source: National Archives of Namibia 
 
 
Figure 11: Commuters queuing for the bus in central Windhoek to take them back to 




Figure 12: Map of Windhoek in the1970s, indicating the forced relocations of black and 
coloured inhabitants to the racially segregated townships of Katutura and Khomasdal 
respectively. The townships were separated from white residential areas by means of a 
large highway (dotted red), industrial areas (grey) and open buffer zones. Also note the 
names of white suburbs such as Academia, Olympia, and Pioneers Park. Source: drawn by 
author based on historical maps (Lühl, 2012a) 
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In a crude diagrammatic representation of apartheid racial hierarchies in which 
coloured residents were often employed in lower administrative positions while 
black residents were employed as labourers, the coloured township was 
infrastructurally linked to the commercial heart of the city in the CBD, while the 
black township was directly linked to the major industrial area. More importantly 
though for this thesis, the coercion and subjugation of black and coloured residents 
based on ostensible improvement of living conditions and ‘development’ is critical. 
Wallace argues that already the 1932 re-organisation of the Old Location – at the 
time considered a more cost-effective solution than its relocation – exposed the 
fault lines between “poorer Africans, fearful of losing their housing and grazing 
rights, and the elite of the Advisory Board, anxious to promote hygiene and 
modernity” (1997, p340). Similarly, the 1959 relocations pitted those who complied 
against those who resisted the apartheid administration’s moves. Yet, the new 
townships created the image of a modern and clean town, and the municipal rental 
housing that was provided (see Figure 14) was held up as representation of 
orderliness and progress. On the whole, the erasure of physical structures and 
representations of underdevelopment in urban areas enabled the new formal 
townships and housing solutions to become considered as the new normal, the 





Figure 13: A family in front of their house in the Old Location preparing to be relocated to 
Katutura, 1960s. Source: National Archives of Namibia 
 
Figure 14: New municipal houses for black residents in Katutura, 1960s. Source: National 
Archives of Namibia 
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4.3 Decolonisation and the re-production of inequality 
The 1970s saw increasing international pressure on South Africa to grant Namibia 
independence as per the United Nations resolution 435 of 1978. Under Namibia’s 
transitional government from 1977-83 much of the racially discriminatory legislation 
was repealed in an effort to portray change during international negotiations on the 
future of an independent Namibia. Chief amongst those laws repealed was the 
South African Natives (Urban Areas) Act of 1923, which was proclaimed in South 
West Africa in 1924, and had hitherto enabled the influx control of rural migrants. 
According to Simon, all “racial restrictions on urban residence, property ownership 
and use of public amenities” had been removed from the statutes by 1983 (1996, 
p52). However, reporting on ‘informal sector’ activities in Windhoek in 1984, Simon 
notes that “only limited blurring of the racial geography has occurred to date [… 
and that] little structural economic change has occurred in Namibia since 1977, 
and a high degree of continuity with the pre-transitional colonial era can thus be 
imputed” (Simon, 1984, p552). In 1981 national unemployment stood at 18 percent, 
up from 10 percent in 1977/8. The increasingly high cost of living in Windhoek could 
be attributed partly to consumer goods and food being largely imported from South 
Africa.31  Given the small population in the country, only small quantities were 
imported which were furthermore distributed through quasi monopoly outlets. 
Simon reports a “widespread wage discrimination, both by race and by sex”, with 
an average wage ratio between whites and coloureds of 2.2:1, between coloureds 
and blacks of 1.8:1 and between whites and blacks of 4:1 (1984, p553–558).32 
 
 
31  43 percent of black households fell below the official Household Subsistence Level (HSL) for Windhoek 
and 69 percent below Household Effective Level (HEL), while 19 percent of coloured households fell 
below HSL and 37 percent below HEL. The HSL and HEL were official indices calculating required 
incomes to sustain a household of 5 people (for coloureds) and 6 people (for blacks) on an annual basis 
for different cities in South Africa, as well as for Windhoek (Simon, 1984). 
32  The latter ratio, however, reflected a few high black wages rather than average earnings. Women earned 
significantly less on average and migrant labourers’ average wages were up to 50 percent lower than 
permanent urban residents. 
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Ferguson notes that the gradual equalisation of political rights happened 
simultaneously with the transformation of Southern Africa’s labour-scarce 
economies in the 1970s to a state of vast labour surplus after decolonisation and 
to this day (2015, p4).  
 
The increased freedom to move to urban areas amid stagnating formal employment 
provided the thrust for the emergence of what later would be called the ‘informal’ 
economy. The effects of the increasingly dire situation for urban black and coloured 
residents were documented in historical accounts: “during working hours many 
hundred unemployed men and women of all ages are evident in Katutura, often 
patronizing illegal shebeens” (Simon, 1984, p559). However, in comparison with 
other African cities where the informal sector represented 25-50 percent of urban 
employment, Katutura at the time fell within the profile of South African townships 
where it only counted for 10-20 percent (1984, p559–561). This further underlines 
the high levels of control of ‘informal’ activities under apartheid rule. 
 
Attempts to ensure externalisation of costs of social reproduction of coloured and 
black residents while continuing to extract their surplus value took the form of 
proposals to administer the coloured and black townships as separate 
municipalities. However, the fact that Katutura and Khomasdal were both originally 
designed as dormitory townships and lacked any significant economic and social 
infrastructure that would enable them to function as stand-alone entities, 
demonstrates that this was a thinly veiled attempt at cementing the racially 
segregated status quo. These plans never materialised as they were overtaken by 
historical events: The National Assembly was abolished and the South African-
appointed Administrator General held executive powers again from 1983 onwards 
(Simon, 1985, p520). Nevertheless, the spatial barriers persisted even after free 
movement was allowed. 
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It took until 1990 and Namibia’s eventual Independence from South Africa, for 
efforts to overhaul local government in non-discriminatory ways to take root. Again, 
it was Simon (1996) who traced the development of this transition. The urban local 
authority system Namibia inherited at Independence, comprised three elements: 
municipalities established in the commercial areas (formerly for whites only), a 
large number of small towns and villages scattered across the commercial central 
and southern areas that were centrally administered, and the peri-urban areas in 
the so-called communal lands or former homelands, which had no local authorities. 
Former personnel of ethnic representative authorities were absorbed into the new 
three-tier government structures: a bicameral parliament, regional councils and 
local authorities (1996).33 The new Local Authorities and Regional Councils Acts 
were drafted and finally promulgated in 1992. Inherited urban governance 
structures were however only slightly modified, which allowed the spatial 
geography of inequality to continue unabated.34 
 
Repeal of influx controls resulted in ‘informal’ urban growth at the periphery of the 
black townships from the 1980s onwards.35 As a result of extremely low incomes 
the vast majority of the urban population country-wide lives today in ‘informal 
 
 
33  According to Simon (1996) the first Delimitation Commission, established in in 1990 to determine 
regional and local boundaries did not concern itself too much with the restructuring of existing 
municipalities, as it deemed their rather extensive territorial boundaries adequate to accommodate 
future growth. It premised its expectations on inclusive future urban development to rely largely on the 
establishment of a free land and property market, which had previously been restricted. Simon’s 
prediction that this approach “could, in the absence of any checks and regulations on resale […] give 
rise to intense speculative pressures on land prices, to the detriment of the majority of local residents” 
(1996, p54–56) certainly materialised. Urban land and housing have since become increasingly 
inaccessible to the majority of urban residents, particularly in the capital (Delgado and Lühl, 2013). 
34  Under the Local Authorities Act three kinds of local authorities are defined: municipalities, town councils 
and village councils. While municipalities are required to be financially self-sufficient, town and village 
councils may receive financial and administrative support from central government (Simon, 1996, p58). 
35  According to the 10-yearly national census data Windhoek’s population grew from 147,022 in 1991 
(Central Statistics Office, 1994, p15) to 232,743 in 2001 (Central Statistics Office, 2011, p10) to 325,033 
in 2011 (Namibia Statistics Agency, 2011, p7) and is currently estimated at about 400,000 (Namibia 




settlements’ unable to access adequate housing and most basic services, 
including adequate sanitation (Figure 15). The percentage of households living in 
such impoverished housing conditions in Windhoek is estimated at about 42 
percent according to official statistics (Namibia Statistics Agency, 2017a, p101).36 
This growth continues along the underlying apartheid city patterns (see Figure 16). 
The former white eastern and southern residential areas are associated with higher 
incomes and standards of living, whereas the north-west continues to bear the 
stigma of poverty and marginalisation (Friedman, 2000; Lühl and Delgado, 2013).  
 





36  Informal settlement counts by the Shack Dwellers Federation of Namibia (SDFN) through their 
Community Land Information Programme (CLIP) put the number of households living in shacks in 
informal settlements considerably higher at about 63 percent of all households. This is based on an 
unpublished CLIP informal settlement profiling report from 2018 that was shared with me by the Namibia 
Housing Action Group. It must be noted that CLIP excludes backyard structures and other forms of 




Figure 16: Map of Windhoek in 2010 showing informal expansion on the fringes of the 
former townships with the general structure of segregated development largely intact. 
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Today, 30 years after gaining Independence from South Africa, Namibia retains a 
highly unequal economy that creates standards of living comparable to 
Scandinavia for a small minority who are seamlessly integrated – economically, 
socially and spatially - into a global economy. This is a ‘first world’ reality, with the 
latest luxury cars, large suburban mansions and shopping malls, world-class 
private healthcare and education, high-speed internet and other advanced 
infrastructure. For the great majority this realm remains out of reach, yet always 
agonisingly present in its material representations. Today, domestic workers 
especially, many of whom are informally employed, have to cross the line between 
these separate and highly unequal worlds daily.37 As Melber highlights, in colonial 
times domestic servants were “often rather intimately – exposed to the world of the 
masters, while these in their overwhelming majority had no idea about the living 
conditions of their servants” (Melber, 2016, p7). This has arguably not changed 
much since. 
 
In 2008 Namibia was reclassified by the World Bank as an upper middle-income 
country based on the Gross National Income (GNI) per capita.38 While in 2015 the 
Namibia’s GNI per capita stood at U$5,190 (The World Bank, 2017), the country 
continues to rank as the second most unequal society worldwide, measured by its 
GINI coefficient of 60.97,39  just after South Africa and other neighbouring countries 
(The World Bank, no date).40 Of those who have work in Windhoek, 55.6 percent 
 
 
37  One of the common euphemisms for apartheid racial segregation was ‘separate but equal’ development 
for the different ethnic groups.  
38  Upper middle-income economies are those with a Gross National Income per capita between U$4,036 
– 12,475 (GBP 3,105 – 9,596) (The World Bank, 2017). 
39  There are different methods of estimating GINI, and data from different countries is not always 
comparable and from the same period. However, this does not diminish the extent of inequality that 
exists in Namibia today.  
40  To put this in perspective, the Namibian Labour Force Survey of 2014 reports that only four percent of 
households have a monthly income above N$ 10,000 (GBP 526), seven percent have an income 
between N$ 5,000 and N$10,000 (GBP 263 – 526) and a staggering 89 percent of households have an 
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are informally employed and 12.4 percent are in vulnerable employment, including 
own-account workers, unpaid family workers and subsistence farmers (Namibia 
Statistics Agency, 2017b, p51–52). These together make up the ‘informal 
economy’, which is characterised by its low and irregular income and uncertain 
labour conditions, amongst other features.41 
 
Efforts to overcome the socio-spatial inequalities represented by these statistics 
face a number of impediments. Tellingly, the pervasive spatial legacies of racial 
and ethnic segregation were not directly addressed in the Namibian Constitution 
even though colonialism, racism and apartheid were singled out as the major 
challenges to overcome (Republic of Namibia, 1990, p5). Private property received 
constitutional protection while ancestral land claims were not entertained (Werner, 
2015, p10), though attitudes towards the latter seem to be slowly shifting after the 
2018 National Land Conference where Guillermo Delgado and I presented on the 
necessity of an urban land reform (Lühl and Delgado, 2018). Article 23 of the 
Namibian Constitution makes reference only to social, economic and educational 
aspects of historical inequality (Republic of Namibia, 1990, p15). Not 
unsurprisingly, during the first 20 odd years since independence, space and its 
significance for a post-colonial future, has not been the subject of much public 
debate, with government focusing more on a “quantitative than a qualitative	
approach” towards undoing socio-economic discrepancies (Tjitjo quoted in Lühl, 
2012b). Only more recently has the issue of housing and access to urban land 
gained prominence in the public debate (Delgado, 2018).  
 
 
income below N$ 5,000 (GBP 263) (Namibia Statistics Agency, 2015). Unemployment stands at 34 
percent of the economically active population (Namibia Statistics Agency, 2017b, p56), while 
underemployment remains a major concern. 
41  Even some of those employed in the relatively large public sector, who themselves account for about 
25 percent of the formally employed, are unable to access adequate housing as urban land and housing 
have become a major speculative playing field (Delgado and Lühl, 2016). 
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Namibia’s post-colonial transition is on-going: previous legal discrimination has 
been abolished, yet social and spatial legacies of earlier dispensations have 
proven hard to dispel. Income inequalities and underdevelopment of the former 
townships remain entrenched and mixed-income neighbourhoods are rare, even 
though local government was extensively reformed to become more inclusive, 
democratic and accountable. Rapid urbanisation and the lack of serviced land and 
infrastructure development have spurred ‘informal settlement’ growth. But this 
emerging ‘urban informality’ is only tolerated at the fringes of the former townships, 
and not near middle- and higher-income areas, perpetuating the segregation that 
was envisioned by the apartheid administration and enabling the entrenchment of 
the formal / informal binary. 
4.4 Policy response to the emerging ‘informal economy’ 
Namibia’s ‘informal economy’ has generally been under-researched. While a 
number of studies exist, the understanding of the ‘informal economy’ as an inherent 
part of the economy is yet to be clearly outlined. One of the earliest studies about 
the local informal sector is Simon’s Urban Poverty, Informal Sector Activity and 
Inter-sectoral linkages: Evidence from Windhoek, Namibia, published in 1984.42 
Simon’s survey, conducted through 25 structured interviews under sometimes 
difficult circumstances,43 proved the notion that “informal urban economic activity 
largely represents a response to poverty, un- or underemployment or lack of job 
security” (Simon, 1984, p551). The survey found that about 52 percent of informal 
activities counted for production and retail, 36 percent for retail and distribution 
 
 
42  Again, as in the literature review above I suspend the use of quotation marks for informal and informality 
where these words are used in the reviewed literature. 




only and 4 percent for production and service activities. Hawking was found to be 
dominant,44  especially in ‘squatter’ areas because of the absence of formal retail 
outlets.45 Hawking was observed to intensify along popular pedestrian routes or at 
major public nodes but was fairly scattered within the township (1984, p562). 
Equally ubiquitous were shebeens, selling liquor bought from formal bottle stores 
or home-brewed mahangu (sorghum) beer or both. In some areas up to one out of 
two or three houses would operate a shebeen for the immediate neighbourhood. 
Shebeens were never advertised, to avoid drawing the authorities’ attention to this 
illegal activity. Services offered included backyard motor mechanics, upholsterers, 
baby-sitters, barbers and hairdressers, shoe repairs, construction and related 
activities, especially since the introduction of home extension and housing self-help 
schemes became more generalised. More marginalised activities such as 
scavenging on refuse dumps, collecting firewood as well as illegal activities such 
as drug-peddling, recycling of stolen goods as well as prostitution were also 
considered part of the informal sector (1984, p571). 
 
Simon’s study aimed to ascertain whether inter-sectoral linkages between the 
formal and informal sector – widely agreed to exist – are exploitative and whether 
informal enterprises are capable of growth and diversification if adequately 
promoted. Purchases from formal wholesale outlets were found to be the major 
supply, and some exploitative relations were uncovered, especially regarding the 
sale of alcohol. Informal enterprises were for the most part one-man operations (68 
percent) and only 4 percent employed more than three people. Women formed 57 
 
 
44  This included retail hawkers and vendors selling a variety of goods, e.g. fruit, vetkoeks (fried batter 
cakes), bread, cool drinks, meat, firewood, baskets, wood carvings, leather goods, and jewellery 
(Simon, 1984, p571). 




percent of the overall participants and predominated in the operation of shebeens, 
basket weaving, doll-making, and hawking food products, while men were 
responsible for all construction-related activities, car repairs and equipment 
maintenance, newspaper vending, woodcarving, operation of private taxis, and 
most fruit hawking (1984, p564–566). Simon found that most informal enterprises 
in Windhoek were subsistence oriented and had little potential for growth. He thus 
concluded that the case of Windhoek lends support to the premise that informal 
sector growth is mainly owing to survival mechanisms in circumstances of rising 
unemployment and diminishing real incomes for unskilled labour (1984, p568–569). 
 
These predictions have been largely confirmed. The Informal Economy Survey of 
2001, undertaken by the Ministry of Labour reported an unemployment rate of 20.2 
percent and estimated that 132,602 people were employed in the informal 
economy (Ministry of Labour, 2004). If compared with 2000 Labour Force Survey 
statistics, which indicated 541,447 people as the total labour force (Ministry of 
Labour, 2002), this constituted roughly 25 percent of the economically active 
population. The survey further found that 53 percent of urban households were 
solely dependent on income from informal enterprise activities. Twenty five percent 
of the informal economy operators were found to be also engaged in other 
activities. In urban areas 45 percent of these had a job in the private sector, 30 
percent had a government job, and 16 percent a job at a parastatal enterprise 
(Ministry of Labour, 2004).  
 
More recent labour statistics indicate that 67 percent of employment in Namibia 
(57 percent in urban areas) is informal (Namibia Statistics Agency, 2017b), 
showing a stark increase compared to 2001. An informal economy survey 
conducted by the Ministry of Labour, Industrial Relations and Employment Creation 
together with the Social Security Commission in 2016 indicates that the Namibian 
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informal economy remains predominantly made up of own-account workers (77 
percent) with low degree of collective organisation, suggesting a more survivalist 
character of activities. 58 percent of informal workers operate from their residential 
premises, 12 percent from dedicated market spaces and 11 percent within the 
public space of the street (Ministry of Labour, Industrial Relations and Employment 
Creation and Social Security Commission, 2017). This is indicative of generally 
stricter regulations and their enforcement in public space, and a lack of public 
infrastructure in support of informal economies. 
 
‘Informal’ trade is regulated by the Local Authorities Amendment Act (Government 
of the Republic of Namibia, 2000). On this basis the CoW developed Informal 
Trading Regulations (City of Windhoek, 2007). An informal trader can register in 
four categories: a “market informal trader” (those who conduct their businesses 
from a stall in a municipal market), a “fixed informal trader” (those who conduct 
their business from a stationary stand or marked site), a “roaming informal trader” 
(those trading in a mobile way but within a defined area specified by the trader and 
subject to approval by the CoW CEO) or a “temporary informal trader” (not 
exceeding 90 days, and not issued for more than two consecutive periods; traders 
must wait at least 30 days before being able to re-apply). Applicants as assistants 
of informal traders must follow similar procedures. The regulations furthermore 
distinguish between “a stall”, or a structure that is permanent “with roof and walls”, 
erected by the council at a municipal market, capable of being locked-up, and let 
to a trader, and “a stand”, which might not have walls, and although being erected 
by council, it does not necessarily need to be at a municipal market. Traders hire 
stalls or stands through a lease agreement with the council, and may only sell 
goods indicated in their permit, and only in the stipulated area (City of Windhoek, 
2007). It is clear from these regulations that their drafters sought to bring all 
economic activity under the purview of the local authority. Failure to comply 
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amounts to a criminal offence, which may lead to the impounding of goods and 
equipment. The irony is that traders are labelled ‘informal’ even after being 
subjected to a protocol of registration and control. 
 
The regulations further stipulate that an informal trader may not sell intoxicating 
liquor, stay overnight at the premises, erect any structure, create a nuisance, make 
a fire that could harm any person or damage property, and may not conduct 
business in a garden or park (unless marked by the council), on a sidewalk, near 
public buildings, churches, national monuments, in an area within 500m from a 
municipal market, or other places where trading creates an “obstruction”. As 
mentioned in CHAPTER 3 above, and as I will elaborate in CHAPTER 6 below, 
traders at the Herero Mall contravene all of the above regulations. The fact that they 
are tolerated by municipal authorities clearly highlights the disjuncture between 
such regulatory fervour and everyday realities of rapidly urbanising spaces. At the 
same time, harassment of vendors and hawkers continues and is frequently 
reported in the media. Existing regulations thus paint a concerning vision for 
‘informal’ trade, being on the border of legality and often beyond it. 
 
Similarly instructive is the controversy that erupted around the introduction of the 
Liquor Act of 1998. The new Act that replaced various colonial legislations around 
alcohol use and though adopted by Parliament in 1998, it was only gazetted in 
2002. According to Dobler (2010) the act combined contradictory objectives of 
increasing control and state revenue through licensing of alcohol outlets, especially 
shebeens, at the same time as addressing moral and public health concerns 
around alcohol abuse (2010, p181–182). Particularly contentious were the 
requirements for licensing of shebeens in the Schedule IV of the act, which 
included that shebeens needed to comply with existing zoning regulations within 
the area; that approval by a health officer had to be obtained before starting 
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operations; that separate male and female toilets had to be provided on the 
premises; that the flooring of the shebeen had to have a smooth finish [read: a 
concrete floor]; and that spaces within the shebeen were not be used as a 
habitable space (Isaacs, 2006).  
 
Opposition to the impending enforcement of these regulations was led by the 
Namibia Shebeen Association with wide support by political and civil society 
organisations, who argued that shebeens presented one of the scarce 
opportunities for economic participation by the most disadvantaged citizens, and 
that the new regulations would be prohibitive for the vast majority of shebeen 
owners, and thus unfair (Dobler, 2010, p184). This led to coordinated protests by 
hundreds of shebeen operators who, after unsuccessfully petitioning the President, 
camped at Parliament until the Government agreed to review the requirements, but 
without scrapping the requirement for licensing altogether (Isaacs, 2006). 
According to Dobler (2010) the shebeen protests saw one of the few moments of 
mass popular protest and debate about regulatory reform as the regulation of 
alcohol use reached many in their immediate everyday lives. I would argue that this 
also signifies the contention over ‘informal’ economic activities as a central locus 
of everyday urban politics that requires further analysis, which I will attempt in 
CHAPTER 5 below. 
 
However, not all regulations are to the detriment of the informal economy. A recent 
study investigated the ‘high street’ or ‘business corridor’ policy applied in Windhoek 
since 2008 through investigating the “leisure economy” of Eveline Street in Katutura 
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(Charman et al., 2017).46  This case study was of interest to the South African 
research team as in South Africa the usual policy response is to restrict where, 
when and how alcohol-serving businesses may operate (2017, p3). The authors 
testify to an on-going “moral panic” around the consumption of alcohol in 
townships, leading to restrictive apartheid-era liquor policies to continue to be 
implemented. The study found that a significant proportion of shebeens in 
Windhoek’s settlements are positioned along important transport routes or “high 
streets” (2017, p13). Comparing 2008 baseline data collected by the City of 
Windhoek with their own 2016 survey, it was found that the high street economy of 
Eveline Street has undergone profound densification and diversification of 
enterprise activities. The number of businesses had doubled from 133 to 270 and 
the economy had diversified from a predominance of bars and car washes in 2008 
to a much wider range of enterprises. While the total number of bars increased from 
61 to 80, as a proportion of overall enterprises bars decreased from 45 percent in 
2008 to 29 percent in 2016. The number of car washes remained constant, 
reducing their proportion from 29 percent to 14 percent. The growing economic 
diversity comprises both what the authors call “survivalist activities”, such as street 
braais, street trade, green grocers, etc. and businesses operating from dedicated 
business premises, such as hair salons, house shops, print shops, food takeaway 
businesses, and vehicle services such as car mechanics, panel beaters and spare-
part suppliers (2017, p15–17). It became clear that car washes, hair salons, and 
takeaways are related to bars “through the dynamic of the leisure economy”, with 




46  The authors’ definition of the ‘leisure economy’ includes bars, restaurants, street food establishments, 
entertainers and musicians, and businesses providing services such as car guards, car washes, hair 
salons, etc. (Charman et al., 2017, p3) 
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The new dimension the study introduced was a spatial analysis of the street (see 
Figure 17), which indicated that diversified land use has been supported by a 
number of factors: varying plot sizes along the high street; a wide and symmetrical 
road reserve, allowing both sides of the street an equal opportunity to develop and 
concentrate activities within the public space; and the initial placing of residential 
dwellings set back from the boundary line, enabling property owners to develop 
the land both in front and behind the dwelling. Generally, businesses are situated 
along the street edge whilst existing backyards allowed for densification with 
additional rental dwellings. According to the authors there is a contrast between 
the transience of the infrastructure set up on public land and the monetary 
investment in solid construction where private property rights exist. Charman et al. 
describe the architecture as follows:  
The architecture of social and business space is people-centred. Buildings, 
structures and objects come alive through the manner of their usage. As a 
result, the architecture is preoccupied with attracting people to various spaces. 
[…] Since the sidewalk is accessible to spatial transitions, it is easily 
appropriated with use rights marked through surface treatments and the use 
of objects (2017, p23–27).  
The authors conclude that despite political support for the high street concept 
having relied on the assumption that shebeens would be compelled to relocate 
from within residential neighbourhoods, this proposition was not supported by the 
evidence (2017, p39). Nevertheless, the spatial and social dynamics and qualities 
created through the business corridor policy are notable for creating unique spatial 





Figure 17: Sketch of architectural interventions along Eveline Street, Katutura. Source: 
(Charman et al., 2017, permission for reproduction granted by the authors). This visual also 
appears in the new publication Township economy: people, spaces and practices by 
Charman et al. (2020). 
Windhoek’s ‘informal’ economy can be traced back to the early 1980s as a 
survivalist response to rising unemployment following increased influx of rural 
migrants.  Early on observers accounted for linkages with the formal, white-owned 
business sector, especially in the realm of retail that continues to dominate 
‘informal’ economic activities. Similarly, in many cases ‘informal’ income 
complements a formal salary within a household. Spatially, most of the activities 
happen in residents’ homes, while activities in the public space are subject to 
increased control, underpinned by regulatory frameworks at the national and local 
levels that criminalise ‘informal’ economic activity. However, in everyday practice 
coherent enforcement of regulations is hardly achievable, which creates ambiguity 
and insecurity for residents. At other times regulations are prohibitive for residents 
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to comply with, which in the case of restrictive liquor licensing has led to protests 
and confrontation with lawmakers. Despite clear evidence – including that 
contained in government surveys – that the ‘informal economy’ is becoming 
mainstream and about to overtake the formal sector in terms of its relevance for 
livelihoods, regulation and control of those activities seems to be the dominant 
policy imperative. 
4.5 Characteristics of professional spatial practice 
Our whole setup is a patron-based, capitalist system of architectural 
procurement, and I can’t see that changing. There is no support system for 
practice-based research or knowledge co-production. 
Local architect 
After exploring the social and spatial development of Windhoek and the wider 
territory and tracing historical vectors of development above, in the final section of 
this chapter I will focus on situating the built environment professions, particularly 
architecture and spatial planning within this historical narrative. Frayne has argued 
that regional and urban planning practice in Namibia, long dominated by the white 
professional class, relied heavily on a positivist-functionalist planning ideology, in 
other words maintaining that the universal rational and scientific planning principles 
that exist are purportedly non-political (2000, p54–59). While the implication of the 
planning profession in the realisation of apartheid geographies created a sense of 
uneasiness amongst planners post-independence, they provided no radical or 
more equitable alternative planning visions (2000, p56). According to Frayne, 
planners’ reluctance to lower “extravagant” engineering standards (which had 
been devised to satisfy the requirements of the white settler minority) in order to 
reach the broader population, exemplify their mental distance from the lived reality 
of the poorer sectors of society. More generally in Africa, Watson argues that the 
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optimistic notion that informal settlements are areas waiting to be substituted by 
orderly or “proper development” (2003, p395) persists. She posits “conflicting 
rationalities” between the formal institutions for spatial production and the realities 
in contemporary urban Africa as a major challenge:  
[…] attempts by functionaries of government to extend the grid of formalized 
and regulated development over what is often termed the ‘informal’ or 
sometimes ‘unruly’ (or unrule-able?) […] part of the city. […] A vast gap exists 
between the notion of ‘proper’ communities held by most planners and 
administrators (grounded in the rationality of Western modernity and 
development), and the rationality which informs the strategies and tactics of 
those who are attempting to survive, materially and politically, in the harsh 
environment of Africa’s cities (2003, p401).  
The question of how planners and spatial professionals in general situate 
themselves ethically within a context of such different value systems becomes 
pertinent and has not, according to Watson, received adequate attention in 
planning theory. I argue that the conventional approach by the architectural and 
spatial planning disciplines, government officials and planning authorities is to 
avoid the socio-economic and political questions inherent in their practice.  
 
Similar to most other built environment professions, I have shown elsewhere that 
the Namibian architectural profession remains profoundly stratified in terms of race 
and gender. Of the 131 registered architects in Namibia 75 percent are white47 and 
only about 22 percent are female. Amongst the 60 percent of all registered 
architects that are Namibian nationals, numbers are even starker: 85 percent are 
white (Lühl, 2018). This demographic distribution has historical reasons, not least 
because of the absence of a school of architecture in Namibia before 2010, when 
 
 
47  ‘Whites” only make up about 7 percent of the population.  
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the Namibia University of Science and Technology established the Department of 
Architecture, where I am working as a lecturer since 2011. The opportunity to study 
architecture outside Namibia had been accessible only to a small and mostly white 
minority of Namibians. Given the historical inequalities related to race, a profession 
largely made up of middle or upper-class white males embodies a specific 
worldview regarding challenges and solutions within the socio-spatial field.48 A 
major gap exists between architects who generally form part of the upper income 
strata of society, and the majority of ordinary citizens, for whom architecture with a 
capital ‘A’ has little meaning. This is most clearly exemplified in the extreme 
discrepancy (by a factor of 100) between government-prescribed minimum fees 
for professional architects, standing at N$ 1,734.95 (GBP 91) per hour (Ministry of 
Works and Transport, 2017), versus the minimum wage of a construction worker, 
currently at N$ 16.94 (GBP 0.89) per hour (The Namibian, 2018a). In addition, this 
gap is spatially articulated in the apartheid geography of residential suburbs 
described above, allowing parallel social worlds to exist and seldom to be 
transcended.  
 
But such disjuncture is not only of a social and spatial nature. Public procurement 
processes in Namibia have historically not considered the involvement of end 
users. The architect I interviewed 49  explained the procurement protocols for 
 
 
48  In a public debate on the topic of inclusive cities I organised in 2013, one architect presented Venice 
as an ideal example of a city that creates integrated communities. While the merit of this assertion is 
not to be discussed here, the mere fact that this extremely unique, central European example was 
considered to have relevance in the face of Namibia’s 21st century urbanisation challenges is telling. 
49  The architect studied at the University of Cape Town during the political upheaval of the final years of 
apartheid under Roelof Uytenbogaardt, Ivor Prinsloo, and Julian Cooke, amongst others who were very 
interested in social issues. She remembered that when in 1986 influx controls were lifted students could 
see from their studio how the Cape Flats changed from being mostly bush to being one vast informal 
settlement. She attributed her environmental inclination and consciousness to growing up in a small 
town in South Africa close to the beach with family life revolving a lot around the outdoors. She has 
since established herself as the foremost environmentally conscious architect in Namibia and has won 




government capital projects through the Ministry of Works and Transport. Until the 
recent implementation of a new Public Procurement Act, professional consultants 
were appointed based on a rotating system, with little transparency regarding 
selection criteria and processes. Besides the client ministry, consultants would only 
deal with the relevant government agencies, such as the regional councils, local 
authorities etc., but not with end users. According to her, “the planning and design 
system is conventionally top-down, it’s not designed for involvement. The 
involvement is often an afterthought”. Design competitions for public buildings 
were extremely rare, as are opportunities for process-based and participatory 
design. Where user-participation is a requirement, as in the case of the Herero Mall 
feasibility study, this is often not well understood and not provided adequate time 
for meaningful processes to take shape as I will elaborate later (see 7.1).  
 
The town planner I interviewed50 speculated that professionals might fear public 
participation because they deem it to “undermine” their legitimacy as “the 
professional” to safeguard the basis to charge fees. The architect acknowledged 
that the post-independence government-led construction boom allowed the 
historically restricted number of professionals to be consumed by getting work 
done without much reflection. Even though the architectural fraternity has an 
obligation to represent “the community” according to its code of conduct, being 
appointed by the state and not the communities, results in consultants following the 
orders of “the people that pay you”. According to her only the ongoing economic 
downturn since 2016, specifically in the building industry, necessitated 
 
 
50  The town planner was born in South Africa, where he studied at the University of the Free State. In the 
mid-1990s he worked at Namibia’s Ministry of Regional and Local Government providing town planning 
support to the Regions, including for the proclamation of towns. Subsequently he worked at a private 
town planning consultant firm, before joining the new Habitat Research & Development Centre as its 
first director and later the university as a town planning lecturer. The interview took place at the town 
planner’s office on 26.06.2017. 
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professionals to be more reflective with regards to their practice. In addition, she 
perceived the establishment of the architecture and spatial planning department 
at NUST as an opportunity to “start a new era of a more socially-conscious, 
research-based, appropriate architecture and urban design”.  
 
Professional spatial practice in Namibia, historically fashioned as an exclusive 
domain for whites, re-produces structural elitism. Class-based differentiation 
continues to be enshrined in law and in space and derivative worldviews do not 
easily align with processes and practices of ‘informal’ urbanisation on the ground. 
Public procurement processes enforce expert-led development that, as Blundell-
Jones et al. (2005) reminded us, removes people from decisions about their spatial 
environment. In the case of Namibia, with its historical legacies of structural 
inequality I have shown above, professional spatial practice remains structured as 
an exclusive practice based on colonial-inherited legislation. The fact that no 
radical visions for an alternative, more equitable urban development have been 
developed after decolonisation is indicative of a general resistance by 
professionals to question the very foundation on which their privilege rests. 
4.6 Conclusion: the conditions of emergence of the ‘informal’ discourse 
In this chapter I constructed an archaeology of the former colonial production and 
post-colonial reproduction of social, spatial and economic inequality in Namibia 
more generally and in Windhoek in particular. This is not only useful to contextualise 
my case study for the unfamiliar reader but also serves as the departure point of 
my analysis. I have shown how relationships of exploitation were created between 
the territory and the colonial ‘motherland’ as well as within the territory between 
colonial settlers and indigenous people. This was achieved through racial 
segregation at the territorial scale as well as within urban areas. Rural homelands 
were designed as reserves for the reproduction of unskilled labour for the emerging 
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colonial industries and as such became spaces of underdevelopment. Native 
locations or townships in urban areas in contrast were designed and equipped to 
be effective dormitory suburbs at the service of urban industry, sustained by the 
formal economy. I have shown how this was spatially articulated in the case of 
Windhoek and how the reorganisation of the city along apartheid planning doctrine 
was nevertheless cloaked in developmental disguise. The latter allowed apartheid 
‘native’ housing and urban planning models to be established as representations 
of orderliness, modernity and progress, though always far inferior to white urban 
areas. At the same time, social reproduction and the most apparent symptoms of 
underdevelopment were outsourced to the homelands and thus remained largely 
out of sight. 
 
I have subsequently demonstrated how the removal of urban influx controls from 
the late 1970s onwards, which had underpinned apartheid segregation, lead to the 
rise of ‘informal’ urbanisation. This form of urbanisation, which I will turn to in 
CHAPTER 6, defied the earlier modernist urban logic and was initially only tolerated 
to emerge on the periphery of the townships, ensuring that former white-only areas 
remained well-planned and regulated and thus further entrenched the binary 
between well-developed parts of town and the former townships that were in the 
process of becoming increasingly ‘informal’. The process included the rise of the 
‘informal’ economy, with activities such as hawking and home-based businesses 
that black residents had to rely on to make a living amid growing unemployment. I 
further showed that many of those activities remain criminalised even after 
decolonisation and exemplified how control and regulation continue to frame the 
primary policy (and police) response, even where it is to the detriment of those who 




In the last section of the chapter I analysed how professional spatial practice 
remains framed by racialised relations of production. I showed that top-down 
capital project procurement is the dominant mode of state intervention in 
infrastructure development. This in turn inscribes expert-led practices, guided by 
colonial-inherited modernist planning ideology, into the production of space. These 
practices are not only distant from the increasingly mainstream realities of ‘informal 
urbanisation’, and thus incapable to meaningfully intervene, but they re-produce 
structural inequality. Piecing together this archaeology was necessary to show why 
the formal / informal binary can persist in this setting. How this binary is constructed 






CHAPTER 5 ‘INFORMALITY’ AS DISCURSIVE PRACTICE 
… the most potent weapon in the hands of the oppressor, is the mind of the 
oppressed. 
Steve Biko (Biko and Stubbs, [1978] 2012, p75) 
When I embarked on this doctoral research, I would inform people that I was 
working on an informal market in a former township of Windhoek. I have since 
realised that I was using ‘informal’ to represent some degree of underdevelopment, 
that ‘market’ was a misnomer with misleading connotations about the spatial 
character of the place, and that ‘in the township’ was a proxy for social engagement 
on my part. I would continue to say that I was looking at how to better integrate 
inhabitants into the spatial planning processes that shaped such places. This 
inferred that the inhabitants had little agency in forming their spaces – which is far 
from the truth – and that spatial planning still reigned supreme, shaping urban 
spaces through legislation and spatial interventions directed by an all-powerful 
state.  
 
I have since realised that almost everything in these descriptions was superficial, 
partial or inconsistent with everyday practice. I realised that I was dealing with a 
whole set of what Foucault would call false self-evident truths (see p13), in other 
words an established common sense that was seldom questioned, and that hid 
unequal relations of power between myself, inhabitants, institutions, spaces and 
knowledges. I had set out to reconceptualise ‘informality’ as the locus of an alter-
urbanisation in the sense Brenner (2017) imagines it (see p7). This is because in 
my everyday spatial practice, which includes the university where I teach on topics 
of housing and urbanisation the term is widely used without reflection. Foucault 
urged that the task of writing effective history is to reveal “what thought … silently 
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thinks” (cited in Allen, 2016, p194) to unmask historically situated points of view for 
what they are: points of view. This made it necessary for me to ask how I (and 
others) had come to think the way I and they thought about the term ‘informality’ 
within the Namibian socio-spatial context.  
 
In the urban discourse in Namibia, ‘informal’ is used largely in relation to the two 
spheres of economic activity and urban areas: the ‘informal economy’ and ‘informal 
settlements’. In the previous chapter I traced the production of inequality under 
colonial rule and showed how both these spheres were the exclusive domain of 
colonial settlers – with few exceptions – enforced through racialised spatial 
planning and governance. In that chapter I argued that central to the colonial 
project was the control of the labour and movement of black bodies, particularly in 
those white domains governed by the paradigm of private property, i.e. in urban 
areas, on commercial farmland and in mines. ‘Natives’ whose labour power was 
not exploited for the purpose of colonial industry through the male-only contract 
labour system and urban influx control, were largely restricted to various rural 
bantustans according to their assigned racial origin. The social reproduction of 
black labour that was required for industrialisation and urbanisation by the white 
minority was externalised to the rural hinterland and could be accessed by the 
colonial power on demand. In this spatial duality, underdevelopment (see p74) was 
effectively relegated to ethnically-restricted rural areas. At the same time the towns 
and urban centres of apartheid assumed a ‘modern’ and orderly spatial expression 
and a civic self-image (see 4.1 above and Figure 18). This was realised though the 
development of modernist residential suburbs with a high standard of living, spatial 
abundance and well-developed service infrastructure. In other words, towns took 
on the spatial and social organisation of a modern, production-oriented, 
industrialising nation – though exclusively for the white minority – while “natives in 
urban areas” (Commission of Enquiry into South West Africa Affairs and Odendaal, 
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1964)51 were consigned to homogenous dormitory townships that were attached to 
the city in such a way as to maximise efficiency in the supply of required labour 
(see 4.1 and 4.2). 
 
 
            
Figure 18: 1970s South West Africa postage stamps presenting the image of a modern 
state. Top: J G Strijdom International Airport, Windhoek, 1977 (Pager, 1977); below left: 
Katutura State Hospital,1976 (Pager, 1976b); below right: Augustineum College, 1976 
(Pager, 1976a). Note that both the hospital and the college were reserved for ‘natives’.  
The following inquiry departs from the observation that today it is overwhelmingly – 
if not exclusively – black citizens who are discursively constructed to embody 
urban and economic ‘informality’. This argument I will unpack in what follows. 
According to community-led ‘shack’ counts, 52  about 80 percent of the urban 
population live in ‘shacks’ in ‘informal’ settlements53 and the NSA reports that 57 
 
 
51  This refers to the title of a chapter of the Odendaal Commission Report. 
52  “Shack” is a widely used colloquial term for a corrugated iron house.  
53  Also see footnote 36. This is based on an unpublished CLIP informal settlement profiling report from 
2018 that was shared with me by the Namibia Housing Action Group. While CLIP includes settlements 
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percent of employment in urban areas is ‘informal’ (Namibia Statistics Agency, 
2017b). These numbers include a vast majority of citizens for whom the end of 
colonial rule held the promise for a better and more equitable future. How could it 
be that in 2018, Namibian President Hage Geingob, who was amongst the leading 
anti-apartheid activists, could publicly contemplate the need for influx control into 
urban areas, in order to regain control over what is referred to as ‘informal’ 
urbanisation (New Era, 2018a)? How could it be that in the face of undignified living 
conditions and public health epidemics in poor urban settlements, he assigns 
blame to those who merely seek better opportunities in cities, while freedom of 
movement was a central demand of the liberation struggle? How could a young 
mayor 54 of the City of Windhoek, raised in Katutura not far from the Herero Mall, in 
the midst of a public health crisis largely because of the lack of municipal water 
and sanitation provision, single out vendors as being dirty and by implication being 
responsible for the crisis (New Era, 2018c)? 
 
While it could be argued that these views are here removed from the context in 
which they were uttered, the fact that they can be expressed by high-level 
politicians today – both stalwarts of the liberation struggle and younger politicians 
– is significant for the purpose of this study. At the beginning of my research I had 
imagined that there was more to understand about ‘informality’ – this assumed 
concept – in order to better plan for and with it. But in the light of such utterings, 
Foucault’s conceptualisation of discourse as the analysis of power relations and 
 
 
that are not proclaimed as urban areas it excludes backyard structures and other forms of informal 
inhabitation within formal areas. 
54  The mayor (at the time of interview) grew up in Katutura, Windhoek, next to Katjimuine Primary School 
close to the Herero Mall. He holds a Diploma in Youth Development, a Certificate in Local Government 
and one in Management of Local Social and Economic Development. In 2010 he was a first-time 
councillor through the Namibia National Students Organisation (NANSO), was elected as Deputy Mayor 
in 2013 and as Mayor 2015. In late 2019 he was succeeded as Mayor by a fellow councillor. The 
interview took place at the mayor’s office on 30.01.2019. 
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their technologies (Scheurich and McKenzie, 2005) led me to question if 
‘informality,’ rather than an analytical category as much of the literature would have 
it (see 2.1), could be understood as a discursive practice.  
 
This led to the formulation of the first research question (see 1.3), which this chapter 
will address: How is the discourse of ‘informality’ constructed through the language 
and practices of activists, professionals, state officials, the media and other actors 
in spatial production in Namibia? This requires engaging with the philosophical 
ideas, institutions, practices, everyday life and formal knowledges (disciplines) that 
constitute and re-produce this discourse, and in so doing expose its technologies 
of power. The aim is to expose the urban politics that this discourse enables and 
its practical implications, to reveal assumptions, presuppositions, and ‘self-evident’ 
beliefs that are held by a range of spatial practitioners in Namibia about the 
‘informal’ and how these form part of the discourse of ‘informality’. 
 
To answer these questions, I undertook in-depth interviews with a range of spatial 
practitioners about their understanding of and engagement with the ‘informal’. All 
the practitioners I interviewed were selected because they were or had been 
involved in projects and practices involving organised groups of people in the 
context of spatial or economic ‘informality’. I relied on triangulation with policy 
documents, media reports and secondary sources where this was necessary. In 
the following section I present a critical analysis of the interviews inspired by 
Foucault’s genealogical method that I outlined in the Methodological strategy (see 




5.1 Locating the discourse of ‘informality’ 
That’s the thinking in Namibia, that the informal sector does not belong in the 
mainstream economy. It does not belong in the main street in the CBD, they 
are dirty, they must be out, we must clean them… 
Informal Sector Organiser  
5.1.1 The formal as normative 
In the Namibian context the use of the term “informal” in relation to urbanisation 
can be traced to academic publications in the 1980s and 1990s (Hansohm, 1996; 
Van der Linden, 1994; Simon, 1984), coinciding with its emergence in development 
debates globally (see 2.1.1 and 0). This temporal intersection with Namibia’s 
decolonisation process, during which the previously excluded black majority 
gradually obtained legal equality, obliterating previous racist definitions of the other 
– the non-white, non-urban, non-modern – is of significance and needs to be 
elaborated in more detail. Labour unrest in the migrant labour compounds in the 
1970s and 80s had galvanised the emergence of the labour movement that fought 
to improve labour conditions for black workers. Both the informal sector organiser55 
and the labour expert56 I interviewed started their careers in the student and labour 
movements emerging in the mid-1980s and remained involved in the trade union 
 
 
55  I derived the title ‘informal sector organiser’ for this particular interviewee from the title of the Namibia 
Informal Sector Organisation he currently directs. He was a student organiser at Augustineum Training 
College in Khomasdal during the 1976 student uprisings. He first joined the workforce as a general 
worker in Windhoek and later as a teacher in Opuwo. In the early 1980s he became actively involved in 
the labour union movement. He recalled how his upbringing in the Old Location, where his mother was 
a hawker, made him aware of the challenges of earning a livelihood, and led him to establish various 
organisations in support of the informal sector. He posits that his class consciousness was based on a 
simple question: why are we poor? The interview took place at an informal market on 06.11.2017. 
56  The labour expert is a teacher by training with a main focus on political studies, languages, history, and 
economics. He emigrated from Germany to Namibia in 1988 to become a teacher at Jacob Marengo 
Tutorial College in Katutura where he supported student boycotts and became a founder member of 
the National Democratic Teachers Union. He has since supported the labour movement in various ways, 
notably during his directorship of the Labour Resource and Research Institute of the National Union of 




and the ‘informal sector’ movements ever since. Many current political and 
business leaders have their roots in the labour and student movements which 
subsequently became affiliated with the ruling SWAPO party. The resultant gains 
for organised labour and formal employees after independence were significant 
and are evident in the Constitution of 1990 and the Labour Act of 1992 and its 
amendments. For instance, workers in Namibia have the right to 24 consecutive 
days of paid leave per annum as part of their basic conditions of employment, 
amongst other wide-ranging labour rights (Government of the Republic of Namibia, 
2007). However, the rate of urbanisation stood at only 28 percent in 1991 (Central 
Statistics Office, 1994), and the number of the formally employed who benefitted 
from these new legal provisions stood at only 45 percent of the labour force (or the 
total economically active population) (see  
Table 2). What was a necessary adjustment to improve labour conditions was 
already at that time unable to reach a broad majority, and the percentage of those 
in formal employment according to official statistics has since decreased further to 
37 percent. 
 

























































Population 1 409 920  100 2 413 643  100 
Labour 
Force 479 779 100 34 1 090 153 100 45 
Employees 
(formal) 218 077 45 15 401 970 37 17 
Unemployed 




Table 2: Formal employment as part of labour force in 1991. Compiled by author from 
(Central Statistics Office, 1994) and (Namibia Statistics Agency, 2019). 
While labour conditions for formal employees improved significantly after 
independence, it did not do so in the ‘informal sector’. For instance, the informal 
sector organiser shared his experience of the lengthy and difficult “struggle” to 
register a welfare organisation to support hawkers, predominantly women, in the 
early 1990s and the resistance by the Windhoek municipality to make land 
available to his organisation:57 “[the] municipality was totally ignoring us”. Yet, the 
Okatumbatumba Hawkers Association58 he headed grew rapidly, with about 5000-
6000 members in the late 1990s. The initial driving force behind organising these 
hawkers was a programme to buy in bulk from the Namibian Breweries and large 
wholesale retailers for distribution amongst hawkers. This allowed collective price 
negotiations and more efficient transport to disparate areas in the townships that 
were under-serviced by formal retail outlets. The informal sector organiser recalled 
that these companies “were very careful about us [hawkers] not to boycott their 
products”. While formal businesses were eager to penetrate this emerging petty 
retail sector and its associated market, government continued to prioritise formal 
sector employment and economic growth. The informal sector organiser 
summarised his frustration: 
They talk about a new constitution, but that constitution does not work for us. 
There are new laws, but there is no law that protects the informal sector. That 
became the problem and we said there must be a law to protect the informal 
sector, it must be recognised as the beginning of business first, before we go 
any further, instead of demonising us. […] They fooled us with the term SME 
[Small Medium Enterprise], but […] the SME policy does not even work for us. 
 
 
57  Simon also reminded us that hawking and home-based business, often including the sale of self-brewed 
alcohol, was strictly illegal in the colonial setting, and subject to harsh penalties (Simon, 1984). 
58  The association was established by hawkers in 1988. Okatumbatumba means “we are trying to come 
up step by step” in Otjiherero. 
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[…] After 14 years they bring a new term SMME [Small Medium and Micro 
Enterprise], and we asked where is the informal sector? Why is it not included? 
So we are still fighting. It’s close to 30 years now after independence and there 
is no policy for the informal sector. 
The informal sector organiser here clearly utilised a binary conception of the 
‘informal’ as a ‘sector’ apart from the formal. He further identified with the informal 
sector, which he saw as being demonised by the government which enabled the 
formal economy and the historically white-dominated retail sector to thrive. Yet, the 
fight according to him was for extension of legislation and protection to the informal 
sector in the same way as the formal sector was legislated and protected. He 
seemed to assert that the ‘informal sector’ had been deliberately overlooked. 
 
However, the informal sector organiser, the labour expert and the economic 
development officer59 I interviewed all emphasised that this sphere of economic 
activity allows large numbers of people without financial means and prior 
knowledge of regulatory requirements to pursue economic activity for survival. Yet, 
a bias by governmental authorities against such independent, petty and survivalist 
economic activity was perceived by all of them. According to the labour expert this 
could partly be explained to have its roots in the contract labour system, which was 
at the heart of the colonial project, and through which a large portion of the current 
political leadership was socialised: 
Through the migrant labour system in our case, the young men had to apply in 
Ondangwa with SWANLA [South West Africa Native Labour Association] for a 
contract with one of those [large formal businesses]. Then, you will find that 
with people from those areas, they were regarded as the outstanding ones, as 
 
 
59  The economic development officer was born and raised in Windhoek and studied business 
administration with specialisation in commerce and entrepreneurship. He worked at a commercial bank 
before joining the City of Windhoek, where he has been working for more than 20 years focusing on 
SME development, and specifically providing infrastructure to accommodate “micro-entrepreneurs” in 
the city. The interview took place at the economic development officer’s office on 07.07.2017. 
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the achievers, they came back with some cash, with nice shoes and with a 
leather jacket, making them immediately visible as those on Okaholo, the 
contract system. That set in motion a system, where to work for TCL [Tsumeb 
Corporation Ltd] as a migrant worker was already a step above being a 
subsistence farmer in Okwaluudhi [Traditional Aawambo kingdom in northern 
Namibia]. 
He argued that the heightened social status of wage labour was partly due to 
colonial contract labourers being the harbingers of the money economy and its 
related aesthetic of modernity in rural areas. In this setting, having access to cash 
with its associated flexibility to command social relations across space and time, 
allowed the perception of the supremacy of formal labour to take root. The strict 
separation between ‘native’ and white, rural and urban areas, meant that the 
realities of the well-documented oppressive contract labour conditions remained 
spatially removed from the rural areas where the remittances were consumed. As 
the recruitment of contract labourers happened in the rural areas, only those who 
qualified for a labour contract would move to urban areas and would become 
intimately aware of the injustice inherent in the system. For those who did not have 
that first-hand experience but observed some of its seemingly positive impacts, 
perceptions of urban wealth and opportunities took hold. Still, in urban centres an 
emerging black working class became established. The labour expert argued that 
formal jobs and their generally higher wages, predictable payment cycles, regular 
working hours, associated benefits, paid holidays and opportunities for promotion 
earned higher social prestige than working independently in the ‘informal’ 
economy. He cited the study undertaken while he was the director of LaRRI, which 
showed that on the whole the income and living standards associated with formal 
jobs were generally higher than in the ‘informal’ economy (Mwilima, 2006). 
According to that study ‘informal’ workers considered formal work as superior to 
their current livelihood strategies, which the labour expert considered “rational”, 
given the economic insecurities that went along with ‘informal’ employment. 
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It is thus no coincidence that in the run-up to independence, the political activity of 
workers was focused on improving labour conditions within the contract labour 
system, drawing on the power of the withdrawal of labour to destabilise the colonial 
economy through strikes. These struggles within and against an overtly oppressive 
colonial economy, dominated by male contract labourers, would later inform the 
drafting of the constitution and post-independence law reform around labour rights. 
At the same time hawking and home-based businesses, dominated by women, 
started emerging in the townships (also see Simon, 1984 above). This was 
confirmed in my interviews with the informal sector organiser and the economic 
development officer from their personal experience. However self-organisation 
amongst hawkers was in its infancy and without much influence on policy 
formulation. 
 
The informal sector organiser added another dimension to the discourse of post-
colonial development in Namibia: the schism between the liberation fighters who 
were exiled in the Socialist / Communist countries and in the West – the so-called 
exiles – versus those who stayed in the country throughout the liberation struggle:  
We saw that those who came from abroad [the exiles], they were kind of 
championing development, while seeing those that were in the country as 
backwards. At the same time, they came from different countries with different 
systems, and these things were not synchronised in such a way that one learns 
from different systems to form one system, which is the local system. They were 
not prepared to learn from the locals […] on what they do and how to change 
the environment. 
Development was here construed as yet another import from industrialised and 
developed countries, disregarding local realities. Both capitalist and socialist or 
communist systems were production-oriented and as such aligned closely with a 
colonial economy based on wage-labour. While strategies might have differed, the 
emphasis on labour as the sole strategy for social progression was a common 
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denominator. Furthermore, the dominant labour model was deeply framed in 
gendered understandings of work, as historically colonial wage labour was male 
dominated while female labour was associated largely with domestic work and 
emergent petty trade and hawking. Within this setting, even those who were critical 
of the dominant development model, the labour expert and the informal sector 
organiser amongst others, called for expanding its reach to include those deemed 
to be excluded. This suggests that formal wage labour with its associated benefits 
and statutory protections has been established as the normative model against 
which all work and economic activity is measured. This model provides the lens 
through which reality is understood and development is conceptualised in a 
production-oriented, neo-colonial capitalist economy. 
5.1.2 ‘Informality’ as non-conformity 
In the previous chapter I outlined the gradual removal of urban influx controls for 
black Namibians since the late 1970s. The perception of urban areas as territories 
of opportunity – contrasting with the underdevelopment experienced in rural areas 
– could increasingly be acted upon by moving to towns without the prerequisite of 
having a job, as had been the case during the apartheid period. Although this 
established the freedom of movement for the black majority, formal employment, 
housing and infrastructure development were not expanding at the same rate, 
necessitating rural-urban migrants to find their own shelter and means of livelihood. 
The housing advocate60 I interviewed remembered: 
 
 
60  The housing advocate grew up in Namibia and studied architecture in Port Elizabeth. She worked at 
the Department of Works (pre-independence) for two years before embarking on a master degree and 
later a PhD in housing studies in the UK. She became involved with Saamstaan, the first community 
organisation working with the poor around improved housing conditions, which over the years led to the 
establishment of the Shack Dwellers Federation of Namibia (SDFN) and the Namibia Housing Action 
Group, the NGO supporting the SDFN, which she currently directs. The interview took place at the 
housing advocate’s office on 26.06.2017. 
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In the late 1980s there were nearly no informal settlements in Windhoek but 
there was lots of overcrowding, families living in one room. Or they were hiding 
in a shack behind houses that looked like it is for chickens, or in an old car, 
because the municipality removed any informal structures. 
Here ‘informal’ structures are those that are not the detached brick-and-mortar 
municipal rental houses that were originally constructed by the apartheid 
government. Avoiding municipal and police scrutiny required making structures 
look un-inhabitable for humans, thus amplifying the differentiation between the 
‘proper house’ and what came to be known as the backyard shack.  
 
Formal housing production continued at a slow rate after Independence, and 
catered for those with formal jobs, regular incomes and the ability to re-pay 
mortgages over a longer period (Delgado and Lühl, 2013, p58). Yet increasing 
rural-urban migration coupled with internal population growth and the 
overcrowding crisis lead to the growth of what in policy documents of the time was 
termed “spontaneous settlements” (Namibia National Housing Policy, 1991: 2) or 
“squatter areas” (1991, p23) on the peripheries of established urban townships. 
The policy called for their facilitation through declaring “reception areas with sites 
and services” for new residents to put up temporary self-built structures, while the 
local authority would incrementally provide services (1991, p23). However, in 
practice, the Windhoek municipality did not provide the sites and services at an 
adequate scale, but instead provided un-serviced reception areas with the 
proclaimed aim of servicing land elsewhere and then relocating residents to those 
areas. Without the alternative formalised land development materialising, many of 
the unplanned reception areas became permanent settlements lacking in basic 
services and without security of tenure. The living conditions in these areas remain 
deeply problematic for residents, to the extent that the President declared the 
situation a “humanitarian crisis” (Geingob, 2018), and have led to, amongst others, 
the current public health crisis alluded to in the introduction to this chapter. 
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Yet, in a similar fashion as with formal labour regulations, at the political level, 
statutory, formal urban land development processes are upheld as the only way to 
achieve what is considered dignified housing. According to Namibia’s Local 
Authority Act (Government of the Republic of Namibia, 1992), land has to be fully 
serviced before ownership can be transferred by the local authority.61 In addition, 
the 1991 Namibia Housing Policy established a minimum plot size of 300m2 
(Ministry of Regional and Local Government, Housing and Rural Development, 
1991), as the minimum space required for a house.62 Existing densities in ‘informal 
settlements’ have since increased to often two or more households living on what 
would become a minimum plot. This means in theory that inhabitants of existing 
settlements would have to be relocated en masse to conform to the legislation, 
while alternative serviced land for such relocations is not provided. Upholding 
unachievable developmental standards while providing too little public investment 
in urban land and housing (Delgado and Lühl, 2013, p58), essentially accelerated 
the production of ‘informal settlements’ while at the same time it delegitimised them 
– and more importantly their inhabitants – as not meeting the developmental goals 
of the political elites in the postcolonial state. 
 
The revised Namibia National Housing Policy of 2009 referred to these settlements 
as “informal settlements” (Ministry of Regional and Local Government, Housing and 
Rural Development, 2009) and called for their upgrading to improve services and 
tenure rights. However, this process was bypassed in favour of the formal, credit-
linked, contractor-based “Namibia Mass Housing Development” scheme launched 
in 2013, but already suspended in 2015 owing to gross irregularities and corruption 
 
 
61  Full servicing refers to availability of water, electricity, sewage and road infrastructure in newly 
developed residential areas. 
62  The most common housing model in Namibia is that of the detached house, usually centred on the plot 
to allow for side-ways additions. 
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in the tendering process (Integrated Land Management Institute, 2017). Because 
of increased advocacy to recognise bottom-up initiatives in the upgrading of 
informal settlements, the upgrading process has gathered momentum only very 
recently, especially since the President declared the living conditions in “informal 
settlements” a “humanitarian crisis” during the 2018 2nd National Land Conference 
(Geingob, 2018). The language in key policy documents on the issue of housing 
and urban development has changed over the years in insightful ways: ‘squatting’ 
clearly refers to unlawful occupation while ‘spontaneous settlement’ seems to 
indicate that this process was unforeseen and deemed beyond control. The shift 
to ‘informal settlements’ acknowledges their permanency yet emphasises their 
status of non-conformity vis-à-vis set formal standards that largely remain 
unachievable by the majority of urban residents. In other words, while ‘informal 
settlements’ are a symptom of underdevelopment, they become framed as the 
problem, which delegitimises such settings and their inhabitants in the eyes of 
government authorities. This shift is essential and linked to a larger transition. While 
free movement of citizens meant that underdevelopment became increasingly 
urbanised in the guise of ‘informal settlements’, the process of urbanisation came 
to be considered as negative, rather than the underdevelopment stemming from a 
lack of investment in urban development and service provision.  
 
The housing advocate provided a nuanced interpretation of formal processes:  
The formal process is regulated. […] In the housing process everything has a 
legal framework for how you get to the product. This is related to land rights 
and the market, financing, and to make sure […] what we need to share 
commonly, the roads, the safety aspects etc, […]. So, the informal would be 
outside of that framework, but it’s not necessarily illegal. It’s just not in the way 
that fits within the legal framework [that] prescribes what can be financed in a 
certain way. And if you are too poor you cannot participate in it. 
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Here the tension between the ‘informal’ and the illegal is addressed. While both 
remain outside the formal legal framework, she distinguishes the ‘informal’ as not 
fitting within the legal framework, rather than contravening it. She thereby attributes 
the non-conformity of the ‘informal’ not to the realities that are born out of necessity 
but to the inadequacy of the formal legal framework. That the poor cannot 
participate in the formal realm portrays them as excluded. A similarly nuanced 
analysis was also offered by the informal sector organiser who observed that: 
…it might be that 90 percent of our cabinet ministers and councillors are in the 
informal sector. I am saying that because they occupy the land in rural areas,63 
informally, without them noticing that they are informal. […] If I am a lawmaker, 
and I don’t like informality, I think everything has to go according to law. But 
then I own an illegal shebeen or a land in the rural areas… What is that law 
which I am making against the informal sector, if myself as a lawmaker I am 
informal. Those are the type of contradictions we have in our society. But when 
a poor person stands up and does something then he is illegal. 
This highlighted the fact that the ‘informal’ label is assigned selectively to the poor, 
and not to those of wealth and political power who might be involved in what would 
essentially constitute non-formalised business activities or landownership. He 
raised the point that on communal land, governed through traditional authorities, 
unlike the formal urban and commercial farming areas based on private property, 
‘informality’ is not well articulated and thus does not carry a similar stigma as in 
urban areas. 
 
In the above I have traced how underdevelopment became urbanised because 
formal employment in urban areas did not keep pace with the influx of rural 
migrants enabled by newly found freedom of movement. I argued that in turn, the 
 
 
63  The former minister of Minister of Industrialisation, Trade and SME Development Tjikero Tweya was 
embroiled in a controversy over unlawfully fencing off communal land in 2012 amongst other cases 
(The Namibian, 2012). 
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process of urbanisation became stigmatised as it was equated with the growth of 
‘informal settlements’. Decolonisation meant that the term ‘illegal’ was used less 
frequently with reference to those who reside in poor urban settlements without 
access to basic services and security of tenure and those engaged in hawking or 
home-based economic activities. However, replacing it with the term ‘informal’ 
reinforces the binary that constructs those who do not or cannot afford to conform 
to what is considered formal and proper as illegitimate. Unlike references to 
‘poverty’ or ‘slums’,64 which solicit moralistic obligations for charitable intervention, 
the fact that the subaltern are discursively construed as at fault, reduces the 
responsibility of the state to take corrective action. 
5.1.3 The ‘informal’ as illegitimate 
Having established the formal as the dominant normative reference that does not 
capture the full reality of lived experience requires us to understand how that which 
falls short of this norm is being treated discursively. Many policy documents such 
as the 2018 report on the Status of the Namibian Economy by the National Planning 
Commission (2018) for example, do not mention the ‘informal’ economy once, but 
rather revel in official data of formal economic activities. Yet, at local authority level 
in the City of Windhoek there seems to be growing acknowledgement that the 
‘informal’ economy is a lasting reality that provides livelihoods for many and is not 
a developmental stage. This was evidenced in my interviews with the mayor of the 
City of Windhoek and the city’s economic development officer who both 
acknowledged that the ‘informal’ economy is a lasting reality and that its 
contribution to the national economy needs to be recognised. Still, most policy 
debates argue for its inclusion, even if partial, in formal regulatory frameworks. This 
 
 
64  In Namibia the term “slum” is hardly used in the policy documents I reviewed for this thesis, unlike in 
other countries where its use is common. 
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impetus to formalise that which is ‘informal’ also became evident in the interviews 
with the two city officials. Both stressed the need for regulatory control over 
activities in the ‘informal’ economy. They insisted on the duality of the formal and 
the ‘informal’ economy, acknowledging linkages between the formal retail sector to 
the ‘informal sector’ only in terms of supply chains. The mayor provided the 
following definition: 
Informal work refers to work or jobs created in the informal sector. We refer to 
the sector as informal because most of the operators or their businesses are 
not registered with relevant authorities such the municipality, Government such 
as Ministry of Industrialisation, Trade and SME Development, Ministry of 
Finance for tax and the Social Security Commission etc. as required. The 
informal sector, informal economy, or grey economy is not taxed or monitored 
by any form of government. Unlike the formal economy, activities of the informal 
economy are also not included in a country's gross national product (GNP) or 
gross domestic product (GDP). […] In an informal work situation, the person 
doing the work generally has very little or no job security, doesn't have a 
contract and might not even have the same employer for more than a few 
weeks or months.  
The ‘informal’ is here identified by all that it is not: not regulated, not compliant, not 
taxed, not monitored, not job-secure and not measurable as contribution to GDP. 
Especially the aspect of measurability in terms of contribution to GDP is insightful: 
instead of the failure to measure the economic contribution of this economic realm 
owing to methodological shortcomings, the implication is that the problem lies with 
the ‘informal’ economy itself. Dismissing the ‘informal’ economy as not contributing 
to tax collection is biased: while individual income tax is lawfully exempted for 
annual incomes below N$ 50,000 (GBP 2,632) (Inland Revenue Department, 
Ministry of Finance, Republic of Namibia, 2018), a category into which the vast 
majority of the population falls (see p90), value-added tax is payable on all goods, 
which because of the dependence of ‘informal’ trade on the formal retail sector, 
applies even in the so-called ‘informal’ economy. This negative framing thus 
delegitimises livelihood strategies that are largely born out of necessity as not 
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contributing towards national development. The labour expert elaborated the view 
that GDP is essentially an unsuitable concept in a context of what he called an 
“enclave economy”, comparing the formal sector which is “preferred and idealised 
and frequently mentioned” to an island surrounded by ‘informality’. He explained: 
[…] we measure the economy through GDP, a classical western economic 
concept, but we maintain it till now. One of the shortcomings of that concept is 
that it only measures the contribution of the formal economy. So, in our case 
that means that two thirds of the population wouldn’t be measured by GDP.65 
[…] It would [require] a complete re-definition of statistics and require different 
measurements. GDP is a very unsuitable instrument to measure livelihoods and 
social progress. You can have massive GDP growth and absolute disastrous 
living conditions in a country, through high levels of pollution, etc. which would 
not affect GDP. 
He discerns the formal sector as idealised which is facilitated by the economic 
tools used for measuring the economy in terms of GDP. Exposing GDP as an 
inadequate economic methodology to capture the complexities of the real 
economy and measure social progression (Fioramonti, 2013), highlights the 
irrationality of this idealisation. He ascribed this to the stubborn notion that Namibia 
and South Africa are predominantly formal economies different from other African 
countries, what others have referred to as South African exceptionalism (Hull and 
James, 2012). However, in terms of survival strategies, incomes, and coping 
mechanisms of citizens, the formal economy is no longer the dominant one as I 
have also shown above (see 4.4). The predominance of such views can only be 
upheld owing to conventional economic indicators that effectively hide the extreme 
inequality that exists in these countries. According to him the stigma on the policy 
level is further reinforced by global institutions such as the International Monetary 
 
 
65  This refers to recently released labour statistics that 67 percent of employment in Namibia is informal 
(Namibia Statistics Agency, 2017b) 
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Fund, the World Bank and later the ILO, which largely represent formal sector 
employers, trade unions and the state, which all considered the ‘informal’ economy 
to be a sign of a problem (International Labour Organization, 2015) rather than 
something to be harnessed, leading to a global policy drive to formalise the 
‘informal’ economy, on which I will elaborate below. 
 
The stigmatisation of the ‘informal’ is thus driven not only locally but also at a global 
scale, with local consequences. In southern African cities, this has spurred the 
rapid expansion of large formal retailers with strong capital backing (both domestic 
and South African franchises) into the former dormitory black and coloured 
townships, resulting in a situation today where Namibia has among the highest 
supermarket penetration rate in Africa (Nickanor et al., 2017, p20). The informal 
sector organiser recounted: 
[…] you remember the apartheid times, there were bad things and there were 
good things. What was bad maybe was that we were not equal in terms of 
payment, but what was good was that blacks were allowed to sell in their own 
townships, and whites could sell this side. Now after independence, all these 
big companies went there [to the townships]. They were killing all those shops 
which were there. We said our money is not even ending up in Windhoek, our 
money now ends up in Cape Town. We buy everything from them, what is that 
which they buy from us? […] We thought we are still at the receiving end while 
the other white groups are building their companies. 
At first glance this might be a surprising argument: the spatial segregation meant 
that independent black shops and small-scale economies were somewhat 
protected in the townships and desegregation meant a sudden, unmitigated 
competition with large-scale capitalist retail companies. At the same time, the 
independent shops were black-owned while the big companies were white-owned, 
such that desegregation in fact enabled white capital to expand and capture much 
of the black majority as its market at the expense of black independent business. 
Different types of binaries are constructed here, not an imagined economic binary 
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of two separate sectors, but antagonistic relationships between us and them, black 
and white,66 small and large, local and foreign, disenfranchised and empowered.  
 
Amid this process of formal sector infiltration into poor townships the informal sector 
organiser narrated the struggle of Namibia Shebeen Association (NASA) opposing 
a Government proposal contained in the 2006 Liquor Bill to issue wholesale liquor 
licences to formal retailers and gas stations. This was considered unfair 
competition to shebeens that were dominating the market in the townships and led 
to the shebeen protests mentioned above (see p96). The provision was ultimately 
included in favour of the large-scale formal businesses. Conceptualising 
‘development’ as access to formal retail and opportunity for consumption remains 
a strong tendency to this day, and is at times paradoxically presented as a way of 
redressing inequities of the apartheid city. 67  The labour expert argued that 
politicians, who are predominantly black, are “too embedded in the formal 
economy and elite structures of society”. This, according to him has led to shacks 
and the ‘informal’ economy being seen as an embarrassment that needs to be 
eradicated,68 instead of seeing them as a base from which to improve the lives of 
those involved. The architect I interviewed also believed that ‘informality’ was anti-
aspirational: “people reject the informal if they have come from it themselves”, a 
rationality that according to her also has an aesthetic dimension.69 Such aesthetic 
rejection can also be linked to the aspect of inter-city competition and global city 
aspirations that are cultivated at the political level. Windhoek was purportedly 
 
 
66  The informal sector organiser here referred to the historic transition in the 1980s and 1990s where formal 
companies were still largely white-owned, which has changed somewhat since. 
67  For example, the Affirmative Repositioning leader Job Amupanda has called for “mega shopping malls” 
to be established in all neighbourhoods of Windhoek, not only in high income areas (Amupanda, 2019). 
68  For example, see Shacks offend Geingob… wants them gone in 5 years (The Namibian, 2019). 
69  In her own practice the architect has often encountered perception that her environmentally conscious 
design approach was likened to building with “mud and sticks”, versus “conventional materials” (i.e. 
plastered cement bricks and corrugated iron). 
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declared the cleanest city in Africa in the early 2000s.70   This has become a 
recurring mantra in political speeches and policy documents, more so since the 
status has been lost to Kigali, Rwanda in 2011 (The Namibian, 2016). The 
preoccupation of politicians with the ‘cleanest city’ status, amid outbreaks of 
cholera, hepatitis, and other public health crises related to poor service 
infrastructure (Ngutjinazo, 2019), exposes it as detached from the challenges 
faced by people on the ground. 
 
The ‘informal’, as the word suggests, remains largely conceptualised as the binary 
opposite of the formal, which I have shown above, is associated with predictability, 
regularity, compliance, cleanliness and stability and has been widely established 
as the normative ideal. The dissonance between construing the ‘informal’ economy 
as non-compliant with regulatory frameworks and the call for its inclusion within 
these frameworks, in other words its formalisation, remains unresolved at policy 
level. It continues to be discursively fashioned as economically immeasurable, void 
of contribution to national development and thus lacking legitimacy. The correlation 
of black-owned small-scale independent shops, home-based businesses, 
shebeens, hawking and survivalist livelihood strategies with filth and illegality, 
versus regulated – and by implication virtuous – capitalist and historically white-





70  I was unable to trace the source of this declaration, even though it was widely reported in the local 
media and has been a talking point in popular and political debates for years. 
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5.1.4 Conclusion: the ‘informal’ as mechanism of othering 
The emergence of the discourse of ‘informality’ in Namibia assumed a particular 
function in the country’s process of decolonisation. The repeal of urban influx 
controls removed legal barriers for free movement of the black majority from the 
general underdevelopment of rural areas into urban centres that had come to hold 
the promise of modernity and social mobility. Where previously social reproduction 
of the colonial economy had been externalised to the rural hinterland, it now 
became embedded and visible in towns and cities with all its symptoms of 
underdevelopment. I have argued that the capitalist-colonial system introduced 
and established the formal as the norm, guiding all developmental aspirations, 
analyses, and interventions. In the context of the gradual de-racialisation of the 
colonial governance apparatus from the 1970s onwards, the emerging discourse 
on ‘informality’ provided a mechanism for othering a burgeoning black urban 
population that was not able to conform to the established formal development 
model rooted in colonial spatial and economic logics, which were most acutely 
present in urban areas. In this process, where the main symptom was the growth 
of ‘informal settlements’, urbanisation itself became associated with 
underdevelopment, demonstrated by the oft-repeated mantra that ‘those people’ 
should rather stay in their rural homes than come to the city to make it 
ungovernable, most starkly represented by the President’s musings about influx 
control that I mentioned in the introduction to this section.  
 
The ‘informal’ is discursively constructed as urban, black, female, non-conforming, 
illegitimate, and economically immeasurable and thus not contributing to national 
development. It is conceived as the binary opposite of the formal, the regular and 
regulated, the predictable, the stable, the secure, the legal; and implicitly blames 
the poor black majority that increasingly falls short of realising such normative 
behaviour. Understanding something by what it is not, relinquishes it to a state of 
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non-being, of not having value in and of itself. These mechanisms of othering and 
delegitimisation elaborated here must thus be understood as technologies of 
power, which can be politically mobilised. This follows Foucault’s understanding of 
the positive effects of power, where power is understood not merely in terms of 
administering direct subjugation, but as a creative force that establishes normative 
behaviour outside of the immediate domain of oppression, against which all 
behaviour is measured (see p14). This means that besides direct oppression, 
colonialism created a mindset in its subjects, who came to embody ‘coloniality’ 
(Memmi, 2003 [1957]; Fanon, 2008 [1952]; Memmi and Bonnono, 2014). I argue 
that this common sense continues to live forth in postcolonial subjects. Such 
normativity, and its consequences, according to Foucault, can be more oppressive 
and wider reaching than overt oppression, and ultimately sustain the base of power 
itself. Although seemingly more neutral than previous racialised categories of the 
other, the ‘informal’ as discourse thus facilitates the perpetuation of colonial 
inequalities in a different guise. 
5.2 Spatial technologies of power  
In the previous section I outlined how the ‘informal’ became a mechanism of 
othering that allowed for colonial inequalities to be perpetuated amid the process 
of decolonisation. As AlSayyad reminds us, historically, the formal is the new mode 
of organising society (see 2.1.3), and this is nowhere more evident than in 
previously colonised countries like Namibia where the rule of law was introduced 
through colonial conquest. The introduction of European systems of law, 
administration and governance, key amongst which was the institution of private 
landownership (see 4.1), gave rise to what we today know as the formal sector. 
Private property rendered control over space to become a central means to include 
and to exclude. This was taken to its utmost extreme with the redistribution of space 
– both urban and rural – along racial lines during the apartheid administration of 
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then South West Africa (see 4.1 and 4.2). I elaborated above how this resulted in 
the formal becoming the norm, rendering everything outside of it illegitimate and 
other, with the exception of rural areas under traditional authority jurisdiction where 
Western systems of governance had never fully taken hold. Having thus 
established the formal as the normative ideal, I will focus in this section specifically 
on the spatial technologies of power which enable the perpetuation of unequal 
power relations rooted in the colonial project. I argue that ‘development’ is being 
equated with formalisation;71 that planning practice is complicit in the exclusion of 
the majority from socio-economic advancement; and that the ‘informal’ economy 
stabilises elite economic interests.  
5.2.1 Formalisation as ‘development’ 
We don’t have enough policies to protect them [informal traders] 
Mayor, City of Windhoek 
While the term ‘informal’ has become widely used in the public sphere in recent 
years, the realities so labelled (un-proclaimed settlements and un-regulated 
economic activities) are hardly acknowledged, let alone strategically considered in 
national policy and developmental plans. In various national development policy 
documents, the word ‘informal’ is mentioned only in reference to very narrowly 
defined formalisation initiatives, while the conditions for those living in un-
proclaimed settlements and those pursuing un-regulated economic activities are 
hardly recognised. For instance, Namibia Vision 2030, the country’s overarching 
developmental policy guide launched in 2004, mentions the term ‘informal’ only 
 
 
71  Formalisation here means bringing activities within the purview of the state through registration and 
taxation, and legal regulation. 
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three times in relation to economic activities: acknowledging its “absorptive 
potential” (Office of the President, 2004, p28); and proposing the need to “develop 
small enterprises” as the “key to employment and economic empowerment” (2004, 
p71); and four times in terms of “informal settlements”, without further elaboration 
or related strategic vision. In other words, an ‘informal’ sphere outside the world of 
regulated development is superficially recognised to exist, but the often explicit 
and otherwise implicit strategy is that this sphere has to be formalised in order to 
improve conditions. At the same time, its “absorptive potential”, in other words its 
ability to provide for livelihoods resources to a large majority that the formal sector 
has failed to provide for, is simply taken for granted without problematising inherent 
inequities.  
 
The language of the current National Development Plan 5 (2017/18 – 2021/22), 
released in 2017, is even less cognisant of these realities and focuses on business 
and enterprise development, increased access to finance, research and 
development, industrialisation, production and adherence to regulations amongst 
others.72 This is particularly striking as it is far removed from the realities of home 
and street economies that are witnessed throughout urbanising spaces, that 
account for 67 percent of employment according to recent national labour statistics 
(see page 94). The municipal officials I interviewed recognised this shortcoming 
and suggested that the national legal frameworks and policies need to be adapted 
to become relevant to the ‘informal sector’. There is thus a substantial disjuncture 
between local governance, the everyday realities of an ever-increasing majority of 
 
 
72  Throughout the five-year National Development Plans (NDPs) that Namibia has been developing since 
1995 the word “informal” is hardly used. NDP 3 (2007/08 - 2011/12, 42 pages long) mentions it one time 
in the same breath as SME development (National Planning Commission, 2008, p9); NDP 4 (2012/13 to 
2016/17, 152 pages) mentions the word two times in the context of education and training (National 
Planning Commission, 2012, p49; 52); and NDP 5 (2017/18 – 2021/22, 134 pages) mentions the word 
twice in relation to gender equality, seeking to “mainstream informal businesses led by women” to be 
“integrated into the formal economy” (National Planning Commission, 2017, p66). 
  
134 
urban and rural residents living in ‘informal settlements’, and to a large extent 
pursuing ‘informal’ livelihood strategies, and primary policy frameworks that seek 
integration of all activities into the formal economy without substantial analysis of 
current realities. The formal here becomes a goal that everything needs to be 
turned into. Without offering concrete strategies how such formalisation is to be 
achieved, it enters the ideological realm. 
 
The continuity of municipal byelaws, some dating back to pre-independence times, 
as well as post-independence legislation embodying paradigms derived from 
colonial laws allow for the continued criminalisation and/or marginalisation of 
‘informal’ trade.73 However, abiding by all relevant formal requirements is not only 
bureaucratically and logistically challenging, but also expensive and thus not easily 
achievable by a large majority as the informal sector organiser exemplified in a 
number of ways during his interview. The required capital to conform to existing 
regulations and standards is often not available even where technical skills are. 
The housing advocate and town planners exemplified the drive towards 
formalisation based on unrealistic standards in the field of land and housing 
provision, with the prime example being the minimum size for residential plots of 
300m2. However, given existing residential densities across most unregulated 
settlements, upholding this ‘standard’ would require extensive relocations of urban 
inhabitants, while in reality very few new plots are being developed. The housing 
advocate noted that “if you tell four households that only one can get a plot and 
you have not created space for the other three, then it’s going nowhere.”74 In both 
 
 
73  In 2018 a group of female street vendors petitioned the Ministry of Gender and Child Welfare to 
intervene with the City Police harassing street vendors and confiscating their goods or fining them and 
jailing those who do not pay the fines on time (The Namibian, 2018b) 
74  This refers specifically to the common situation in informal settlements in Windhoek, where up to four 
households share a potential 300m2 plot, requiring the relocation of more than half of the households 
when the settlement is upgraded to conform to the 300m2 policy. 
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economic and urban development in Namibia there is ample evidence that for 
many, the formal remains an unobtainable yardstick of legitimacy. Still, most major 
developmental policies only focus on a formalisation agenda, instead of 
envisioning forms of re-distributive justice that many had expected to be the result 
of independence and decolonisation.  
 
The leaning towards formalisation was echoed in my interviews with the mayor and 
the municipal economic development officer who determined ‘informal’ economic 
activity as either the lack of contractual agreements of employment and/or the lack 
of business registration and related non-compliance with municipal health and 
hygiene standards. Both interviewees highlighted the difficulty in accessing what 
the Labour Act defines as basic “conditions of employment”, including minimum 
wages, regulated working hours, and leave amongst others (Government of the 
Republic of Namibia, 2007), where such registrations are not in place. The mayor 
argued that this undermines job security, creates an unstable work situation and 
opens up opportunities for exploitation. The labour expert also noted that in the 
‘informal sector’, where businesses have employees, often these are based on 
family relations that can hide exploitative practices, as minimum wages and social 
protection mechanisms do not apply like those enjoyed by the unionised sectors.  
 
As outlined in the literature review, class distinctions amongst ‘informal’ workers 
can differ widely (see 0), which was also highlighted by the informal sector 
organiser: “Those that started the business are poor, but those working for them 
are poorer”. However, from my own empirical work at the Herero Mall it became 
clear that having a registered business does not necessarily impact the level of 
vulnerability that ‘informal’ workers are exposed to as I will elaborate in the next 
chapter. Business registration is only one of many instances within the network of 
associations between traders and the state. Here, formalisation through 
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compliance with regulatory frameworks is discursively projected as the only way 
for various activities to be recognised as a legitimate contribution to national 
development and to protect those involved. The assumption that extending formal 
rights to everyone will provide the impetus for inclusive development reveals a 
state-centred, rights-based developmental approach that I will argue has limited 
impact on the status quo.  
 
But the formalisation agenda is also driven by global institutions that Namibia is 
signatory to, including by the International Labour Organisation (ILO) that calls for 
the formalisation of the ‘informal’. The Namibia Informal Sector Organisation (NISO) 
(directed by the informal sector organiser I interviewed) was at the time of the 
interview investigating how to improve salaries and protections for workers in the 
‘informal’ economy, a project funded by the ILO and guided by its Decent Work 
Agenda. He noted the need to observe provisions of the Labour Act and the 
constitution – which “must be respected” – also in the ‘informal sector’. He claimed 
that “ignorance” of legal provisions by ‘informal’ workers and business owners was 
the main factor in the lack of their implementation, and that there was a need to 
raise awareness through training. Again, formal legislative frameworks are 
positioned as paramount, which highlights the level of assimilation of local NGO’s 
such as NISO into state-centred development.75 This also shines a light on the 
relationships between NGOs and international institutions and the extent to which 
these are able to influence local advocacy agendas. 
 
The mayor elaborated that ‘informal’ work includes “business activities conducted 
at various street corners and within road reserves” including the sale of fruits and 
 
 
75  Namibia has an established tripartite alliance of government, employers’ organisations and organised 
labour unions that deals with labour-related conflicts.  
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vegetables, cooked food, fresh meat and services such as car washes, salons, and 
tyre repairs. The economic development officer mentioned with some frustration 
that “we still have informal traders operating from street corners, pavements, which 
can bring conflict with other users within the city, be it motorists or pedestrians, 
passing along those pavements”. Both officials thus directly addressed the aspect 
of space, more specifically the fact that such activities often occur on public land 
which was designated for other land uses. Firstly, this means that besides the often-
mentioned aspects of business registration and employment, access to land plays 
a central role. They also seem to implicitly suggest that the assigned uses, in this 
case pedestrian and vehicle traffic, have priority in such spaces over largely 
survivalist economic activity. What is presented here discursively as antagonistic 
conflict between users, hides the fact that traders would not be in those locations 
if some of the pedestrians and motorists would not require their goods or services. 
In other words, it hides a transactional logic. 
 
In addition, hawking is often presented as competition for formal businesses. The 
economic development officer mentioned that “it might be that informal traders 
operate next to formal setups like big supermarkets, which is often perceived to be 
direct competition”. The labour expert stated that “many formal sector operators 
[…] see the informal competitors as a threat, especially in the retail sector”. 
However, he argued that the odds are stacked against ‘informal’ trade: “if informal 
traders sell their goods in front of a formal retailer, the formal retailer tends to call 
the police and they will be able to chase people away on the basis of lacking 
licences etc., or fine them or even arrest them”. 76  But he highlighted that 
“supermarkets also use the informal networks to their own advantage. Some sell 
 
 
76  See footnote 73 
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their own goods through informal traders in other areas on a commission basis at 
a different price on the street”. The relationship between formal retailers and 
hawkers varies between protectionist interventions on the one hand and 
collaborating in the economic interest of large retail on the other. 
 
According to the labour expert the dominant thinking regarding economic 
development is thus to move traders to “a nice place elsewhere” where basic 
infrastructure is provided, but usually accessibility and thus potential for economic 
success is reduced, often leading to tensions between traders and authorities.77 
Indeed, over the years a number of formalised markets have been built in Windhoek 
and other towns in areas where open land was available, similar to strategies 
followed elsewhere (see p43). But where these were located off the main 
pedestrian and traffic arteries such markets have never succeeded in taking off, 
even where they were subsidised by the local authority.78 In addition, under the 
CoW’s regulations, in municipal markets fixed rents are levied and business 
activities are restricted. Specifically, the sale of alcohol is forbidden and “light 
industries” are not allowed as these are deemed to be incompatible with other 
market functions for health and safety reasons. The economic development officer 
admitted that “we have some challenges from […] the way we used to plan for the 
markets. […] In the past people allocated whatever land was available, that could 
not be used for other uses”. He thus acknowledged that allocating space for 
trading used to be low on the priority list of the local authority. This also makes clear 
 
 
77  This strategy is repeatedly reported in daily newspapers form local authorities all over the country. I 
supervised an independent student-led project to investigate the informal economy in Opuwo, a small 
rural town in the far north-west of Namibia. The town council had requested students to design a formal 
market at an inaccessible site, even though the research clearly showed the importance of proximity of 
vendors to mobility routes and formal retail outlets amongst others (Namupala et.al, forthcoming). 
78  In one case in Windhoek a market has since been remodelled into a pre-primary school as it proved 
not to be viable for trade. 
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the misguided approach to develop ‘markets’ that do not engage with the spatial 
logics of the economic activities themselves, but rather propose projects that can 
be politically mobilised as ‘development’ as the informal sector organiser 
maintained.  
 
Skinner (2008) argues that providing formalised markets for street traders is a 
widespread approach in Sub-Saharan Africa, often with negative consequences 
for traders, and contrasts this with the notion of “natural markets” that has been the 
result of bottom-up struggle for the recognition of street vending rights in India 
(Bénit-Gbaffou, 2015). But relocation of traders was supported by the informal 
sector organiser, who recalled that: 
We reached some agreement that where there is a market built, traders must 
go into the market. They were refusing at one point, because they see the areas 
where they sell for free for many, many years. You see, when you are changing 
the culture of your people you must be also tough.  
In Namibia the tendency to relocate traders away from public land to formalised 
spaces reserved for markets still prevails, though some shifting in the thinking of 
the Windhoek municipality seems underway, as I will show in the next section. What 
underlies this is the view, derived from modernist concerns about land use, that 
assigning a use to a space will make it viable as such, often disregarding existing 
socio-spatial and economic patterns. The informal sector organiser framed 
formalisation in terms of transforming culture, implying that such development is 
generally progressive. At the same time, he highlights the fact that selling in the 
public space is usually for free, making it a form of commons, whereas markets that 
are owned and operated by the local authority are regulated spaces that are part 




In the above I aimed to show that formalisation or inclusion within the formal 
economy of all economic activity is an unquestioned assumption throughout 
government and non-governmental sectors.79 Given the stark income inequality 
(see p90), and inadequate public spending priorities based on policy frameworks 
that I have already shown do not adequately address the economic and urban 
development challenges of the ‘informal’ (see 5.2.1), this rights-based 
developmental drive towards formalisation effectively excludes a large majority of 
citizens. On a spatial level, ‘informal’ trade in public space is discursively construed 
as generating ‘conflict’ between different users of space, which underlies the thrust 
to relocate traders from the public space to dedicated market areas. However, 
street trade evidently requires a symbiotic relationship with those other ‘users’ who 
provide the customer base. Views of street trade being unruly thus seems to hide 
deeper, class-based differentiations between those who (have to) buy from street 
traders and those for whom streets are merely mobility networks aimed at getting 
from point A to B with maximum efficiency.  
 
At the same time the generally restricted nature of formal municipal markets sharply 
contrasts with traders’ conceptualisations of economic diversity as a key factor for 
viable economic development that I will elaborate on in the next chapter. 
Formalisation thus often negatively affects traders as it remains steeped in 
modernist paradigms of state control, separation of functions, and orderliness. 
Ultimately, common spaces of relative freedom within the city where ‘informal’ 
economies thrive are increasingly being enclosed through regulatory control. In the 
 
 
79  In a workshop we organised at my university with Prof James Ferguson in August 2019 on 
conceptualising livelihoods beyond formal employment it was striking how participants from across the 
academic, governmental, non-governmental and private sector insisted on the need for more and better 




extremely unequal context of post-colonial Namibia, I argue that formalisation 
without concomitant redistribution of resources must be understood as a state-
centred, exclusionary technology of power, aimed at the preservation of elite 
interests. As Roy (2005) reminds us, from a governance perspective the benefit of 
the ‘informal’ is that it can be tolerated where opportune or criminalised where 
necessary for power to be asserted. At times of political expediency however, the 
developmental promise of formalisation can always be mobilised even though in 
practice it often does not mean ‘progress’ on the ground. 
5.2.2 Planning as mirage 
No person shall use or cause or allow to be used any land or portion thereof 
for a use other than provided for in this Scheme. 
Clause 11(3) of the Windhoek Town Planning Scheme  
(City of Windhoek, no date a) 
In the previous section I outlined the imperative for formalisation of ‘informal’ 
economic activities, and how this becomes a technology of power that – under the 
guise of progress – excludes those who cannot conform to its imperatives. In the 
following section I will elaborate on how contemporary planning practice 
perpetuates these dynamics and with which methods. This highlights how the 
discourse on ‘informality’ becomes a discursive practice and what role spatial 
planning and design play within this dynamic. Indicative for the planning paradigm 
are the visions that guide local development. When I asked the mayor about what 
a well-functioning city must achieve in his view, he had the following to say:  
As a city we need to ensure improved public transport linkages and 
alternatives, mixed land uses and high-quality services which can have long-
term positive effects on the economy due to technological innovation, including 
more efficient public transport that responds to economic needs and better 
connects labour with employment thus increasing firm's productivity. Here we 
are looking at new approaches to urban service provision, such as that of smart 
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cities, where through harnessing technology, including ICT, efficient service 
delivery is offered. 
This statement again echoes the developmental vision of an industrialising country 
based on formal employment, increased productivity and technological solutions 
to improve communication and service delivery. Especially the smart city concept 
can be seen to permeate this thinking, which is further elaborated in the city’s 
Transformational Strategic Plan.80 Given the extremely poor conditions in ‘informal’ 
settlements in the city and the challenges to provide livelihoods such visions seem 
far removed from everyday realities of the majority of residents. The economic 
development officer elaborated on the relationship between planning and the 
‘informal’ economy: 
For a long time, the informal sector was considered a nuisance […]. In 
most of the spatial planning within the city the accommodation of the 
informal economy was one of the least priorities […]. It has become an 
afterthought that was not integrated. Now most operators are actually 
illegal, because they are operating in areas that have not been approved 
for them to be […]. There is not sufficient accommodation for informal 
economic activities which also hinders them in applying to be registered. 
Because in strategic areas where more income can be earned, we might 
not be able to accommodate them because of requirements, such as 
town planning schemes and safety requirements for operators and 
residents etc. 
Regarding planning practice he clearly spells out a conundrum: whatever activities 
do not conform to the planning scheme are illegal by default, while the lack of 
spatial provision for activities that fall outside the statutory ones, such as street 
vending for example, prevents them from meeting the requirements for 
 
 
80  The vision outlined in the current City of Windhoek Transformational Strategic Plan 2017-2022 is to be 




formalisation (an example of this will be elaborated in the next chapter). This 
disjuncture has been highlighted during the 2006 shebeen protests for example. 
The denial of unregulated economic activity in urban and developmental policy and 
lack of spatial provision in planning practice thus dialectically reinforce each other, 
continuously marginalising those engaging in such activities.  
 
This was confirmed by the town planner I interviewed, who acknowledged that in 
current planning practice, whatever “does not conform to the town planning 
scheme”81 is considered ‘informal’. He explained that all planning processes and 
regulatory frameworks are “regulating and controlling” (also see Frayne, 2000 
above) coupled with a lack of capacity at all levels to administer and enforce them 
effectively.82 At the same time, high spatial planning and engineering standards 
are derived from past planning practice. The town planner argued that “especially 
the middle and upper classes are spoilt with the professional input and 
development that took place in the past”. He referred to the suburban development 
of former white suburbs where in the 1970s the minimum size for single residential 
parcels was still 900m2, roads were tarred, sewage, storm water management, 
water, electricity and street lighting was provided from the outset. However, 
suburbs with such high spatial standards were solely implemented for the white 
 
 
81  A town planning scheme is required for municipalities as per the Local Authorities Act of 1992. The 
Windhoek Town Planning Scheme provides for use zoning, divided into (1) primary use, (2) consent 
use and (3) prohibited use as well as for density zoning. Land uses include single residential (generally 
one primary dwelling per plot), general residential (several dwellings per plot, depending on density 
zoning), business, industrial, institutional, municipal and street. Land can be re-zoned although with 
considerable financial and bureaucratic implications. Density zoning for residential uses is generally 
determined as number of primary dwelling units per m2 of plot, with ratios between 1:100 to 1:900. 
Notwithstanding some exceptions, residential buildings are to be set back 5 m from any street boundary 
and 3 m from any lateral and rear boundary of the plot. Business and industrial buildings are not 
required to be set back from the street boundary, but 3 m side and back setbacks generally apply. In 
addition, without consent of council, no building on residential land may be higher than 2 storeys (City 
of Windhoek, no date a). 
82  Administrative under-performance has caused professional town planners to bypass the municipality 
and request approval directly from the ministry concerned with final approvals of town planning issues 
(Namibian Sun, 2017). 
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minority, and while they are the spatial outcome of an exclusionary regime, as 
standards they remain as yet another utopian mirage. These frameworks render 
everything outside such official plans and policies – which are still largely based 
on assumptions of full employment (see page 39) – illegal, while the state does not 
possess the capacity to enable its citizens to realise what it considers formal and 
appropriate.  
 
Where ‘informal’ business has been successfully promoted, such as is the case of 
Eveline Street, it required wholesale re-zoning of residential plots along the entire 
street that has been transformed into an ‘informal’ business corridor (see 4.4). 
However, lessons from such retro-active interventions have not filtered through into 
forward planning practices. The second town planner I interviewed83 recalled that 
during her tenure as a planning official at the CoW in the early 2000s, where she 
was responsible for ‘informal settlement’ upgrading, the question of neighbourhood 
economies was simply neglected. Entire neighbourhoods for up to 2000 
households were formalised with solely residential plots and no provision for formal 
business zoning or consideration for home or street economies. On the one hand, 
this shows that the concern about the acute shortage of dignified shelter 
overshadows other pertinent aspects of urban development. On the other hand, it 
is an indication that the premise of employment elsewhere in the city as the basis 
of residents’ livelihoods was still firmly rooted in the thinking about the city’s future. 
The first town planner explained that in most ‘informal settlements’ there are no 
parks or playgrounds, for example, “because local government does not develop 
 
 
83  The second town planner was born in Lüderitz and raised on a small farm south of Rehoboth. She first 
moved to Windhoek to study urban geography and sociology. She started working at the City of 
Windhoek before moving to Cape Town to pursue a master’s degree in town planning. Subsequently 
she worked as a town planner at the city and later joined NUST as a lecturer. Her interest in ‘informality’ 
derived from surveys she had done as a sociology student on migration, aiming to understand people’s 
lives after moving to the city. The interview took place at the university on 29.01.2019. 
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those kinds of facilities”.84 He clarified that for planning practice – and especially 
during ‘informal settlement’ upgrading processes – this means that planners 
“usually only reserve the areas [for future public use] and explain to people that 
there is a necessity to have a certain hierarchy of play parks, schools, institutional 
facilities etc.” Such reserved land parcels can remain empty for years or decades, 
as was the case at Herero Mall, before they are developed. Given resource scarcity 
public facilities are considered a luxury, to be provided at a later stage. While 
cloaking itself in the language of civic-ness, without the adequate allocation of 
resources to develop the envisaged public facilities such promises ring hollow, 
especially if such land could be more meaningful for people to access livelihood 
strategies.  
 
The informal sector organiser also regretted that space for vending is hardly ever 
considered when public works such as hospitals, government offices or other 
public facilities are constructed. Such facilities usually attract vendors selling food 
and snacks at the entrances to serve the public in the absence of alternative 
outlets. As such they compensate for a lack of facilities and add to the functioning 
of public amenities, yet they are denied a dignified presence, and often these 
vendors are harassed by police or private security guards employed by the various 
facilities.85 He asked: 
Why do the town planners or government planners, if you do plan things like 
Government Park [a cluster of Ministerial office buildings at the edge of the 
 
 
84  I recently supervised a student-led project for a public space intervention in a formalised informal 
settlement in Gobabis in the east of the country. The plot of land reserved as public open space was 
merely that: open space without any infrastructure provided. Students co-produced a multi-functional 
spatial intervention with local residents, funded by the German Development Cooperation, to highlight 
the importance of providing functional infrastructure to residents at the earliest stages of urban 
consolidation. 
85  At the university where I work a similar situation exists: although there is a lack of provision of food 




Windhoek CBD] for example, why don’t you plan us in, and provide a market 
nearby so that we can participate in the mainstream of our economy? 
He suggested that provision for vending should be made as an integral part of 
capital projects for public facilities, leveraging the potential of such facilities to 
generate conditions of density for hawking to become viable. Supporting vending 
directly through provision of public infrastructure for vendors would be one way of 
re-distributing resources towards those who cannot afford to participate in the 
formal sector and in turn dignify their working situation. The economic development 
officer acknowledged that because of a large demand for markets the city would 
not be able to provide for all needs and that the municipality is moving towards a 
model where it becomes responsible for markets jointly with traders. In such cases, 
the city would provide the infrastructure, and traders would take responsibility for 
some of the services and the management of the market. However, this is a recent 
shift in policy and only one market of this kind has thus far been established, which 
was largely funded by the private developer of the adjacent shopping mall. 
 
The question of livelihoods continues to be an afterthought in planning. The mayor 
and the economic development officer both acknowledged the need to 
strategically integrate the ‘informal economy’ in future planning to provide space 
for ‘informal’ trade. The economic development officer proposed that: 
In the existing parts of the city we need to revisit some of the structural setups, 
if it ever possible, to see if there are ways to accommodate informal trade. If 
there is sufficient space and it does not negatively affect any other operators 
in the neighbourhood then we can see how to re-integrate informal trade in 
those areas. That can also help us to legalise informal operators that we 
currently refer to as illegal operators, who can then be licensed and registered 
and then they can also contribute to the revenue of the city in terms of rent for 
the spaces. 
Given the fact that in many parts of the city ‘informal’ activities take place, either in 
houses, in road reserves and on sidewalks or on public or private land, 
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“accommodating” or “re-integrating” them seems to suggest that they are not 
considered legitimate. But registering these activities opens up the possibility for 
the city to gain revenue, even though most of the activities need to be considered 
survivalist in nature, and thus not in a position to generate much income. Yet the 
economic development officer went further to suggest that besides a form of 
taxation, the city could also try to “re-coup whatever investment is made, from the 
operators […] even over a period of ten years, so that operators are able to fully 
pay back what has been invested”. This statement exposes the expectation that 
traders would be able to re-pay the infrastructure, which is in stark contrast to other 
infrastructural investments that are not considered on the basis of direct cost-
recovery and are simply budgeted for under regular capital budgets.86 The thinking 
that some ‘users’ of space have to repay the cost of the infrastructure they make 
use of while others do not, and more importantly where the expectation to repay 
falls on the shoulders of some of the most marginalised in society, reaffirms the 
argument that such formalisation remains a tool to exclude and disempower. 
 
In this section I aimed to highlight some of the methods through which 
contemporary planning practice perpetuates the exclusion of those who do not 
conform to the premise that all human activity be rationally pre-determined (through 
planning) and subject to control. One such spatial technology is exemplified by the 
town planning scheme that describes what is considered adequate and 
permissible in terms of land use within the local authority jurisdiction and renders 
all else illegal. However, Watson argues that planning practice describes what is 
considered “proper” development based on western and modernist planning 
ideology (see p102) which disregards realities of African cities on the ground. I 
 
 
86  Public investment in road infrastructure for example is not based on the principle of cost recovery.  
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have shown already how in developmental policy the lack of recognition of 
unregulated economic activities continues to reinforce their marginalisation and 
furthers their delegitimisation. Here I aimed to show how this dialectically impacts 
on planning practice, which disregards what is not provided for in policy, and which 
in turn influences policy development in ways that are informed by its own 
epistemological underpinnings – the by now near-utopian assumption of full 
employment being chief amongst them. While contemporary planning standards 
largely derive from those that were reserved for the white minority at the expense 
of the black majority under colonial rule, it becomes increasingly clear that the state 
does not possess the capacities to realise such standards for everyone. Where 
‘informal’ settlements are formalised, only the barest of the formal attributes are 
realised in the form of basic service provision, while necessary public amenities 
are disregarded, and land is merely reserved for their future development. The 
insistence on qualitatively high planning standards however then exposes this as 
not merely a blind spot in policy development, but rather a way to preserve elite 
privilege while rhetorically offering the promise of development for all. Here, 
planning becomes a promise of a utopian future – a mirage – that is not guaranteed 
to materialise. On the other hand, where support to the ‘informal’ economy is being 
re-thought, such as in the case of Windhoek which I shall expand on in the last 
chapter, neoliberal premises of cost-recovery for infrastructure development are 
applied to those who largely follow survivalist livelihood strategies, re-emphasising 
the continuous marginalisation of the urban poor. 
5.2.3 Stabilising inequality 
As indicated in earlier studies, and confirmed during my interviews, in Namibia the 
‘informal sector’ has a high degree of dependence on the formal, heavily import-
reliant economy. The economic development officer of the City of Windhoek 
observed that “especially in Windhoek most of the informal activities that are taking 
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place are in the area of retail and a bit of service industry: tailors, shoe repairs and 
[hair] salons.” He described the dependency on formal suppliers as follows: “the 
obvious linkage is that the informal depends on the formal, because especially in 
areas of retail, whatever products are offered are purchased wholesale from the 
formal sector.” This dependency has historical roots as business and trade in black 
townships was severely restricted under apartheid which I elaborated before (see 
4.4). He considered urbanisation and migration from smaller towns and villages to 
cities as the major factor driving the ‘informal’ economy: 
There are expectations that there are many job opportunities in the city. But 
that is not the case and when people get into the city, they get stranded and 
cannot find a job due to unemployment. They turn to the informal economy or 
SMEs, earning a bit of income for them to sustain themselves. 
The argument that urbanisation is largely driven by the promise for jobs in the city 
has become a mantra in Namibia where urbanisation is conventionally understood 
as a linear movement from rural to urban areas, fuelling the growth of such urban 
areas. The related stigmatisation of the urban, based on the symptoms of 
underdevelopment that accompany this process have been elaborated above (see 
p122). However, the economic development officer characterises the ‘informal’ 
economy as a secondary realm that new urbanites chose to turn to in the absence 
of formal sector jobs. However, the labour expert recalled that during his tenure at 
LaRRI the institution carried out a survey on the ‘informal’ economy which showed 
that if “they had a choice people would much rather prefer working […] in a formal 
sector job, as an employee” (Mwilima, 2006). However, the recent labour statistics 
showing that the majority of the workforce is employed in the ‘informal’ economy is 
an indication that the possibilities to get such a formal sector job are extremely 
limited. The labour expert positioned “survival” at one end of the spectrum of the 
‘informal’ economy, where “someone who lost the job […] out of desperation starts 
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selling vetkoeks87 on the street corner to earn an immediate income” without any 
form of registration. The informal sector organiser similarly explained that “informal 
business is anybody who is operating a business within his own means, without 
consideration for any law or regulation at the beginning. […] It’s a person who is 
operating business just for survival”. Again, the ‘informal’ economy is construed as 
an alternative to the world of formal employment, a sort of ‘second choice’ for those 
who cannot find the highly prized formal job. 
 
Ferguson conceptualised this as the sphere of “distributive livelihoods” (2015), 
where people who are no longer integrated into systems of production are 
increasingly busy with advancing systems of distribution and making claims on the 
income of others. The labour expert and the informal sector organiser both 
highlighted that partial compliance, registration or observation of legal provisions 
is part of this reality. Depending on the situation, certain licences might be applied 
for or regulations adhered to whenever this is needed to access a certain other 
service or benefit, without otherwise operating as a formal business. This was 
confirmed by my own experience at the Herero Mall as I will elaborate in the 
following chapter. The labour expert accounted for practices in the construction 
industry where “operators that are registered as SMEs, and thus not really informal, 
don’t pay minimum wages”. This essentially bridges what is too often presented 
discursively as a binary between formal and ‘informal’ employment. In both 
categories one can find exploitative labour practices where power relations 
between employer and employee are often extremely skewed, curtailing the 
effectiveness of labour legislation as a mitigation measure. At the same time, the 
conceptualisation of the ‘informal’ as opportunistic versus foregrounding its state 
 
 
87  See footnote 44, p93. 
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of non-compliance opens up the understanding of its function within long-standing 
economic and social dynamics. The labour expert provided this explanation: 
The informal economy is what was described as the reserve army of labour. 
So, the formal sector which enjoys all the attention, government subsidies etc., 
draws a certain number of people from the informal sector and formalises them. 
But the informal is a constant given when you refer to unemployment […], and 
it serves in economic terms as an enormous pressure group to either arrest or 
even place downward pressure on wages and working conditions. The other 
side is the social one […]. Usually you have one main income earner with a 
formal sector job, but because of the low wages paid in many sectors, that 
salary cannot cover all household expenses, so the others need to contribute 
in very fluid and changing ways towards household survival. 
The so-called informal economy is here conceptualised as a force that stabilises 
the formal capitalist economy in that on the one hand it absorbs surplus labour 
power but on the other hand it diminishes organised labour’s ability to demand 
better wages since the oversupply of labour would easily neutralise such claims. 
As functional surplus labour reserve the ‘informal’ economy is a sphere of survivalist 
livelihood strategies that mitigate the negative impact of a low-wage economy (see 
p90). The emerging void between jobless growth and rapid urbanisation is thus 
filled by the so-called informal economy, which stabilises capitalist development in 
a profoundly unequal society. 
5.2.4 Conclusion: perpetuating colonial spatial technologies of power 
Having set out in the previous section how the formal has been established as the 
norm, and the ‘informal’ is discursively being used to delegitimise the poor, in this 
section I argued how such discourse enters the realm of developmental and 
planning practice. In a context of deep-seated, long-standing socio-economic 
inequality, an unquestioned formalisation agenda that is not underpinned by 
adequate public spending to achieve its objectives, must be exposed as an 
exclusionary mechanism, despite its developmental and inclusionary rhetoric. 
  
152 
‘Informal’ trade in public space in particular continues to be discursively construed 
as conflicting with implicitly more legitimate and formally sanctioned use(r)s of 
space. The typical response is to isolate such activities in dedicated, formal 
markets that often are not economically viable. Formalisation thus becomes a 
technology of power that aims to centralise and consolidate state control and 
enclose existing commons in the sense that Negri and Scelsi argue (see page 45). 
The unceasing enclosure of such commons requires spatial technologies that allow 
the differentiation of the permissible from the illegitimate, which is achieved through 
planning regulatory frameworks. These frameworks, I have argued, continue to 
disregard the that reality which is captured as ‘informal’, and rather perpetuate an 
exclusionary planning paradigm invented during colonial times. This paradigm, 
which upholds the promise of high developmental standards even though the state 
lacks the capacity to realise these, establishes a utopia as it is commonly 
understood – the perfect place that is impossible to reach. Combined with the 
delegitimisation and even criminalisation of those who do not – or are not able to – 
conform to such standards, it establishes an apparatus of exclusion of the majority 
of citizens. Simultaneously, the ‘informal’ economy provides a seemingly unlimited 
labour reserve that sustains a low-wage economy for the preservation of elite 
interests. 
5.3 ‘Informality’ as resistance 
If above I traced the rise of the discourse on ‘informality’ and its mechanics as 
discursive practice furthering and consolidating the interests of power, in the last 
section of this chapter I aim to put the discourse back into the field of the political 
as Mouffe (2001) conceptualised it. Delegitimising substantial parts of the 
population, as I have argued above, does not go unchallenged, and in the following 
I will focus on realms of contestation and struggle against this marginalisation. This 
will allow us to understand the opportunities and constraints for political agency of 
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those who are presumably excluded and understand their agency in shaping their 
own reality before we enter into the lived experience of the ‘informal’ at the Herero 
Mall in the next chapter. 
 
The labour expert cautioned that while Namibia has a few organisations 
representing ‘informal’ economy operators, there is no organisation that represents 
the interests of the generally more marginalised ‘informal’ employees. This lack of 
self-organisation has as a consequence the underrepresentation of ‘informal’ 
workers during public consultation processes where an array of formal sector 
organisations like the Namibia Chamber of Commerce and Industry, Namibia 
Employers Federation, and various trade unions amongst others are conventionally 
represented.88 However, he acknowledged the difficulties for self-organisation in 
this particular context: 
The hardships and deprivation within the informal economy create a condition 
where you can hardly think beyond tomorrow. You’re so embroiled in the day-
to-day struggles for survival, that you have very little time and energy to think 
[…] what could be a transformative agenda for ourselves.  
Survival is here understood as both acute deprivation but also as a factor that 
largely immobilises transformative political activism at the grass roots. At the same 
time voices of ‘informal’ workers are not heard in those spaces and institutions of 
society where political influence can be leveraged. However, instances of outright 
protests are relatively rare in Namibia, where a veneer of participatory politics is 
generally upheld, notably through the so-called tripartite relation between 
organised labour, employers and the state. The labour expert suggested that to 
 
 
88  He contended that the Shack Dwellers’ Federation of Namibia was one of the only examples of self-
organisation around undignified living conditions, but that similar forms of organising do not exist around 
wages and working conditions in the ‘informal’ sector. 
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increase the recognition of the ‘informal’ economy “would require self-organisation” 
from within, in similar ways that migrant workers fought against the exploitative 
colonial migrant labour system. He recalled: 
We have seen one outcry many years ago when the Okatumbatumba Hawker’s 
Association organised that camp near Parliament and slaughtered cattle there, 
demanding that the law must be changed that required shebeens to have two 
toilets for licensing purposes. The lawmakers back-pedalled, to get those 
people off their lawn (also see p96).  
The labour expert thus establishes an antagonistic political relationship between 
‘informal’ workers and the state, where direct and concerted opposition to the 
institutions of the state bears fruit. While political mobilisation has proven 
successful in influencing policy formulation in few instances, varying interests 
within the ‘informal’ economy present the potential for disjuncture unlike in more 
clearly stratified formal labour relations and their corresponding organisational 
forms. The informal sector organiser expressed his view that a certain dependency 
of ‘informal’ traders on politicians is consciously maintained by the latter. He 
provided an example of municipal markets: 
The municipality is not in favour of those markets being run by anybody else 
than themselves. Partly because it is their campaigning ticket, politically. It is 
built by us for the traders, so they have to vote for us. Because it’s a visible 
development for them, something you can show. It’s not about development, 
but about who did it, what can I get out of it.  
He establishes here a power dynamic of dependence between the local authority 
and ‘informal’ traders who often depend on public space for their livelihood, which 
is exploited to administer political patronage. He also highlights the 
conceptualisation of physical infrastructure as the only tangible form of 
development. Such mechanisms of patronage require a level of dependence to be 
re-produced for which the historical criminalisation of ‘informal’ trade and its 
contemporary delegitimisation are useful underpinnings. The informal sector 
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organiser further related how in the 1990s he did not receive much support from 
the municipality for market stall development. He described the strategy “to 
educate the hawkers and the informal sector on how to have negotiation skills, to 
plan for advocacy and action, and the need to lobby their leaders”. He shared his 
experience of the growing ‘informal sector’ movement in the 1990s and 2000s: 
They [the government] did not understand if it is a political movement, is it really 
a hawker’s association, what is it all about? It was confusing, because other 
groups joined like the panel beaters, the small builders […], and the shebeen 
association […]. So, they were more confused. We were having a big training 
programme, providing business planning, finance, hygiene, human rights, 
because we noticed that our people have to understand their constitution to 
fight over their rights, because we feel more oppressed.  
He proposed a different form of politics which engages the state through advocacy 
and negotiation. This strategy builds on NGO-led civic education as the basis of 
strengthening the hawker’s agency and to increase citizens’ independence from a 
paternalistic government. He envisioned the potential of a social movement that 
could challenge hegemonic party politics that have seen the dominance of SWAPO 
since independence.89 This political threat was also noted by the architect: 
Within the Government and authorities and the middle class there is a strong 
perceptual bias against the ‘informal’ which is a big problem. These prejudices 
are aesthetic, things look messy, and disorganised and poor. It’s also power-
based, because it is complex to manage, and it has the potential for 
independence and political disruption. So, the aesthetic rejection is also a kind 
of a sub-conscious concern about where the power rests. 
She here establishes a link between the aesthetic realm, which, following Harvey 
acts as space of representation (see p7) of the realm of lived experience, and the 
 
 
89  While SWAPO received 57 percent of votes in the first democratic elections in 1989, its share of votes 
since rose to 73 percent in 1994, 76 percent in 1999 and 2004, 74 percent in 2009, 80 percent in 2014, 
and 65 percent in 2019 (Electoral Commission of Namibia, no date). 
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threat of political disruption due to the perceived ambiguity of the ‘informal’. She 
thus positions class interests at the heart of these differences.  
 
The world of the ‘informal’, often considered ot be outside the purview of the state 
and thus seemingly separate, has many points of contact with institutions of the 
state and as such holds multiple possibilities for contestation. However, such 
contestation is rarely antagonistic, or outright class-based, and more often 
conciliatory. On the other hand, its ‘illegibility’ provides the potential to see the 
‘informal’ as realm of resistance as a whole, which opens up a different sort of 
politics through direct everyday action. It is this realm that I will explore in depth in 
the next chapter. 
5.4 Conclusion: the production of informality as apparatus of exclusion 
In this chapter I have explored the question of how I and others had come to think 
the way we think about the ‘informal’ in order to expose the historical situatedness 
of such discourse and its inherent power relations. This was guided by the precepts 
of critical urban theory, which following Brenner (2012) requires a critique of 
ideology and a critique of power. My initial concern was that ‘informality’ does not 
seem to be a useful category of analysis, but rather acts as an ambiguous label 
that conceals a lot of what is happening. In addition, the notion that in Namibia 
‘informality’ is largely relegated to the black urban experience raised questions 
regarding how this sphere is entangled with the historical development of 
urbanisation on the one hand and decolonisation on the other. As laid out in the 
theoretical framework I attempted to achieve such critical reflection through 
constructing a genealogy of the ‘informal’ by tracing discursive practices and their 




I have argued above how increasingly free movement for the black majority during 
the transition to independence together with job-less growth shattered the pretence 
of modernist development based on full employment and a related city image of 
efficiency, orderliness, and civicness that previously had been upheld by means 
of modernist planning principles and protected through urban influx control. 
Underdevelopment which had previously largely been relegated to rural areas now 
became increasingly visible in towns and cities in the form of unplanned and 
unregulated settlements as formal development did not keep pace with the influx. 
At the same time an ‘informal’ economy began taking hold, driven by a lack of 
formal employment opportunities and low wages amongst others. This led to 
urbanisation – a historically recent phenomenon in Namibia – to become 
associated with underdevelopment. The concept of ‘informality’ that was 
simultaneously emerging in urban theory allowed for the escalating urban 
population that did not and could not conform to elite visions and standards of 
urban development to be othered as non-conforming and illegitimate. This could 
only be achieved because the formal – essentially the ways of organising society 
that were introduced by the coloniser – had been firmly established as the norm 
guiding all aspirational developmental goals before and after independence.  
 
This, after Foucault, is the more lasting legacy of colonialism: a deeply entrenched 
normativity which delegitimises everything that falls short of the formal, Eurocentric 
paradigm and thus consolidates elite power. Discursively the ‘informal’ is 
constructed as everything the formal is not, further implying its inadequacy and 
relegating it to a state of non-being, which is mirrored in policy documents that fail 
to acknowledge the complexity of the world that is labelled ‘informal’. This then 
explains why the focus of post-independence developmental policy was on 
preconceived formalisation of the activities and spaces of the ‘informal’, without 
much engagement with the realities within that sphere. Yet this focus and drive to 
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formalise everything in policy was not supported through concomitant redistribution 
of resources, which in the context of historically produced and deep-seated 
inequality exposes such formalisation agenda as an exclusionary technology of 
power disguised in a rhetoric of inclusive development. Within this setting, planning 
functions as a technology that not only derives from colonial practices, and 
perpetuates much of their original underpinnings, but more importantly produces 
the ‘informal’ through insisting on unachievable formal requirements and standards 
far beyond the reach of the state or the majority of the population, who in turn are 
discursively rendered illegitimate.  
 
Yet, unlike the binary conceptualisations suggested by concepts of ‘informality’ 
versus formality, I have argued that the sphere for the ‘informal’, in other words its 
lived reality, has multiple overlaps and points of contact with formal institutions, 
processes and actors, allowing opportunity for political contestation, even though 
this rarely takes the form of outright confrontation with the state and its institutions. 
I will argue in the next chapter that contestation itself might need to be rethought 
as everyday socio-spatial practice, through which not only the formal paradigm is 
challenged, but an alternative form of urbanism is being created.  
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CHAPTER 6 EVERYDAY LIFE AT THE HERERO MALL 
Our life is just here… 
Harry, Herero Mall Trader90 
In the previous chapter I investigated how ‘urban informality’ operates as discursive 
practice, as an apparatus of othering on the one hand, and of stabilisation of 
capitalist development on the other. Both these mechanisms allow colonial 
inequalities and spatial paradigms to be entrenched and perpetuated far into the 
future. This, I argued is one of the positive effects of colonial power in the 
Foucauldian sense. If the discourse of ‘informality’ serves to entrench unequal 
power relations by delegitimising those it oppresses, critical urban theory as 
proposed by Brenner (2012) demands of us to explore the latent, yet suppressed 
emancipatory possibilities within that setting or in the words of Kellner (2002), to 
explore contestation and struggle that pushes back against such manifestations of 
power. This means we must enter the realm of everyday lived reality that is labelled 
‘informal’ and establish its relationships with such discourse. I have argued above 
that the Herero Mall provides a uniquely relevant case for such inquiry (see 
CHAPTER 3). 
 
To reconceptualise the ‘informal’ in terms of the emancipatory possibilities such 
settings embody, I carried out an ethnographic study of the Herero Mall to explore 
ways of knowing ‘urban informality’ as lived experience by engaging with and 
listening carefully to those who produce this space. To convey this lived reality for 
 
 
90  Harry was one of the traders I interviewed for this thesis. He will be introduced further below. All names 
in this section have been substituted to ensure interviewees’ anonymity. 
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what it is, instead of what it is not – such as the prevailing discourse would have it 
– I aim to immerse you as the reader in the everyday life of the Herero Mall through 
text and image. This narrative is based on my observations during the seven years 
that I have been engaging with the mall. It is based on participant observation and 
notes of meetings with the traders’ committee, memories, spatial mapping and 
semi-structured interviews with business operators as well as casual conversations 
with traders and visitors at the mall. The overarching research question I attempt 
to answer in this chapter is: How do people inhabit the Herero Mall spatially, 
economically, and socially? This classification, derived from Harvey’s triad of 
absolute, relative and relational space (see p7), is not meant to isolate these 
evidently interdependent instances of spatiality, but rather to allow me to structure 
the inquiry to develop an understanding of a contemporary form of alter-
urbanisation defined by what it is: a socio-spatial practice. 
 
I, therefore, wrote the following chapter in a narrative tone and largely in the present 
tense to reflect my personal experience of this space and allow the reader to enter 
as closely as possible into this reality. I aimed to describe the space and the 
practices as I experienced them as well as the way they were accounted for by 
those I interacted with. I aimed to avoid framing these accounts and practices in 
terms of the prevailing discourse established earlier, but rather acknowledged that 
they remain in constant tension with that discourse as it acts directly on the setting. 
Scattered throughout the narrative are vignettes that highlight specific moments of 
experience or conversation that are significant for establishing the relationships 
between social, spatial and economic ‘spheres’. In addition to describing the 
spaces and practices in detail, I translated the information into socio-spatial 
diagrams that visualise the relationships between people, institutions, space and 
economic flows. Throughout this narrative that transverses scales and sites, people 
and things, practices and theory, I aimed to draw conceptualisations of an alter-
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urbanisation that form an analytical strand throughout the text and that are 
consolidated in the conclusion of the chapter. 
6.1 Retro-fitting the Township 
Vignette: lunch at the mall 
It is 1:30 pm. I order pap 91 with meat and gravy from Muarii who operates 
next to Uzuva’s shebeen. Before I know what’s going on, she has 
organised me a table with a tablecloth and chairs at Uajenenisa’s place on 
the other side of the thoroughfare for cars. Her other customers sit on beer 
crates and self-made furniture in the shaded area of Uzuva’s shebeen and 
they hold their plates in their hands or on their knees. I realise that I only 
carry a 200 Namibian dollar note on me, which is quite a lot of money 
around here. But this is not a problem. Uzuva’s sister, who also makes 
food nearby, takes some change from her bra but soon realises that it is 
not enough and disappears to get change elsewhere. She and Muarii must 
be working together somehow? There is clearly no shortage of cash here, 
and soon the problem of change is resolved, at least for me. Uajenenisa’s 
place, where I sit, has stackable steel and plastic chairs. It is essentially a 
roofed and paved veranda alongside a 20-foot container in which the 
fridges and freezers and other equipment are stored. Containers are more 
difficult to break into than corrugated iron shacks that are the general 
standard around here, but they are also more expensive to obtain. Next to 
it is a food cart that permanently rests on stacked bricks. The sun is 
burning, and everyone gathers in the few shaded areas that are provided. 
Sitting all by myself, I feel awkward at the special treatment I receive, but it 
is not entirely unexpected. I am as usual the only white person around, 
which tends to create this kind of situation. But it allows me to calmly 
observe the scene. At Tjikaa’s place opposite, which is also a veranda, 
customers make space on the benches for some seemingly high-status 
individuals who joined to eat. As usual, Tjikaa’s seems the most popular 
 
 
91  Pap is made of white maize meal and either prepared as a thick porridge or into a firmer polenta-like 
consistency. It is the local staple food. 
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place to be at the mall during the day. Next to me on the veranda two 
women peel potatoes in large quantities. Kovii, who runs the food cart next 
to Uajenenisa looks energetic today. I arrange an interview with her for 
later in the afternoon. Two hawkers selling plastic flip-flops and car 
keyholders pass through. Children, on their way back from school, walk 
through the mall and along Klaagliedere [Afrikaans for lamentations] Street 
at the back. Music blasts from different shebeens, indistinctive. Parked 
cars fill up the open spaces between buildings. The roof of a nearby house 
is being repaired, which becomes part of the soundscape. Utaara 92 
arrives to have lunch at Tjikaa’s and brings along his own plate. He greets 
me in passing. More school children cross. A woman passes through, 
selling meatballs which she carries in a large Tupperware container for five 
dollars. I ask and she tells me she cooks them at home. She offers me 
some, but I decline because I just finished my big lunch. A man and a 
woman return to Uajenenisa’s, carrying a 25-litre water container that they 
refilled at one of the neighbouring houses. The water will surely be used for 
cooking those many potatoes. An old man with a hat, a beard and a 
beautiful, thin knobkierie,93 made from acacia branches with the root ball 
carved as the handle, passes by. He swings the kierie elegantly as he 
walks…  
 
The Herero Mall is a so-called informal market. This is a designation which, as I 
argued in the previous chapter, is discursively structured as lack, deficiency, and 
non-conformity (see 5.1.2). It characterises the place as a place of non-being, 
something that is neither measurable in conventional economic terms nor 
compliant with statutory regulations and is therefore deemed to lack legitimacy. But 
once one becomes more familiar with the setting and the people, even spending 
just one lunch hour there – observing the space and the dynamics for what they 
are – is enlightening. It revealed the interdependency and mutual assistance 
 
 
92  Utaara was the first trader to occupy the site in 2005. He operates a car mechanic and welding business 
and has been the chairperson of the Herero Mall Trader’s Committee since its inception.  
93  Kieries are common to many Southern African cultures and come in many shapes and materials. While 
often used as weapons, the Ovaherero kieries are primarily used as walking sticks.  
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between traders who, superficially, seem to be direct competitors; that cash is 
required to lubricate these transactions; that this economy forms part of wider local 
and global networks of distribution; that minimal infrastructure, providing only basic 
shelter from the elements, is sufficient to make this space habitable and conducive 
for business and socialising; that the space is perpetually under construction to 
suit evolving needs; that activities here partly depend on the surrounding formal 
infrastructure and governance regimes as part of a system of distribution of goods 
and provision of services; and that this place allows class differentiation and 
cultural affiliation to overlap in a multi-layered system of social membership. This 
experience also exposed me as isolated in this space, feeling alienated, and 
receiving special treatment. This needs to be kept in mind as I narrate about this 
place, aiming to develop and deepen our understanding of ‘informality’ as socio-
spatial practice. 
6.1.1 Occupy, appropriate, defend 
When they [municipality] break here [Herero Mall], then we build another one, 
where there are those open lands. 
Sukona, Herero Mall trader94 
As outlined in the introduction to the case study site (see CHAPTER 3), the mall is 
located on what used to be a vacant piece of municipal land dedicated and zoned 
for future institutional use. 95  Within conventional town planning practice, land 
reserved for such future uses becomes a ‘placeholder’, a promise for future 
development that can remain empty for decades. Beyond its southern boundary, 
slightly higher than the mall, are three major institutions of relevance for the 
 
 
94  Sukona will be introduced further below. 
95  Also see footnote 17, p63. 
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Ovaherero: The Ovaherero Traditional Authority (OTA) Headquarters, the Oruuano 
Church, and the Commando Hall No 2 (see Figure 4 and Figure 19). The OTA 
Headquarters and the church have solid boundary walls bordering the mall, 
creating a hard, impermeable edge. Their entrances, and that of the Commando 
hall face south, away from the mall.96 Towards the north the land slopes downward 
and has been eroded in places by storm water flowing downhill towards the 
northern edge of the plot, where an open storm water drainage ditch takes the 
water westwards, into the seasonal river network feeding the nearby Goreangab 
Dam.  
 
Figure 19: The mall seen from Clemence Kapuuo Street with the roofs of the OTA 
Headquarters, Oruuano Church and Commando Hall in the background. The image depicts 
a protest march by Ovaherero groups in the context of the genocide negotiations between 
the Namibian and the German governments, February 2016. Photo by Guillermo Delgado. 
 
 
96  The entrance of the church used to be from the mall through a large gate, but it has since been moved 
towards the street in the south, away from the mall allegedly because of the incompatibility with the 





























The distribution of buildings on the land has developed over the years, guided by 
a certain spatial logic (see Figure 20; Figure 21; Figure 22): to the south a row of 
attached buildings (cluster A, see Figure 23) run along the boundary wall of the 
adjoining OTA and Oruuano Church properties. The high boundary walls of 
approximately two metres act as back walls of the various buildings. Existing 
physical infrastructure is thus utilised to minimise required materials. Consequently, 
all the spaces in cluster A open up only to one side towards the first thoroughfare, 
which runs fairly straight in a north-east to south-west direction. Opposite this row, 
at the centre of the plot, are clusters B, C and D, comprising various abutting 
spaces that again reveal efficient use of materials. The spaces in these clusters 
open up on various sides and have a number of indentations which form 
courtyards. A number of spaces in these clusters have several entrances, allowing 





Figure 20: The site in 2001 before it was occupied with the light pole (A) and electricity 
substation (B) already in place. Image source: City of Windhoek. 
 
Figure 21: The site in 2005 when it was first occupied. Amongst the first businesses were 










Figure 22: The Herero Mall in 2011 with vehicle thoroughfares (A) and (B) indicated. Image 
source: City of Windhoek. 
 
Figure 23: The Herero Mall in 2019 indicating clusters of buildings. Map drawn by author 
















The central clusters are encircled on the northern and western side by the second 
thoroughfare, the existence of which can be traced back to the footpaths cutting 
across the open land before it was settled (see Figure 20). This pathway connects 
the neighbourhood to the nearby business node surrounding Soweto market to the 
north-west of the mall as part of the larger open space network of Katutura (see 
Figure 3). The retaining of this pre-existing pathway throughout the site’s 
development is inherent to the process of its incremental development as emerging 
economies tend to establish themselves in direct relation to pedestrians, or, in this 
case, increasingly to vehicular traffic. To the north-east of the second thoroughfare 
is another tight cluster of buildings (cluster E) that is less permeable and has a 
somewhat inaccessible edge with a number of spaces facing the storm water ditch 
to the north. Towards the north-west is cluster F which turns it back towards the 
stormwater ditch entirely while along Clemence Kapuuo street are a number of 
detached buildings (cluster G) that by and large open up towards the thoroughfare 
instead of the street that borders them. This indicates that these businesses are 
more dependent on traffic crossing the site than passing along the street. 
 
This inward-looking character of the mall has been accentuated since a boundary 
fence has been erected by the municipality in early 2018 at the request of the 
traders’ committee. The idea of the fence can be traced back to around 2012 when 
it was first mentioned in the media as a way to curb crime at the mall (Die 
Republikein, 2012) which had been widely reported in previous years and created 
a harsh police response (see CHAPTER 3, and Appendices, p292). The committee 
had also argued that besides reducing crime, a fence would enable them to control 
access for underage children who pass though the mall on their way home from 
the nearby primary school. This ‘exposure’ of youth to drinking in public and other 
“immoral behaviour” was often used as argument by residents and authorities for 
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the banning of alcohol from the mall, and thus threatening the traders’ livelihood.97 
The fence became a strategic device for traders. On the one hand, they could 
deflect moralistic opposition to their activities, on the other, a fence built by the 
municipality to improve the security could be seen as a de-facto acknowledgement 
of the legitimacy of the mall.98 
 
The fence is made of razor diamond mesh and has a number of pedestrian and 
car entrances (see Figure 23), which changed the spatial dynamic by reducing 
pedestrian access to the previously open site. 99  I was not the only who had 
reservations about the fencing of the site 100 and the issue was the subject of 
various discussions during my visits. In one particular discussions over lunch at 
Tjikaa’s place, a customer told me that he thought the fence was not a good idea 
because it would feel too enclosed and stated that “if you create a fence you create 
colonisation”. He lived in Klein Windhoek (where I also live), a central, 
predominantly white high-income neighbourhood, where “you don’t even see your 
neighbour”. He justified his view by saying that “we are all Hereros here, so there 
will be little crime”. He thus clearly distinguished the white / colonial city from the 
mall and surroundings and marked out ethnic affiliation as the factor that would 




97  On several occasions that I presented the feasibility study to the City Council the sale of alcohol was 
debated. During interviews with surrounding residents that formed part of the feasibility study the issue 
was raised, e.g. during an interview with the chairperson of the Residents Committee on 23 February 
2014. 
98  One trader told me that during a visit to the mall by the CoW CEO she had shown him the shoddy 
workmanship of the fence and requested him to get it rectified, which was done. This is indicative of 
the position of legitimacy that traders have acquired to make direct demands on senior municipal 
officials. 
99  While numerous pedestrian entrance gates have been provided, not all are unlocked during the day. 
Vehicular access gates were located to maintain original thoroughfares. 
100  My objection to the fencing of the site was mainly based on the expectation of reduced economic 
activity due to restricted access. 
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While it is difficult to establish if security has improved – as access through the 
various gates is not being controlled as originally proposed – committee members 
maintain that it has. They argue that there is generally reduced business activity 
since about 2017 which is caused by the economic recession and not related to 
the increased enclosure of the mall.101 Most of the venues on the north-eastern 
edge along the storm water ditch (see Figure 24) stand vacant as this area is now 
relatively isolated as the gate provided in the fence is kept permanently closed. 
The new fence also highlights the fact that the land comprising the mall is made up 
of two plots, only the larger one of which belongs to the municipality, while the 
smaller one has been sold to the OTA after years of negotiations.102 While the mall 
historically occupied both plots, the fence now practically separates the land in a 
way that suggests a future spatial development that may yet sever the original 
thoroughfare. But physical enclosure also delineates inside from outside, who 
belongs and who does not. In this way, the fence could be considered as a physical 
acknowledgement of the presence of traders on its land by the municipality and 
thus provide traders with a sense of tenure security.  
 
Figure 24: The north-eastern edge of the site remains somewhat secluded since the fence 
(right) has been erected. Note the storm water ditch in the foreground, and the permanently 
closed vehicular gate to the right. 
 
 
101  The temporal overlap of these two developments made it difficult to verify this argument. 
102  The application to buy the land from the municipality goes back to the early 2000s and had only been 
implemented in 2010.  
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Another dominant feature is the various Shepherd Trees (Omutendereti in 
Otjiherero) dotted around the mall, which are the only remaining trees of the original 
savannah landscape. They provide valuable shade and their fruits can be 
fermented to make beer as Utaara told me. In many cases the trees are an integral 
part of the spatial arrangement. Some trees show traces of red spray-painted 
numbers, which was done to demarcate the various businesses at the mall when 
traders were first registered by the municipality. Trees can, therefore, be 
considered venues in and of themselves, dissolving the distinction between nature 
and infrastructure. A large tree on the northern edge of the site is regularly used by 
a male wood carver who sits on the ground making traditional artefacts for sale 
(see Figure 25). Another large tree close to the road used to be the established site 
of a woman cooking meals for lunch. Since the site has been fenced off her location 
became separated from the road and is now secluded within the spatial setting of 
the mall. I have not seen her since. 
 




As per conventional planning procedure, the parcel was reserved for future 
development of civic amenities which have not materialised since the 1970s. But 
in a township context, where hardly any provision was made for business activities 
to take place, and in an economy with an increasing labour surplus, for residents 
the open land had a different meaning: free and unrestricted space ready to be 
occupied to establish independent livelihood activities. Here a parallel with 
Foucault’s notion of the conditions of emergence comes to mind (see p13). Once 
appropriated, the spatial logic underlying the incremental development of the site 
over the last 15 years has been guided by numerous factors. The presence of 
adjacent culturally significant institutions had established an a priori centrality with 
a reach beyond the neighbourhood and the city, far into the rural areas. At the 
neighbourhood-scale, pedestrian mobility networks linking other centralities, and 
passing through the site, encouraged vendors to unlock latent economic 
opportunities.103 Pre-existing infrastructure, topography and the existence of trees, 
in addition to the pathways, informed where structures would be set up. The need 
for efficient use of building materials dictated the way buildings are constructed, 
which I will expand on in the next section. 
 
The ongoing process of formalisation of the mall by the municipality, manifested in 
the form of the new boundary fence, affirms a logic of property, of static boundaries 
and pre-conceived land use, which I argue are hostile to the on-going mode of 
urbanisation witnessed at the mall. One customer called these logics of enclosure 
colonisation. All the same, to the traders’ committee, the fence represents the first 
official affirmation of their legitimacy after years of engaging, at times 
 
 
103  Up to this day most businesses at the mall face pedestrian and car traffic crossing the site, rather than 
outwards towards the street as conventional urban planning theory would have it. 
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antagonistically, with municipal authorities and the police. 104  It delineates their 
presence,105 which has become one of the main strategies for legitimisation. It has 
also been a tool which traders used strategically to counter moralistic arguments 
by surrounding residents and authorities which threaten their existence: the fact 
that the mall used to be open for schoolchildren to pass through and witness 
‘immoral’ behaviour. Arguing that a fence would allow the control of access and 
thus keep young children out – even though this did not happen in practice – 
allowed traders to pursue the sale and consumption of alcohol in a de facto public 
space, which is otherwise forbidden. Strategies of defending their presence at the 
mall thus ranged from direct confrontation with the police to tactics of engagement 
and negotiation with authorities. 
6.1.2 Build, transform, keep it light 
Despite the slope most buildings are built directly onto the land, without prior 
levelling of the ground.106 This makes many buildings prone to flooding during the 
short but intense downpours that are common in Windhoek’s climate. The vast 
majority of structures are steel – or in fewer cases – timber frames, with corrugated 
iron sheeting as walls and roofs. Roof sheets are often held down by placing bricks 
or rocks on top, in addition to a few roofing nails. Besides the dominant galvanised 
corrugated sheets, a deep blue version is one of the few pre-painted options for 
corrugated sheets available in Namibia, providing a means of differentiation 
between buildings as only few structures are painted (see Figure 26 and Figure 
 
 
104  The fence as recognition is analogous to the demands for new policies as a way to recognise the 
‘informal’ during the workshop we organised with James Ferguson (also see footnote 79, p140) 
105  Here I have to acknowledge James Ferguson’s notion of presence, which he has partly developed in 
his book Give a Man a Fish (Ferguson, 2015). In a public lecture he presented while visiting our 
university in August 2019 he developed the idea further. However, the above represents my own 
interpretation of this notion. 
106  Building on sloping land without any terracing is also a hallmark of the majority of so-called shacks in 
settlements for the urban poor that sprawl along the periphery of larger Katutura. 
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27). 107  Undeniably these construction methods and materials testify to the 
precarious nature of the situation. At the same time such materials are the most 
affordable, lightweight and easy to transport. They lend themselves to self-
construction and can be transformed easily when changing uses or circumstances 
so require. As steel prices are calculated by weight, the more lightweight a 
structure, the less expensive it is. 
 
Figure 26: Mukupua’s shebeen. 
Where internal floors are made of concrete, as most are, they are only casually 
levelled and, in some cases, have steps to make up for the slope which attests to 
their incremental construction. The frequently corroded lower edges of the 
corrugated sheets are a result of the sheets being directly buried in the ground 
without any detailing of the transition between ground and building, indicating the 
 
 
107  One structure that is bordering the street was painted with the colours and logos of a popular beer 
brand, providing free advertising for the owner at little cost to the advertiser. 
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prioritisation of immediate design solutions over long-term sustainability. Here and 
there old shipping containers form part of the spatial arrangement. While these 
provide improved security and longevity, they are expensive to purchase and 
require heavy duty transport. This suggests that the use of containers depends 
largely on opportunity, and is not necessarily a generalisable solution, as is often 
suggested.108 Altogether, the majority of buildings at the Herero Mall are made 
primarily of steel in its various forms (see Figure 28). 
 
Figure 27: Kaumbe's shebeen. 
The predominant welded steel-frame construction permits easy, rapid and 
comparatively inexpensive transformations of space, which is further enabled by 
the four welding businesses located at the mall. Over the years I have witnessed 
the on-going transformation of a number of buildings, especially those that are 
 
 
108  For example, the economic development officer suggested in the interview that containers would 
provide a good solution for markets without making them too fixed.  
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operated by the owners themselves, whose interest is in setting their place apart 
from others and opening up additional possibilities for business activity. However, 
the necessity of generating livelihoods demands that such transformation does not 
impede existing business activities. At times new structures are built over the 
existing ones in order to allow activities to continue during construction. A floor can 
be paved early in the morning, so that at lunch time customers are not disturbed. 
A major limitation for spatial transformation is the availability of space surrounding 
the structure, and only few structures are still able to grow sideways. Despite this 
increasing lack of space, no double storey structures have yet been erected, as 
these would require much sturdier, and thus more expensive structures. The only 
tall building in the vicinity of the mall is a tower, three stacked containers high, on 
the adjoining premises of the Commando Hall and belongs to a prominent 
businessman. It features a trailer and a billboard atop, advertising the trailer 
welding and rental business at the premises below. The ground floor container 
houses a music shop selling Oviritje109 CDs that are popular for jukeboxes found in 
shebeens. The upper containers are reachable by a steel staircase and are used 
as an office on the first floor and storage space on the second floor. The second 
landmark is a ca. 15m high steel light pole – a substitute for street lighting and 




109  Oviritje is a contemporary Namibian music genre that is primarily sung in Otjiherero. 
110  The traders told me that at one point the municipality wanted to remove the light pole and use it for a 
stadium elsewhere. Only after protests from the committee did the municipality review its proposal and 




Figure 28: The Herero Mall seen from the top of the adjacent container tower: two recently 
installed prefabricated municipal toilets are visible in the foreground. 
The architecture at the Herero Mall is an architecture of immediacy, of steel, of 
minimised means and weight, which is perpetually being made and re-made by its 
inhabitants to suit their needs. The prevailing construction methods and materials 
lend themselves to the dynamism that the precarious nature of the context 
demands: affordable to buy, easy to transport, quick to erect, and conducive for 
transformation. Here, incremental building is the given, and construction methods 
prioritise adaptability and efficiency of means in the current moment over solutions 
which might be more long-lived, but usually come at higher cost and provide less 
flexibility. The dominant aesthetic of temporality, of lightweight corrugated metal, 
of self-construction and perpetual transformation reflects this architecture to be one 
of process rather than product. 
6.1.3 Live, work, socialise 
As mentioned in the introductory vignette, at the Herero Mall shade is of primary 
concern for daytime activities. The most elemental structure, the veranda, only 
provides a roof on poles without further enclosure, which, if high enough to avoid 
direct radiant heat emanating from roof sheets, is enough to create a comfortable 
space. In many cases existing trees have been integrated as shading elements. 
Often, only selected sides of verandas, especially those facing the harsh western 
afternoon sun, are partially closed off. Some of the most popular daytime spaces 
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are essentially enabled by such elemental structures, highlighting the fact that very 
little physical infrastructure is required to enable social interaction. 
 
Figure 29: Food vendor Muarii cooking in front of Uzuva’s shebeen, Tjikaa’s blue veranda in 
the background. 
The few permanent food vendors are located directly adjacent to a shebeen (see 
Figure 29), the one providing food while the other provides drinks in a mutually 
beneficial relationship that I will expand on further below (see pages 197 and 211). 
Generally, in these settings no music is played, unlike in most of the other 
shebeens: these are places of conversation. People sit on beer crates, plastic 
chairs in various states of disrepair, and on elongated welded steel benches where 
they are provided. There are generally few tables, allowing seating arrangements 
and constellations of social interaction to change continually.111 Those structures 
that are more enclosed usually feature large sliding or hinged doors that open up 
 
 




large parts of the façade and thus allow sight of activities inside. Free-standing 
structures often have such openings facing multiple sides (see Figure 26, Figure 
27 and see Figure 30), which allows them to be closed selectively for climate and 
dust control or for increased privacy.112 These large and glass-less openings also 
make possible the continuity between interior and exterior spaces (see Figure 31). 
Openness and enclosure of spaces is made to be flexible, allowing for a wide array 
of spatial arrangements and continuous adaptation to the requirements of social 
dynamics. 
 
Figure 30: Different versions of the shebeen typology showing the permeability and 
flexibility of spaces that open up to several sides (RF = fridge, FR = freezer). 
The most common architectural typology at the mall is the shebeen (see Figure 30) 
which is sometimes re-purposed as a shop or a restaurant. The largest space is 
usually the social space of the shebeen, which opens up to the outside as 
described above. Where adequate cross-ventilation is enabled, the interior spaces 
are comfortable throughout the day. In some cases, attempts at improving 
insulation have been made, either by cladding the inside with plasterboard off-cuts, 
or by fixing recycled freight truck canvas covers or other fabrics to the inside of the 
 
 
112  Window openings are usually covered with expanded metal mesh or steel reinforcement mesh, which 

































structure.113 There is usually a separate room inside or adjacent to the social space. 
This space functions as the bar and most commonly takes the form of a cage made 
of expanded metal mesh or iron burglar bars with a counter and a little opening to 
pass through drinks, while protecting the bartender on the inside.114 The bar usually 
houses a variety of fridges and freezers for keeping drinks cool, as well as other 
valuable equipment and is generally the most secure space in the shebeen. 
Sometimes the jukebox, a standard feature in most shebeens, is fitted in such a 
way that it is secured insider the bar, but accessible from the social space for 
customers to operate. In other cases, jukeboxes are secured with their own 
lockable metal cage. Security of bar tenders and equipment is ensured through 
providing a protected space at the centre surrounded by a more permeable social 
space which blurs the distinction between the interior and the exterior (see Figure 
31).  
 
The third space, sometimes an additional room, sometimes just a niche inside the 
bar, is used as storage and often for bartenders to sleep, evidenced by rolled up 
and stowed-away mattresses. 115  Over the years I have witnessed the 
transformation of one shebeen in particular: it started from the typical typology of a 
bar ‘cage’ in one corner of a square corrugated structure and subsequently a 
second, larger bar was added as an extension of the original structure, allowing 
the original bar to be used as a kitchen. Two years later, a second addition was 
built towards the road, which the owner explained was planned as a future 
butchery. However, at the time of our conversation she was staying there 
 
 
113  There seem to be trade-offs between improving interior aesthetics to distinguish the shebeen from the 
competition, the availability of large amounts of material, and its thermal insulation capacity. 
114  These spaces often have lockable, low doors that require one to bend down when entering.  
115  I was told by several business owners that this arrangement is mostly to ensure the security of the 
business, equipment and stock during the night as structures are easy to break into. 
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temporarily with her partner and their two children since the rent for her backyard 
shack across Clemence Kapuuo Street had become unaffordable.116 Shebeens 
thus often perform a residential function in addition to their commercial purpose 
and thus provide a very direct means of integrating living and working, and in the 
process improve security of the space. Where sleeping quarters are separate, they 
can be quite spacious and provide privacy and a level of comfort. Sleeping niches 
within the secure space of the bar are often quite small and separated only with a 
curtain.117 I am not aiming to belittle the ultimate inadequacy of corrugated iron 
structures as habitable dwellings, nor to dismiss the concern for the exploitation of 
family labour, for which such dual spatial arrangements provide an effective 
solution. But under the prevailing circumstances the typology is fit for purpose and 
challenges the prevalent single-use zoning, which the municipality, through the 
process of formalisation, wishes to re-affirm. 
 
The experience of continuous space is not merely reliant on the blurring of physical 
barriers. The open and permeable structures and the spatial distribution of 
buildings at the mall allow people to communicate up to 15-20m across to other 
places. At the same time, music – the pulse of the mall – emanates in various 
volumes from countless jukeboxes, as well as from passing and parked cars, 
aurally enhancing the perception of spatial continuity. Jukeboxes and CDs for on-
demand music can be found in nearly all of the shebeens, with the occasional 
exception of a laptop or smartphone for digital streaming. This allows customers to 
choose their own music according to taste and thus personalise their experience 
at the mall. It is no surprise that local Oviritje music predominates, interspersed 
 
 
116  The trader confirmed that although some people at the mall sleep in shebeens to avoid paying rent, it 
is usually done for security reasons. 
117  In one case I witnessed I was told that up to 3 people would share the single bed. 
  
182 
with the latest international pop megahits like “Despacito”, or “Shape of you”.118 
The lightweight metal structures meanwhile do little to prevent sound from travelling 
and one way to ensure drowning out noise from neighbouring establishments is to 
turn up the volume. 119  The resulting cacophony is punctuated by construction 
noise, most likely steel grinders and hammering where structures are being built, 
repaired or transformed. 
   
Figure 31: A typical enclosed bar with jukebox (left) and flexible social space (right) with 
large openings to the outside. 
The mall is a spatial continuum where activities, sounds, economies and 
jurisdictions blur. Its physical infrastructure is concentrated in the minimum 
required for comfort and enabling social life to thrive in ever changing 
constellations, bringing to mind conceptualisations of architecture as social 
condenser.120 Typologies allow freedom of movement for customers, and flexibility 
of use and adaptation through large, variable openings, while ensuring safety of 
staff and security of stock and equipment at the heart of the space. Often primarily 
 
 
118  This refers to 2018 when these songs were popular. 
119  ‘Noise pollution’ has been another major concern for surrounding residents that has been repeatedly 
raised in our engagements during the feasibility study, both with neighbours and municipal authorities.  
120  Architecture as ‘social condenser’ was a key concept of the constructivists in the post-revolutionary 
Soviet Union the 1920s. 
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recreational spaces also include residential functions, challenging established 
principles of land use separation. The architecture thus blurs delimitations of 
interiority and exteriority, enclosure and openness, economic competition and 
mutual assistance, personalised and shared space, working, socialising and living. 
Visual continuity and a soundscape of conversation, music, construction and 
vehicular movement stretches this spatial continuity beyond the immediate 
boundaries of the mall and embeds it in the lived reality of the neighbourhood, 
which initially had been conceived as a residential-only suburb. Here, citizens give 
shape to the right to the city that Brenner (2012) and Roy (2005) invoke: much more 
than the right to access, this is the right to transform the city in their image. 
6.1.4 The agencies of cars 
The mall seems to be as intrinsically linked to the automobile as any commercial 
shopping mall would be, though in a different way. Unlike the swathes of static, 
parked cars surrounding suburban shopping malls, here the automobile, moving 
or stationary, forms part of the space and is difficult to disassociate from the on-
going dynamics. A rhythmic trickle of cars passes through the two main 
thoroughfares. Especially the northern thoroughfare has increasingly sharper 
bends as buildings are expanded limiting the space of the automobile.121 Traces of 
cars which rammed into buildings, even though at low speed, are visible 
everywhere, but buildings are easy to put back into shape. Pickups and small 
lorries deliver goods, including from wholesale retailers that deliver beverages to 
some of the shebeens, exemplifying the direct economic link between formal retail 
and the mall which will be explored below (see 6.2.1). Drivers often stop temporarily 
to exchange some words with visitors or business owners without the need to step 
 
 
121  Steel bollards, positioned at strategic corners of the accessway to discourage cars bumping into 
structures, were much too weak to perform their intended function. 
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out of their car, or they park in close proximity to the business they are frequenting. 
In the latter case customers often play their own music from their car, as long as it 
is acceptable to other customers.122 Such personalisation of space through music 
does thus not only apply to shebeens but also to the shared space of the mall.  
 
Then there are cars parked at the carwash: those waiting their turn and those that 
are drying, their polished tyres glistening in the sun. In this setting the car itself 
becomes part of the economy: the owners usually sit at the shebeen towards the 
back of the car wash, engaging in conversation over a drink, while waiting for their 
car to be cleaned as I will expand on in more detail below (see p207).123 There are 
also those cars with former lives, that have since become part of the immovable 
property. Next to Uzuva’s shebeen stands an old Volkswagen minibus that, until 
the recent installation of municipal toilets, had functioned as a discreet enclosure 
for women to relieve themselves in a bucket that could then be emptied into the 
storm water drainage ditch behind it. Other stationary, large cars, or parts of them, 
such as the body of a delivery van, are used for storage, providing functional 
space. In some cases, rusting car bodies, stripped of all useful parts, are simply 
too demanding to dispose of and serve no further purpose. 
 
Cars come in all forms and sizes. The bakkie (pickup) is ubiquitous. It is evident 
from the existence and form of the loading bay tralies 124 if pickups are used for 
farming, and the number of farm bakkies that frequent the mall reveals that many 
patrons have farming interests, on which I will expand below (see p217). This 
 
 
122  Even with the doors open the music must be on full volume as noise competition from the surrounding 
shebeens is not easily outdone. 
123  Other car-related economies include car and tyre repair services that are scattered throughout the mall. 
124  Tralies are purpose-made steel loading bars for pick-up trucks that range from ornamental to functional 
additions to the car. 
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reveals the relationship between the mall and the larger territory of which it is part.125 
The foremost urban transport option in Windhoek, the sedan taxi, is equally 
omnipresent. While it is the regular transport mode of choice for the majority,126 it is 
also used widely to transport goods such as crates of beer, meat, groceries or 
firewood needed for the various businesses, to and from the mall.127 
 
At the same time, it is not uncommon to see very expensive cars, such as the latest 
Range Rover, glide past with the owner exchanging greetings through lowered 
windows.128 Yet the fact that the owners, who assumedly live in higher income parts 
of town relatively far away, frequent the mall sheds some light on the complex 
overlap of cultural affiliation with an emerging class formation. Sporadically, an 
open-roofed beige Land-Rover shuttles tourists past the mall on a “township tour”, 
conjuring up images of Safari and wild Africa. The official website of the Namibia 
Tourism Board advertises township tours as a way to learn about the “real Namibia” 
in a “safe and educational way” (Namibia Tourism Board, no date) and informs 
tourists about the charitable projects supported by such ventures.129 Here, the 
moving car provides a shield, establishing distance and thus preventing social 
interaction. This strange display of orientalism is telling of the continuous othering 




125  The large-scale trailer-hire business on an adjacent property is further evidence of this distinctive link 
with farming, and the strategic position which the mall holds in this respect. 
126  Taxis are the major public transport option in Windhoek and account for about 35 percent of all trips 
made (City of Windhoek, 2013, p17). 
127  In Windhoek taxis have do not have predefined routes, but rather go in certain general directions. For 
this reason, they provide a very flexible transport option.  
128  Range Rover is the car of choice for the new elite and easily worth two million N$ (GBP 105,263). 
129  The tourists only leave the car at a few pre-determined spots which do not include the mall, and instead 
point their cameras at the scenery as they pass by as if immediate danger lurks. 
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In modernist planning the automobile was primarily conceptualised as a mode of 
transport and infrastructure for cars still provides the overwhelming majority of 
transport investment in Namibia. 130  Many critiques of modernist planning have 
singled out the prioritisation of cars as a major obstacle to social interaction in 
public spaces (Gehl, 1980; Jacobs, 1961). However, in the context of the Herero 
Mall, the automobile transcends a functionalist, transport-oriented framing and 
takes on multiple uses and meanings that are closely intertwined with the space 
itself: while it still serves as a mode of transport, it enables larger distributive 
economic networks, can act as extension of personal space, becomes the subject 
of local economies, serves as utilitarian space, carries meaning of status and social 
mobility, but can also provide a shield for social interaction. It is not spatially 
separated from the core spaces and activities, and thus becomes part of a shared 
space of circulation. The car is thus intrinsically a link to and enabler of the 
economy at the mall.  
6.1.5 Withholding services 
Cars passing on the coarse gravel ground churn up lots of dust. This worsens in 
the months of August and September when the bare ground itself is swirled up by 
seasonal winds. The storm water ditch is littered with refuse that is collected 
elsewhere at the Mall and dumped there. Customers of adjacent food places 
casually throw their bones over their shoulders into the ditch. Flies abound. The 
municipality outsourced the responsibility to maintain the drainage ditch to the 
Roads Contractor Company in 2017. 131 It has not been cleared for long periods 
 
 
130  The CoW’s public spending for non-motorized transport represented only 2 percent of the budget for 
road repair and maintenance in 2012 (City of Windhoek, 2013, p37). 
131  The Roads Contractor Company is a Namibian Public Enterprise established by Act of Parliament “to 
undertake the construction and maintenance of roads and other construction works”. Source: Roads 
Contractor Company Act 14 of 1999.  
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since, which could cause a blockage of the storm water drain under Clemence 
Kapuuo Street. Now and then, through his networks the chairperson of the traders’ 
committee manages to arrange a municipal bulldozer to clean the ditch, which 
requires money to be collected from traders for this purpose, while supposedly the 
municipality pays for this service. Two municipal refuse skips are located on the 
sidewalk outside the mall, next to major entrances (see Figure 23). They seem not 
to be emptied often enough as they spill over, and garbage is blown into the 
surrounding streets. Some of the food vendors who cook on open fires discard their 
hot coals directly into the skip as it is the only place where they do not produce a 
safety hazard, making the garbage smoulder – at times for hours – with noxious 
smoke everywhere. The municipal system of refuse removal is evidently not 
adequate, yet blame for the place being dirty is apportioned to traders as the mayor 
of the city did (see p111). 
 
But refuse removal does not provide the most urgent service delivery concern. 
Instead, the smell of urine lingers. Despite six toilets having been installed by the 
municipality in late 2017, not everyone seems to use them. Especially for men it is 
easier and seemingly acceptable to urinate against the side or back walls of 
buildings rather than to ask for a key to the toilets that are relatively far away (see 
Figure 23). It is also not uncommon to see men urinating in the drainage ditch out 
in the open, just a few metres from where people are sitting.132 The most notorious 
places, usually somewhat sheltered corners, have been fenced off with NATO razor 
wire to discourage open urination, and in some of these areas old motor oil is spilled 
onto the ground to cover up the stench. The sanitary challenges are more difficult 
for women and I have mentioned innovative ways of dealing with the problem of 
 
 
132  This might be because of habit or the distance between some of the shebeens and the toilets, or even 
because of to reduced inhibitions of people when in a state of drunkenness. 
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lack of toilets above (see p184). Two young women who regularly visit the mall told 
me that whenever they needed to urinate, they had to find a sheltered spot and go 
with someone to protect them, highlighting the gendered impact of the lack of 
toilets. 
 
It is not my aim here to explore in much depth the issues related to sanitation, but 
rather pursue the question of how it could take so long for the municipality to 
provide public toilets in a fully serviced area, while concerns over poor sanitation 
had been raised in the media and by the municipal authorities since the early 
beginnings of the mall (see CHAPTER 3), let alone by the traders themselves. In 
October / November 2017 three sets of two adjacent toilets were installed by a 
building contractor commissioned by the municipality. The municipal officer I used 
to deal with Herero Mall-related issues explained to me that the municipality had a 
pre-defined list of contractors established through open public tender, from which 
it would pick contractors depending on the project. The outsourcing of the 
construction to an ‘external’ contractor had been met with much disappointment by 
the traders who claimed that they could have done the job themselves, generating 
some income at the mall. This happened more than a year after the traders’ 
committee had applied, with my assistance, for the municipality to provide them 
with building materials to construct their own temporary toilets until the longer-term 
development plans for the mall were being finalised (see Figure 32). I had designed 
the toilets using local construction materials and methods as they have been 
described above (see p173), so that local welders could build the structures 
themselves. They were planned to connect to the mains sewer line which passes 
through the plot since the neighbourhood was first linked to the municipal sewer 
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system, long before the land was occupied.133 The only missing aspect was a water 
connection which was requested from the municipality. Statutory, ‘transparent’ 
public procurement in this case became a structural impediment to a locally 
embedded process.  
 
Figure 32: 3D visualisation of the proposed self-built toilets that was part of the proposal 
submitted to the municipality in 2016. 
A calls for the immediate installation of temporary sanitation facilities was also 
included in our 2014 feasibility study for the development of the mall, which I will 
expand on in the next chapter. Instead, the municipality opted for standardised, 
prefabricated concrete toilet cubicles that are used in informal settlements. The 
pre-installed WC suites are inexpensive, domestic-grade fittings.134 The steel doors 
of the toilets open directly to the outside, as the inside of the concrete cubicle 
measures only 800 x 900mm. Sukona, who controls access to the two toilets closest 
to her shebeen, told me they are “too small for tall or fat people”.135 One woman, 
she told me, had to enter the toilets backwards as she is not able to turn around 
 
 
133  The availability of sewer mains makes the fact of the delayed sanitation more remarkable as this is 
usually by far the most difficult infrastructural aspect to provide. 
134  I witnessed two of the six toilets breaking when the contractor carelessly hauled the heavy cubicles 
onto the concrete base that had been cast earlier. 
135  Among the Ovaherero in particular there are many tall and heavy-built people. 
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inside.136  The prefabricated toilets, though answering a basic sanitation issue, 
provide no privacy and little dignity to people, especially in a public setting like the 
mall. 
      
Figure 33: Installation of the toilets by the external contractor (left) and interior of newly 
installed cubicle with broken fittings (right). 
Figure 34: Two of the refabricated toilets after installation 
 
 




While water for the toilets is provided by the municipality free of charge, the design 
is such that it is only available for flushing and no hand wash basins are provided. 
Apart from a lack of space to install a basin inside the cubicle, it appears that the 
fear of people using ‘free’ water for other purposes is the main concern. Besides 
the car wash, which has its individual water connection and meter, the toilets are 
the only water source at the mall, with nothing provided for washing hands, pots, 
cooking utensils and cutlery or for human consumption. In some cases, the lids of 
cisterns have been removed to enable people to wash their hands.137 The toilets 
also have no light at night, putting into question stated municipal priorities for 
hygiene and safety. Minor maintenance, the committee was told, has to be carried 
out by the traders themselves while the municipality would only be responsible for 
large-scale maintenance. The original copper plumbing was cast in the concrete 
to avoid tampering and most of it was damaged or leaking within a year after 
installation. To repair the broken plumbing, traders replaced the cast-in pipes with 
more affordable, surface-mounted plastic ones. In repairing the piping, traders 
added a tap with a hose inside one of the cubicles, which allowed them to fetch 
water for consumption. This particular cubicle would be kept locked under the 
watch of one trader, to ensure that it was not discovered by the municipality. 
Contradictions in the provision of sanitation solutions, such as providing ‘tamper-
free’ plumbing while requiring traders to undertake their maintenance, seem 
problematic. At the same time, such inconsistency provides opportunities to 




137  The pre-paid communal water-point the traders’ committee applied for in 2016 has not yet been 
installed. 
138  For water pricing also see footnote 188, p215. 
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The provision of electricity at the mall has been less controversial but equally 
complex. A map developed with traders’ committee members (see Figure 35) 
revealed the intricacies of the electricity distribution at the mall in relation to its 
incremental growth. Currently four electricity meters are shared by the various 
businesses, which were installed in 2006, 2008 and 2012 respectively,139 while one 
butchery gets its electricity directly from a neighbouring building140 and the car 
wash has its individual meter. In all other cases, traders share the expenses per 
meter, and given the diverging uses, especially between welders and other 
businesses that use much less electricity, this arrangement provides for some 
friction. The first electricity box from 2006 still supplies businesses at the far end of 
the mall, even though new meters have been installed closer by, revealing the 
chronology of the development. The meters are controlled by members of the 
traders committee, who thus yield some power over traders as they can disconnect 
individuals who are deemed to contravene any rules or are in arrears. Control over 
the electricity supply thus allows the committee to assert a level of governance.141  
 
While the meters were installed by professional electricians who were paid for their 
services with money collected from traders, the connections to the various 
businesses have been installed by traders themselves in often precarious ways 
(see Figure 36). Yet, the chairperson of the traders’ committee told me that 
normally, if traders need any assistance regarding the electricity supply up to the 
meters, they call the municipal officer who then arranges someone to assist.  
 
 
139  This explains why some businesses on the western side of the mall are connected to the electricity 
distribution box on the far eastern side of the site. 
140  The butchery received electricity form the neighbouring head office of the Popular Democratic 
Movement, Namibia’s largest opposition party, which does not allow shebeens to be connected to their 
electricity. 
141  Traders’ committee members conceded that control over electricity supply is the only way the 





Figure 35: Sketch of the history of electricity distribution at the mall developed in 
collaboration with traders. Red indicates the current distribution network from five electricity 
meters that are numbered according to the year of installation (green). Blue indicates the 
need for new meters that was discussed with traders. 
 
Figure 36: Electricity meters and 
distribution boards inside the 
space that traders constructed in 
2009.  
  
However, traders argue that this assistance is only happening because the 
municipality is recovering its costs by selling electricity. In 2017 electricity tariffs 
were increased from N$100 for 50 units to $100 for 29 units, nearly double, because 
the mall was considered to be a business area by the municipality. The attitude of 
the municipality towards service provision is thus at best vague, if not opportunistic: 
generating revenue from certain services while withholding others. 
 
The chequered history of service provision at the mall is telling about the attitude 
towards providing municipal services to the poor as well as of the conceptualisation 
of legitimate economic activity. On the one hand, the monopoly of provision of 
services is upheld as the only legitimate system by the municipality, even where 
such provision is insufficient and inadequate, as in the case of refuse removal. Still, 
blame for litter and dirt is levelled at the traders. Where such services are 
outsourced, their reliability is further diminished, prompting traders to arrange and 
pay for alternative services, which is not acknowledged by the municipality. On the 
other hand, while sewerage bulk infrastructure was available on site throughout the 
existence of the mall, for more than 10 years water was provided only to individual 
car wash businesses but not for public sanitary uses, with major negative and 
gendered implications for traders and customers of the mall. At the same time, in 
the absence of municipal provision for water and sanitation, proposals for self-help 
approaches to creating temporary sanitation facilities and generating income for 
local traders were disregarded in favour of formal procurement of generic and 
inadequate solutions through established formal processes and providers. 
Concerns of cost recovery seem to outweigh those of public health, safety and 
dignity as evidenced by the provision of toilets without facilities for washing hands 
and equipment used for food production, without light at night and without privacy. 
At the same time, owing of the ambiguity in the municipal approach traders were 
able to exploit the situation and create their own free water supply. Electricity, on 
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the other hand, has long been provided on a cost recovery basis, and business 
tariffs and municipal assistance with maintenance suggest the acknowledgement 
of the mall as a place of business. Yet, the evident precarious nature of electrical 
connections between municipal supply and end-user businesses and the related 
safety hazards seems to be ignored. Again, traders know how to exploit this 
ambiguity to their own advantage by making electricity supply the central lever of 
their self-governance. 
6.1.6 Conclusion: presence as act 
The Herero Mall was never planned this way. Reserved by town planners for future 
civic development within an otherwise dormitory township for black urban waged 
labour, the open land took on a different meaning of potential: making an 
independent living in a city that could no longer uphold the myth of employment for 
all. As I have shown above this myth of full urban employment was artificially 
constructed through urban influx controls, amongst other measures (see 4.1 and 
4.2). In this setting, space for economic activity has to be appropriated: either by 
turning private residences into mixed-use businesses, as in the case of Eveline 
Street (see p97); by trading in the public space of streets; or by occupying public 
land as is the case at the mall. Key to the latter operation is to establish legitimacy, 
as such occupations are resisted by the municipality not necessarily through 
outright eviction, but in more subtle ways, as I have shown in the case of the Herero 
Mall, through withholding provision of municipal services.  
 
In the post-independence context of Namibia, legitimacy is primarily achieved 
through presence.  However, presence is not a condition but an act: in other words, 
it requires to be enacted continuously to be sustained. In the above sections I 
demonstrated how such enactment occurred in the case of the Herero Mall. 
Historically presence has been established through occupation, building, and 
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everyday practice, spatially guided by an adjacent institutional centrality, pre-
existing neighbourhood-scale mobility patterns, pre-existing public infrastructure 
and trees. Once established the presence was strategically defended through 
confrontation, engagement and negotiation with the local authority and other 
stakeholders. Only through the enactment of presence did traders ultimately 
negotiate access to municipal services that had been available on site long before 
traders occupied the land. Architecturally, this presence has been materialised as 
lightweight, incremental, affordable, adaptable, and flexible buildings that continue 
to be transformed. Interiority and exteriority blur and use patterns and opportunities 
are perpetually changing. The architecture challenges conventional modernist 
separation of functions, spaces and infrastructure and fuses these into a unitary 
spatio-temporality of being urban.  
6.2 Popular urban economies 
If the spatiality of the urban is changing as I have attempted to show above, so is 
the economy that produces – and is produced by – this setting. In the following 
section I aim to explore how these economies operate, that are, again, 
conventionally labelled ‘informal’. This exploration is based primarily on semi-
structured interviews with business operators at the mall and casual conversations 
with traders and visitors throughout the research. I approached a number of traders 
as I outlined in my data collection methods (see 1.7) to develop an understanding 
of the social, spatial and economic aspects of their operations. As in the previous 
section, narrative description is used to develop qualitative insights into what I will 
call the popular economy and interspersed with discussion and analysis 
throughout. I derived the idea of popular economies from the Spanish concept of 
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“artes populares”, or popular art, as opposed to high art. 142  The socio-spatial 
diagrams of some of the businesses that I developed from the gathered data (see 
Figure 38; Figure 39) allowed me to visualise – if only in a crude way – the 
complexity and scale of these popular economies as a network of relationships and 
economic transactions between people, institutions, spaces and sites. While I had 
originally thought of these diagrams as tools for co-producing knowledge on 
‘informal economies’ with traders, they quickly became too elaborate to function as 
didactic instruments. Rather, the diagrams took on a role of analytical tool, through 
which I constructed, or in the words of Latour (2005), deployed various actors as 
networks that cut across sites and scales. While my original research question and 
interview guide distinguished spatial, social and economic aspects, the diagrams 
reveal that, in terms of lived experience, these spheres are impossible to separate. 
Theoretically, such separation would be incongruous. Instead, they allow us to see 
these instances of spatiality to be the site, medium and outcome of a process of 
urbanisation that is distinctly different – I will argue – from an urbanisation paralleled 
by industrialisation, which had historically been the basis for modernist urbanism 
to develop, which in turn had been influential in the development of colonial 
urbanisation in Namibia (see 4.1).  
6.2.1 The shebeen as the beginning of business 
The history of the shebeen has already been elaborated above (see 4.2) as has its 
generic spatial typology (see 6.1.3). As I mentioned in the introduction to the Herero 
Mall, the sale of alcohol at the site has been one of the major contestations 
throughout its existence (see CHAPTER 3). The historical stance of the municipality 
that sale of alcohol should not be permitted in any future development scenario, 
 
 
142  Hull and James have also used the term popular economies in the case of South Africa (Hull and James, 
2012). 
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which is in line with Municipal market regulations (see 4.4) and to which extent a 
stand-alone council resolution exists, 143  has created much unease amongst 
traders. One shebeen owner asked me repeatedly over the years if shebeens 
would be allowed by the municipality, which I was in no good position to respond 
to as the thinking on this issue within the municipal structures seems to be shifting. 
In my interview with the now former mayor, he acknowledged that while alcohol 
abuse is a problem, sale of alcohol enables the mix of businesses: “If you don’t 
have the alcohol component it would not work”. 144  Yet, there are no official 
pronouncements by the municipality on the matter and the feasibility study that I 
was involved in, which recommended the sale of alcohol to be maintained at the 
site as part of the economic mix (Delgado and Lühl, 2014, p140–142; Lühl, Delgado 
and Kozonguizi, 2016, p9), has not yet been approved by the city council.  
 
The three shebeen owner-operators that I interviewed for what follows are all 
members of the traders’ committee and have all been at the mall since the early 
years of its existence.145 Rather than elaborating on their individual businesses, I 
will explore what we can learn about popular economies by looking closely at the 
shebeen as type, the agencies involved in its production and its role within the 
popular economy of the Herero Mall. While their shebeens largely follow the generic 
spatial typology explained above, they are variations on the theme. Uzuva’s 
shebeen146 only comprises an enclosed bar, with a veranda that is open towards 
 
 
143  The resolution reads that “no spray painting / mechanical activities and alcohol sale be allowed at the 
market”. Council Resolution 271/09/2013. 
144  In an interview which I conducted for the feasibility study in 2014 while he was deputy mayor, he was 
still opposed to the idea of allowing the sale of alcohol at the Herero Mall. The interview was held on 10 
May 2014.  
145  Sukona and Harry confirmed that the owner-operators that have been at the mall the longest still remain 
in control of the traders’ committee.  
146  Uzuva is in his 40s and although he was born in Windhoek, he grew up and went to school in 
Grootfontein, some 500km to the north of Windhoek, before returning to the capital. At the time of the 
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the vehicular thoroughfare (see (A) Figure 37). Harry’s shebeen 147  has two 
enclosed social spaces for customers separated by metal mesh screens, which 
are evidently a result of a gradual enlargement of the structure (see (B) Figure 37). 
Sukona’s shebeen148 has also undergone major transformations since I have known 
it, which have been described earlier (see p180). Its social space is large enough 
to accommodate a pool table, as one of the few shebeens at the mall (see (C) 
Figure 37). In two of the cases the owners constructed their structures themselves, 
sometimes with the assistance of friends in return for monetary compensation. 
Permission to set up a business was usually sought directly from the chairperson 
of the traders’ committee, who would also propose the respective location for 
setting up a structure. As alluded to earlier, structures are continuously transformed 
and adapted to suit the owner’s needs, improve customers’ comfort, and to 




interview he rented a room in Greenwell Matongo, on the outskirts of Windhoek, for N$1,500 (GBP 79) 
per month. 
147  Harry is in his early 30s and had his shebeen at the mall since 2008. He lives close to Soweto market, 
some 5 minutes away from the mall but originates from the far north-west Kunene Region. His income 
supports 8 dependents, including his parents who live in Ruacana on the Namibia-Angola border, a 
sister who studies at UNAM, four brothers and a child. He derives his main income from the shebeen, 
which fluctuates a lot depending on the months and the general state of the economy. 
148  Sukona is in her 30s and had her shebeen since around 2005. At the time of the interview she lived with 
her family in an appendage of her shebeen. One of her major expenses is the education of her 10-year-
old son who goes to primary School in Hochland Park, the middle-class neighbourhood that replaced 
the Old Location. 
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Figure 37: Map of the various businesses at the mall that are mentioned in this  section: (A) 
Uzuva’s shebeen; (B) Harry’s shebeen; (C) Sukona’s shebeen; (D) Tjikaa’s restaurant; (E) 
Nduezu Car Wash; (F) Muarii’s food; (G) Muarii’s shebeen; (H) Kovii’s food cart / 
Uajenenisa’s veranda; (I) temporary food vendors; (J) Kaumbe’s shebeen; (K) Ndeshi’s 
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However, investments in spatial transformation are calculated carefully. Uzuva, for 
example, told me that he wanted to build a small retaining wall around the front of 
his veranda, to avoid storm water from flooding his space. According to him, fixing 
the roof and improving the floor of the veranda would improve his business. On the 
other hand, he did not want to waste money as he was not sure when the 
municipality would build the new market. He showed me a meat cutting machine 
he had received from the Ministry of Industrialisation, Trade and SME Development 
(MITSMED) when he registered his business.149 But there were already too many 
meat cutting businesses along Clemence Kapuuo Street, and some at the mall, 
which made starting a meat cutting business too competitive.150 At the time of the 
interview he told me that he was thinking of rather settling and investing in his farm 
near Grootfontein.151 He showed me photos of his cattle on his phone as well as his 
bank savings of N$55,000 (GBP 2,895). While he had plans for improving the 
business, some machinery and capital to invest, he would rather invest it in his farm 
as ownership there was secure. Insecurity of tenure clearly undermined his 
willingness to invest further in his business at the mall.  
 
But not all traders have such secure possibilities elsewhere. For Sukona, who 
started the shebeen as a young woman after school, accessing capital to realise 
her future plans was one of her primary concerns, and something she asked me 
about often. For the butchery she had planned in one of the extensions to her 
shebeen, she would need a cool room, a meat cutter, a sausage machine and 
 
 
149  The MITSMED ran an Equipment Aid Scheme that supported SMEs with equipment and technology 
according to their requirements in order to grow businesses and create employment (Financial Literacy 
Initiative, no date). 
150  The meat cutting machine was stored at the shebeen as he had no use for it. Instead, he thought it 
would be better to start a meat cutting business near his home in Greenwell Matongo, on the outskirts 
of Katutura, though he had not yet adequately investigated this option. 
151  Since 2019 he was mostly at the farm and had employed someone to run his shebeen. 
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fridges. But to get a loan to finance the equipment she told me she needed a 
professional “business plan”, which can cost between N$ 3,000 –  6,000 (GBP 158 
– 316), which in addition to the repayment of the loan with interest, made it entirely 
unaffordable to her. In the case of Harry, although he had a company registered 
with the MITSMED, it remained difficult to get a liquor licence for his shebeen 
because he did not own the land. In his view this prevented him from having a 
“professional business”. In addition to the sale of alcohol and cool drinks he would 
like to sell fresh meat, but the fact that he did not have a stable electricity supply 
proved too much of a risk to begin such a business.  
 
In addition to alcohol and cool drinks, Uzuva sells charcoal and firewood from the 
farm, vetkoeks, ice cubes, loose cigarettes and Oros 152 water. Although his sister 
and another relative cook food independently in front of his shebeen, they help out 
when needed.153 Harry also wanted to sell prepared food, macaroni, russians,154 
and braai meat in addition to drinks to set himself apart from the other, more 
traditional Herero food offered nearby. But he told me he will start slowly and test 
the impact with customers before taking a step to employ someone for the purpose 
of preparing and selling food. Although he had strong dedicated customers,155 now 
and then when business was stagnant, he offered free meat, cooked outside his 
shebeen, to customers who buy a drink. He would announce such “sales” by SMS 
to his regular customers. Usually, he collaborated with Tjikaa’s Restaurant where 
customers could buy food (see (D) Figure 37), and if he ran out of drinks, he could 
 
 
152  Oros is a popular South African orange concentrate that is mixed with water to make juice. 
153  Before his sister started to prepare food on her own, Uzuva used to make food and run the shebeen. 
He has since handed over his cooking equipment to his sister. Besides the food vendors surrounding 
his shebeen he also collaborates with Kaumbe and Ernest, owners of two neighbouring shebeens. 
154  Russians are meat sausages that are locally produced. The name has become a synonym for sausages 
in general.  
155  Harry told me that some of his best customers live in Pioneerspark, a former white, middle class 
neighbourhood in the south of Windhoek, and they come specifically to the mall to frequent his shebeen. 
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get some from other bars. In addition to direct sales, he rented a jukebox from 
someone for a 35 percent share of its earnings. Harry saved the remaining money 
in a bank account specifically to buy his own jukebox to avoid such high 
deductions.156  
 
Most shebeens are open daily and require long working hours. All owners reported 
that they are open Sundays to Thursdays from 10:00-22:00 and Fridays and 
Saturdays from 10:00-24:00. These times are regulated by the 1998 Liquor Act 
(Government of the Republic of Namibia, 1998) and detailed in the regulations. The 
busiest time is after 17:30 when people return from work and spend time at the mall 
to socialise. For owner-operators that usually means between 12 and 14 hours of 
work per day. However, at the time of the interview, all three interviewees had 
employed people to serve at the bar, after initially having started out on their own.157 
The competition amongst shebeens, especially in a depressed economy, requires 
continuously comparing their prices with those of other bars. Many shebeen 
operators, including Uzuva and Harry, buy supplies monthly from a wholesale 
retailer in the Northern Industrial Area some four kilometres away, paying about 
N$300 for transport. They asserted that direct deliveries from Namibia Breweries 
were too expensive. 158  However, Sukona claimed that according to her, many 
traders do not adequately calculate the cost of transport in the pricing of their 
goods although it reduces their profit. She told me she had spent the previous 
holidays calculating her income and expenditure to better understand where her 
challenges lie. The mall could thus be considered a place of learning about 
 
 
156  According to Harry the jukebox is an essential ingredient for a successful shebeen as people want to  
choose their own music. 
157  Harry employed a relative and only Uzuva disclosed the salary of his employee to be N$ 1,400 (GBP 
74) per month. 
158  Sukona told me that “the Owambos know how to make business”. They buy crates of beer from Metro 
(large wholesale retailer) and re-sell them to shebeens, including the cost of the taxi money and profit. 
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business principles, and Sukona was eager to teach her children about trading and 
money.159 Sukona explained to me the logic of her pricing: the Namibian Breweries 
deliver beer at the mall from Monday to Saturday at 7am for N$180 per crate (12 x 
750ml bottles @ N$15). She sells a bottle for N$20 and thus earns N$60 per crate 
of which she has to deduct another N$12 for empties (N$1 per bottle),160 making 
her a profit of N$48 per crate. Uzuva told me that he would sell about 130 crates of 
beer (12x 750ml bottles) in 3 weeks, which, using similar profit margins as Sukona, 
equates to a profit of about N$ 6,500 (GBP 342) per month.161 
 
I learned that most of the owners who started businesses at the mall have since left 
and rented out their places or have employed someone – often relatives – to 
operate it on their behalf. According to Sukona there were only about ten owner-
operators at the mall, out of the ca. 67 businesses. She told me with some 
frustration that “they don’t come here to check or participate anymore. As long as 
the rent is paid, they don’t have a problem”.162 In the flux of self-governance people 
can easily become rent-seekers once they have secured a space, extracting value 
from the open land they had initially occupied. But this also relies on the mall being 
an entry point for rural-urban migrants. According to Sukona about 80 percent of 
 
 
159  Once I ordered a cooldrink from Sukona at her bar and she involved her pre-school daughter in the 
transaction. She told me she needs to learn how to count and how to sell, so that she will develop a 
“sense for business”. 
160  Because customers at the mall often carry their bottles around from one place to another, shebeens do 
not require them to return their empty bottles. Instead, the “zula boys” (young Aawambo boys) collect 
empties and usually get paid 50c per bottle if they sell them back to shebeens at the mall, and N$1 if 
they sell them at the nearby Single Quarters Market. Metal cans and plastic bottles are, however, picked 
up by the Damara boys, indicating some sense of territoriality and ethnically constructed distribution of 
labour in the waste collection and recycling system. However, tracing these networks of distribution 
was beyond the scope of this research. 
161  An average about 130 crates of beer per month, and an average gross profit of N$50 per crate equals 
N$ 6,500 (GBP 342) per month. This figure does thus not include earnings from all other sales of 
cooldrinks etc., but these were considerably less than beer sales according to him. From this he had to 
deduct about N$1500 for electricity and N$1400 for the salary of his employee. 
162  Sukona provided the example of Kaumbe who now owns a hardware store in Gam, a rural village which 
he supplies from Windhoek, about 535km away. Because of this he was rarely at the mall anymore. She 
also used the example of Uzuva, who did not want to lose his cattle to the drought, so he went to the 
farm and rented out his shebeen. 
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traders at the mall are Ovazemba and Nkhumbi 163 and most of them rent their 
premises from the business owners who in the majority are Ovaherero.164 Often 
these rural migrants would initially work at Ovaherero-owned farms before arriving 
at the mall via those connections and being employed by owner-operators or 
renting a business from the owners.165 Sukona elaborated that because of these 
migration dynamics most people at the mall either did not have identity cards or 
had false identity cards. For her the dominance of tenant-operators at the mall 
made self-governance more difficult: “how do you give loans to people who rent? 
How will you find these people? If they are Hereros you will be able to find them 
from their surname, which is linked to a village”. The diverging interests between 
owner-operators, owner-rentiers and tenant-operators at the mall poses a 
fundamental dilemma which the informal sector organiser had highlighted (see 
page 135).  
 
Shebeens are the most controversial amongst the popular economies where moral 
values clash with pragmatic considerations. Charman et al. (2017) argue that in the 
case of Eveline Street the predominance of shebeens has statistically declined over 
the course of 8 years, which they interpret as an indication that shebeens as drivers 
of the “leisure economy” play a role in the diversification of business activities 
(2017, p45–46). In the case of my study it is difficult to propose such views 
quantitatively, but from interactions with shebeen owners it became clear that 
starting a shebeen indeed provides a possible “beginning of business” as the 
informal sector organiser coined it (see p115). As shown above, all shebeen 
 
 
163  Ovazemba are a tribe from north-western Namibia, who like the Ovahimba, are related to the Ovaherero 
and share the language. Nkhumbi are a tribe from southern Angola who are difficult to distinguish from 
the Ovazemba. 
164  According to Sukona only three Omuzemba and four Aawambo own businesses at the mall. 
165  The fact that many young men I encountered working in shebeens could neither speak English or 
Afrikaans supports these accounts. 
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owners I interviewed either already pursued additional economic activities or were 
aiming for business diversification and in some cases wished to ‘professionalise’ 
their business. While the normative discourse would have it that insecurity of tenure, 
inaccessibility of capital, inadequacy of service infrastructure, and lack of 
identification are inherent to ‘informal’ economies, understanding economic 
activities at the mall shows that people negotiate these constraints continuously but 
selectively by engaging the municipality or other relevant authorities where 
required and distancing themselves where opportune.  
 
Most shebeen operators relied on a collaborative stance towards ‘competitors’ as 
customers were largely reported to be loyal to certain shebeens and their owners 
or operators. Beyond the often disproportionally emphasised alcohol consumption, 
other leisure activities are offered in bars that include listening to music, gambling, 
watching television, playing pool amongst others. Remaining competitive requires 
comparing pricing and seeking reduction in transport costs that are the main 
differentiating factors while retail prices for drinks generally vary little. Only a few 
had alternative livelihood strategies external to the mall, which usually led them to 
renting out their ‘properties’ or employing someone to run their business. However, 
in many cases this emerging landlordism provides an entry point into the city for 
rural migrants who only speak indigenous languages and often have no 
identification documents, and thus little chance of success in seeking formal 
employment. As their employment is often combined with shelter, the mall 
effectively functions as a conduit for them becoming urban and has developed into 
a setting where this transition is not too disruptive as food, social dynamics and 
cultural aspects provide a familiar setting. 
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6.2.2 The car wash as anchor 
Amongst the first businesses at the site were two car washes (see Figure 21). The 
car washes were established at the two outer edges of the mall and have been 
instrumental anchor points in its spatial development. Of the one near Clemence 
Kapuuo Street only a concrete platform remains after it closed down a couple of 
years ago. The remaining one, Nduezu Car Wash, 166  is seemingly the largest 
business at the mall (see (E) Figure 37). The car wash is located on the portion of 
land that today belongs to the OTA (Erf 6300) and the owner pays the organisation 
a monthly rent based on an oral agreement. He told me that he initially got 
permission to start the car wash at the site from the late Paramount Chief Kuaima 
Riruako, even though he was not the legal owner of the land at the time, revealing 
the power wielded by the chief over early decisions about the site.167 Besides this 
agreement, his current tenure relies on a letter provided by the OTA consenting to 
the use of the site, which is required by the CoW to issue a Certificate of Fitness,168 
which indicates municipal approval of his business based on meeting certain 
minimum requirements.169 The certificate of fitness in turn is a requirement by the 
municipality to provide the business with a separate water meter, and it is still the 
only entity at the mall that has piped water. This all happened despite a 2010 
 
 
166  Nduezu is about 40 years old and was one of the first people to start a business at the site around 2005. 
He told me he started washing cars because his grade 12 results did not allow him to enter university. 
As he used to wash his neighbour’s car as a child, he took it on as a business, using the open land as 
a resource. Together with his wife who worked for a government ministry, the business allowed him to 
support about 15 people including his family and parents. He also had a farm near Okakarara that he 
visited once a month which suggests a further income for the family, and – given the chronic 
unpredictability of farming in Namibia – possibly an additional expense. 
167  At the time the OTA application to purchase the land was in process, but legally the chief had no 
jurisdiction over the property. A 2006 Council Resolution (Resolution 196/08/2006) mandated the sale 
of both erven to the OTA but this was later rescinded in 2010 with a new resolution (RESOLUTION 
113/05/2010) that mandated the sale of the smaller Erf 6300 to the OTA. This sale has since been 
implemented. 
168  The CoW issues Certificates of Fitness after municipal inspection of business premises to be fit for 
purpose (City of Windhoek, no date b). 
169  In this instance Nduezu was required to install a 3-chamber grease trap before connecting to the sewer 
mains to reduce contamination with cleaning chemicals.  
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Council Resolution that mandated the sale of the plot to the OTA for “institutional 
use” under the condition that “trade [is] to be stopped” and “illegal occupants” are 
to be “removed” from the site.170 Although this stipulation has not been effected, 
the threat of eviction remains imminent. While the recent fencing of the larger 
municipal plot (see p168) has provided some form of legitimacy for traders situated 
on that land, for Nduezu and those outside of this parcel it only highlighted the 
insecurity of their tenure.171 What used to be open land ready for appropriation, is 
increasingly becoming enclosed. 
 
The venue of the car wash is made up of roofed and paved wash bays for three 
cars, and two containers, a metal mesh store room for the workers’ clothes and 
equipment, and a semi-open shop and a toilet cubicle,172 all aligned along the OTA 
boundary wall (see Figure 38). The second aspect – but not secondary – of the 
business is a shebeen.173 In between the container that functions as the bar, and 
the wash bays is a paved veranda with fixed seating in rows, which acts as the 
social space where customers interact while waiting for their cars to be cleaned. 
The seating is aligned perpendicular to the bar for ease of access and movement 
and allows customers to face each other as they wait. A concrete curb acts as a 
barrier to protect customers from moving vehicles. This setting is a prime example 
of the limited infrastructure required to procure social interaction (see 6.1.3). The 
electricity meter and water tap are installed inside the bar container as it is the most 
 
 
170  Council Resolution 113/05/2010. 
171  Nduezu told me that his ongoing insecurity prevents him “to buy a car or a house or to get an overdraft”. 
172  Nduezu installed the toilet a year prior to the interview to improve the customer experience (municipal 
toilets had not yet been installed). This was possible as the car wash had its own municipal water and 
sewer connection. Non-customers were required to pay N$3 for the use of the toilets. 
173  The symbiosis of shebeens and car washes can be widely observed in Windhoek and has been 
described by Charman et al. (2017). This will be elaborated on in the next section. 
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secure place.174 He told me that he continues to advance his business and had 
plans to rent out the vacant shop as a barbershop and to improve the food products 
that are on sale.175 Nduezu confirmed that all the structures were made to be 
removable because of the insecurity of tenure, and that they could easily be re-
positioned elsewhere.176 In addition to the reasons stated above, the insecurity of 
tenure provides further reasons why temporary, removable and flexible spatial 
solutions are sought by operators at the mall.  
 
Nevertheless, he told me that business was good. Having a car washed here is 
cheaper that “in town”177 and some customers come all the way to the mall for this 
purpose as it is a familiar place. 178 Nduezu employs 13 workers in two shifts,179 
some of whom have families and several jobs. Though the business is open seven 
days a week, Sundays and Mondays are the busiest days because people return 
from the farm, or from weddings and need their cars to be cleaned for the week 
ahead. Saturdays he usually took off. Rough calculations of turnover based on the 
figures provided by Nduezu reveal that on average 31 cars were washed per day 
at N$65 per car, which translates into a daily turnover of about N$ 2,000 (GBP 105) 
and an average monthly turnover of N$ 60,000 (GBP 3,158). This income directly 
touches the lives of about 30 people though this number is much higher if 
dependents of employees are included. 
 
 
174  Nduezu showed me his CCTV installation with which he could observe and record customers’ and 
workers’ movements, and which he checked every evening. 
175  At the time of interview customers were allowed to bring their own food as according to Nduezu the 
offerings were not sufficient. He also considered installing Wi-Fi for customers’ convenience. 
176  He told me he continued searching for an open area in the vicinity of the mall to lease from the city, but 
his applications to the municipality had so far been declined without  any reasons given. 
177  Nduezu’s rates ranged between N$ 55 – 75 (GBP 2.90 – 3.90) depending on the type of car. These 
figures can easily be more than double in car washes in the wealthier parts of Windhoek.  
178  Nduezu told me that even the former mayor of Windhoek, who grew up in the neighbourhood, is a 
regular customer. 
179  The employees washing the cars are men, while two women are employed to attend to the shop and 
the bar. 
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Car washes have become a mainstay within Windhoek’s popular economies and 
in the case of the Herero Mall the two car washes have been instrumental as two 
anchor points in its spatial and economic development. As I have suggested in the 
introduction to this chapter, the example of the car wash clearly renders any 
formal/informal dichotomy baseless and misleading: it cannot be considered a 
survivalist strategy, but rather a complex entrepreneurial activity that is 
opportunistically compliant with municipal regulations yet perpetually insecure in 
terms of tenure and operations. While the language of council resolutions remains 
delegitimising of “informal trade”, municipal actions including provision of water 
and electricity and enforcing selective regulatory control over certain activities at 
the site speak of a more pragmatic approach towards popular economies, as long 
as these are situated on private land and cost-recovery of services provided is 
ensured. 180  From a governance perspective, such ambiguity allows the 
municipality to affirm a supportive stance towards emerging economies while 
keeping options open for withdrawing such tolerance when it becomes politically 
opportune to do so. This requires business owners to continuously negotiate which 
aspects of formal regulatory requirements to comply with and which ones to 
consider irrelevant for their operations to continue. At the same time, traders 
innovate in making infrastructure removable to mitigate the ever-present threat of 





180  Nduezu paid about N$ 6,000 (GBP 316) for electricity per month.  
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6.2.3 Food as marker of difference 
I previously mentioned the symbiosis of shebeens and food vendors (see 6.1.3). In 
some cases, is not obvious that food vendors and shebeens are separate 
businesses. Of the three food vendors I interviewed, Tjikaa 181 and Kovii 182 had 
premises of their own, while Muarii 183 cooked on an open fire next to Uzuva’s 
shebeen (see (F) Figure 37). According to her it was a better location than next to 
her own shebeen (see (G) Figure 37). It is certainly more exposed to people and 
cars passing by. Her customers would usually sit on the veranda that is part of 
Uzuva’s shebeen. Kovii rented a stationary food cart from Uajenenisa and shared 
a veranda with him (see (H) Figure 37). Tjikaa’s place only features a veranda with 
a paved floor and fixed steel benches, a tree, and a car chassis as storage. It is 
especially well suited for conversation. Women patrons were usually in the minority. 
Muarii conceded while there is a lot of competition between the three food vendors 
that are in close proximity, she also collaborated with Tjikaa and their customers 
sometimes shared spaces to sit. In all cases, drinks were available from adjacent 
shebeens and food vendors often made use of their electricity. In addition to the 
permanent food vendors, a number of women regularly cook in the open near the 
former car wash, usually on weekends, with no further infrastructure and protection 
from the sun (see (I) Figure 37). As temporary vendors they pay a daily fee to the 
 
 
181  Tjikaa is in his 40s and was born and went to school in Okakarara, some 300 kilometres from Windhoek. 
He rents a house far from HM and has been at the mall for 10-11 years. He co-owns the business, 
informally known as Tjikaa’s business, with his wife and it is their core business. 
182  Kovii is 24 years old and lived in Clemence Kapuuo Street near the mall with her son. She was born in 
Opuwo and came to Windhoek after high school. At the time of the interview she had been at the mall 
for two months and rented a food cart with electricity from Uajenenisa whom she knew. This was her 
first business and it was her main income, although her husband had another income. Her business 
was not yet registered, but she had planned to register if the business took off. 
183  Muarii is 37 years old and lived in Clemence Kapuuo Street, nearby. She supported her boyfriend, her 
mother and 3 children with the income from food vending, a home business selling take-away chips 
and sweets, and a shebeen at the mall. She employed two males in shifts at the shebeen for 5 years 
(who were not family), and one female at her home shop who also looked after the children. She had 
been at the mall for 10 years and had both businesses registered with MITSMED. 
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traders’ committee and store their equipment in neighbouring shebeens when they 
are not there. Cooking mostly happens outside on an open fire on the bare ground 
and firewood is sold at the mall every morning directly from farms. The only 
infrastructure required is a roof for the customers. That space, however, is flexible 
and often shared by several businesses, allowing spatial boundaries to blur. 
 
Lunch was one of the best reasons for me to spend time at the mall when I was not 
working with the committee and I often had meals at Muarii’s or at Tjikaa’s. They 
serve similar food, which is specific to Herero culture: pap184 with meat and grav. 
A big portion costs N$40. Muarii served 40 meals on a good day and 10 on a bad 
one and Tjikaa served between 30-70 people per day. The meat is cut in big 
chunks, with fat and bones, and cooked in large steel pots that are manufactured 
by local welders out of recycled gas cylinders. The fat that separates in the pot is 
scooped off the top and stored in plastic containers to be sold separately. It is used 
by people cooking at home to add flavour to pap. Kovii sold fries, russians, and 
macaroni salad for N$39.185 She served 20-25 meals on a good day and 7-10 on a 
bad day.186 Which foods are eaten by which ethnic groups is one of the more subtle 
ways of differentiating cultural identity at the mall.187 While language and traditional 
dress can be obvious signifiers of Ovaherero identity, food opens up the cultural 
experience to non-Ovaherero.  
 
 
184  See footnote 91, p162. 
185  To prepare this food she required a potato fries’ cutter and an electric frying pan, which she had bought 
from a large catering supplier in town.  
186  According to Kovii she did not have much competition as she had made sure her products are unique 
and competitive. 
187  Sukona told me that one can distinguish tribes by the food they prepare. According to her, people 
selling kapana are Aawambo; if they have large pots, they are likely Ovaherero; the Damara know how 
to cook well; and the Baster make good roosterbrood [bread rolls] and salads, like Macaroni salad. 
Tjikaa maintained that the different vendors’ food is distinct, which makes each have their own loyal 
customers. 
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Next to the large pots, a smaller pot contains boiling water for cleaning plates and 
cutlery with a cloth. Only recently the municipal Health Services Division distributed 
devices that have a water container and a bucket for washing hands, but vendors 
still have to buy water from surrounding houses for N$10 for a 25-litre canister. This 
is about 14 times the municipal tariff for pre-paid communal water and 11 times the 
municipal tariff for domestic water as delivered to neighbouring houses.188 Given 
the fact that the mall is situated within a fully serviced urban area, traders could 
manage to mitigate the lack of provision of water by buying water from neighbours. 
But this comes at an extreme premium that factors into the pricing of goods and 
services at the mall and creates dependencies between traders and residents who 
are able to exploit this to their own benefit. 
 
The food vendors cook once in the morning for the entire day, as their pots are 
large enough to hold sizable quantities. They are busiest around lunch hour and 
after work, and none of the interviewees had employees. They got their non-meat 
supplies from nearby supermarkets or wholesale retailers and butcheries, 
highlighting the vendors’ dependency on formal retailers. Meat was usually 
sourced from the Single Quarters market nearby. 189  Cattle are slaughtered at 
Brakwater, a peri-urban area with smallholdings about 10km to the north of 
Katutura. Tjikaa bought meat at the market every day at 06:00, had it cut at the mall 
by 06:30 and started cooking by 07:00. He bought N$500-1,300 worth of meat per 
day.190 Muarii also sourced her meat from the market, but had it delivered and paid 
in cash daily. I asked Sukona why Ovaherero farmers – many of whom frequent the 
 
 
188  This equals N$400 per kilolitre compared to the current CoW domestic water rate of N$35 per kilolitre 
and communal-tap water rates of N$28 per kilolitre (Iikela, 2019b). 
189  Even the meat cutting business next to Sukona’s relies on people bringing their own meat that they 
bought from Single Quarters, as the owner does not sell meat. 
190  For 30-70 people this translates into ca. N$20 per meal for the meat alone, of the overall price of N$40. 
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mall – are not trading cattle there. She told me that the permits required to move 
cattle through the country and the police controls were not conducive. She 
explained that the “Owambos”, who sell meat at Single Quarters had smallholdings 
at Brakwater which allowed them to buy a small number of cattle for a month, keep 
them there and slaughter them one by one for sale at the Single Quarters. Though 
the mall has a central position amongst Ovaherero farmers as has been described 
above (see 6.1.4), and meat is the main staple at the mall, this does not translate 
into direct economic chains of production and distribution. Rather, supply chains 
are more intricate owing to factors of regulatory control, which further dispels the 
notion of a formal / informal duality, or the idea that the ‘informal’ lies outside the 
reach of the state. Mobile food vending, as alluded to in the introductory vignette, 
further transcends rigid logics of land-use zoning as food is prepared at home and 
sold elsewhere at the mall and in the street.  
 
Whenever I inquired with customers about how they decide where to eat I was told 
that loyalty prescribes where to go. Usually that meant going to familiar business 
owners, the people you are “comfortable with”. Tjikaa confirmed this view, telling 
me that he did not advertise actively and had no signage for his business. Both he 
and Muarii mostly had regular customers who spread the message by word of 
mouth.191 As Kovii was only in business for a few months at the time of the interview, 
she only just started to have regular customers.192 Regularity, usually associated 
with formal economic dynamics as I showed above, is here construed by vendors 
in terms of their customer base and evidenced by their readiness to give credit 
based on trust.  
 
 
191  Both provided credit to selected customers and kept books of names and cell phone numbers for end-
of-month payments. 
192  While Kovii did provide credit, it was payable after 1-2 days to reduce the risk of non-payments. 
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Now and then I observed people collecting plates with food leftovers, including fat 
and bones, indicating a food chain, both literally and figuratively, in the 
neighbourhood.193 In the evenings, I was told, street kids help with washing the pots 
in exchange for 10-15 N$ and food leftovers. While food vendors did not employ 
others to assist them with their work, they did produce spin-offs that allowed wider 
benefits to emerge from their activities. Muarii told me that she started to work at 
the mall because she “likes business”. She had asked permission from Utaara, the 
current chairperson of the traders’ committee, as the committee had not been 
established at the time. Kovii had not heard about the traders’ committee, as she 
was renting from one of the owners. This re-emphasises the differentiation between 
owner-operators and tenant-operators in terms of governance that I discussed 
above (see p205). 
 
Food vending plays a central role in the economic network of the mall, and usually 
occurs in symbiosis with shebeens. Largely prepared out in the open and 
consumed in the shade of multiple verandas that are often shared by customers of 
more than one vendor, food vending effectively operates within a shared space on 
the interstices between exterior and interior. While food vending lacks overt 
physical markers such as dedicated premises or visual advertising which other 
businesses at the mall have, as an activity it has a permanent presence during 
daytime and success depends on being exposed to customers and customers 
being exposed to each other. This explains why the open veranda is the ideal 
space for this activity, as it facilitates public display of its popularity. If above I have 
alluded to the notion of architecture as social condenser (see p182), it is more 
precisely the activity of eating and drinking that allows the space to become a 
 
 
193  I observed that sometimes vendors would call someone on the phone to come pick up leftovers, 
suggesting an established relationship between the vendors and person. 
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social condenser. Mobile food vending, as alluded to in the introductory vignette, 
further transcends logics of land-use zoning where food is prepared at home and 
sold at the mall and in the street.  
 
But food transcends more than just social and spatial confines. Specifically, the 
economy of meat forms circuits of distribution between rural and urban areas that 
are neither formal nor informal, but rather partially institutionalised (Hull and James, 
2012). Supply chains for non-meat products are more directly dependent on the 
dominant formal retail sector. Smaller economies are created around food 
preparation such as provision of firewood, locally produced cooking equipment, 
and syphoned-off fat used for home cooking. But also, non-monetary chains of 
distribution were established with reference to food leftovers that are bartered in 
return for washing dishes. Social and economic co-dependencies circulate as 
much as commodities and money. As result of the lack of water provision at the 
mall, a market for water provided by surrounding formal residences was created, 
leaving vendors in the vulnerable position of paying between 11 and 14 times the 
municipal water tariff. If understood as a signifier of cultural identity, food culture 
allows urban residents to articulate difference in a non-exclusionary way and helps 
to bridge the gap between established rural traditions and an emerging urban 
culture. 
6.2.4 As long as the hair is done well… 
Hair salons and barber shops abound at the mall. These are usually gendered 
spaces. I conducted semi-structured interviews with two female-run hair salons, 
both located close to Clemence Kapuuo Street, which the operators claimed is a 
good location because of increased pedestrian movement along that street. One 
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salon is run by Ndeshi 194 who had started it at the mall four years earlier, after 
renting a space elsewhere in the city. She rented the space from Kaumbe, and it 
is in the same cluster as his shebeen (see (J) Figure 37) and an independent male 
hair salon which borders it.195 Ndeshi’s salon (see (K) Figure 37)  is an enclosed 
space with only a door and a window to the neighbouring male salon for ventilation 
(see Figure 39).196 The concrete floor is tiled with recycled broken tiles and furniture 
is kept to a bare minimum with a counter for hair products, and two chairs and 
mirrors on the walls. One wall is layered with corrugated metal sheets on the outside 
and reinforced steel mesh on the inside, which is used for hanging hair extensions, 
tools, and other required items.  
 
The second salon is a few shops up the street, and is run by Ndapandula,197 who 
at the time of the interview had been at the mall for two years (see (L) Figure 37). It 
also borders an independent barber shop. She had set out renting a chair for 
N$600 per month for the first six months from a friend’s in-law who had a salon at 
the mall.198 But then she stopped renting and rather paid for the land,199 bought her 
own corrugated sheets and timber poles and set up her own structure with the help 
of two male friends. Regarding an ensuing dispute with the neighbouring shebeen 
 
 
194  Ndeshi is Aawambo and in her mid 20’s. She lived in Havana, a peripheral informal settlement and 
supported six dependents. Her business partner, also an Aawambo female in her mid 20’s, had joined 
Ndeshi in the year of the interview and only supported her mother. 
195  When I interviewed Ndeshi a customer who was waiting for her turn indicated she was waiting around 
the corner at the shebeen.  
196  At the time of the interview the baby of one owner was sleeping in one corner, while a little schoolgirl 
sat on a crate following the conversation. 
197  Ndapandula is also Aawambo and in her mid 20’s. She lived in Goreangab, which was a 40-minute 
commute by taxi to the mall. She had two children:  the little one was with her mother and the older one 
was in a kindergarten close by. The salon provided her only income and besides general expenses she 
also paid a funeral cover and a study policy.  
198  The owner of one of the barber shops told me that he rented out three barber chairs at N$30 per chair 
plus N$75 for electricity per day. This translates to a gross income of about N$ 315 per day or N$ 9,450 
(GBP 497) per month. 
199  Ndapandula did not want to disclose whom she paid or how much. 
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owner, who requested a lease amount for the land, Ndapandula responded: “this 
land is illegal, so when Mukupua kicks me out I would report her! She is also here 
for free”. She thus highlighted the fact that the open land was free, and that the 
mere fact of first occupation had no relevance in this setting. It also exposed the 
emerging petty landlordism that had taken hold at the mall. Her structure faced the 
street as one of the few at the mall and had the name and phone number written 
on the door. The wide sidewalk facilitated her business as customers could easily 
park right in front of the shop.200 Both salons were not registered in any way, though 
Ndapandula told me she would like to register “in town”, revealing a mental 
conception of the difference between “the town”, where registration was effected, 
and “the township”. Although Ndapandula owned her structure, she did not have 
a relationship with the traders’ committee. Yet, she was aware of meetings that were 
announced by megaphone now and then. This revealed that the committee’s 
governance was not broadly accepted or even known to all at the mall.  
 
Both Ndeshi and Ndapandula worked up to 10 hours a day, every day, starting 
between 08:00 and 09:00am. Generally, afternoons and towards the end of the 
month was the busiest time for them.201 Ndapandula used to have an employee, 
but she had gotten a job at a large South African grocery retailer three months 
earlier and had left. Mid-month, she told me, she did not come to her salon some 
days, but since her number was on the door customers could always call her. At 
the time of the interview she only did braiding for ladies but could not cut hair due 
to the unaffordability of electricity. 202  She had bought a blow dryer and a 
 
 
200  Ndapandula had experienced a break-in before, where her chairs, hair extensions, and mirrors were 
stolen. She thought a fence and security guards would improve security, as long as it was a wire fence 
that would allow visibility of her shop for potential customers to be able to see if it is  open. 
201  In Namibia salaries are paid monthly, usually at the end of the month. 
202  Kaumbe asked N$700 per month irrespective of use. 
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straightener but because of the lack of electricity she could not use them. She also 
wanted to do nails but needed electricity for that too. She decided rather not to 
incur electricity costs as the irregularity of her income made such a decision risky. 
Ndeshi bought equipment and supplies in different shops once a month.203 Most 
hair supplies she told me are found in the CBD, about 7 kilometres away, but some 
products can be bought from the nearby supermarket. Ndapandula bought hair at 
China Town in the Northern Industrial Area and cosmetics at Pelican, a wholesale 
retailer for hair products in the CBD. Similar to the food vendors, both had to either 
bring water from home or buy water from surrounding houses. The economy of 
salons thus exists throughout the city and depends fully on formal retail for 
supplies. Unlike the food vendors, barbers and salons are dependent on electricity 
for most of their operations.  
 
Both interviewees asserted that the key to competing in the hair business was that 
customers were treated well and that the hairdo was proper. Once customer loyalty 
had been established based on positive experiences, competition became less of 
an issue as customers would return regularly and would receive credit until the end 
of the month if required.204 Though sometimes repayment was problematic, giving 
credit was considered a necessary competitive advantage. Ndapandula reported 
that she catered for between two and six people per day and considered four as 
enough to make ends meet. Depending on the respective hairstyle, her prices 
ranged between N$50 for braiding own hair (30 minutes), to N$300 for long Rasta 
style (3 ½ hours).205 Ndeshi mentioned that, without the need for active advertising, 
 
 
203  Ndeshi usually used a hair straightener, a blow dryer, needles, and hair products to conduct her 
business.  
204  But passers-by also contributed to the customer base, and usually they would ask for recommendations 
from previous customers. 
205  Ndapandula’s prices ranged according to the style and time needed: Dena: own hair N$50 (30 mins); 
Benevrag: own hair + braids N$70 (40mins); Fishtail: Braids N$100 (1h); Rasta: (own + add) short 
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she and her partner usually had between two and eight customers per day and 
considered four customers to be enough to have an income. Their prices for a 
hairdo ranged between N$120 (1-2 hours) to N$140 (up to 3 hours) for labour plus 
the price of the weaves, which were around N$15 per pack and quantities would 
differ per hairstyle. Four customers, at prices between N$120-140 equals a gross 
income between N$480-560 per day for the salon, which translates to a gross 
income of N$240-280 per person per day or N$ 6,720 – 7,840 (GBP 354 – 413) per 
month. If compared to the statutory monthly minimum wage for domestic workers 
of N$ 1,564.39 (GBP 82.33) 206 it becomes clear that such independent activity 
becomes a viable alternative to formal employment. Ndapandula told me that as 
an Aawambo woman she had not experienced any tribal issues with her customers, 
as long as the hair was done well. But she had experienced verbal assault when 
she complained about some men urinating against her wall who told her to “go 
back where you came from”. Ndeshi, however, reported that she had never 
experienced any problems as a non-Ovaherero at the mall. But she added that she 
believed that the “Herero Mall should be called something else” to avoid referring 
to tribal identities.  
 
Within the mix of businesses at the mall, hair salons and barber shops provide an 
opportunity to start a business without the need for major infrastructure, equipment, 
or formally acquired skills. As independent economic activity they often create 
significantly higher incomes than domestic work, which ranks amongst the lowest 
paid yet regulated formal employment. However, this comes at the cost of long 
 
 
N$170 (2h30), medium N$200 (3h), long N$300 (3h30); Weave: Jodia N$120 (1h), Brazilian N$140 (1h), 
soft dread N$140 (1h40); Soft Dread Rasta: N$180 (2h30) 
 
206  This was the minimum wage for domestic workers as of October 2018 which was around the time of the 
interview (New Era, 2018). 
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working hours as the processes, especially braiding hair, tend to be lengthy. 
Workspace is accessed by renting a chair from an established salon, or by renting 
a complete space, exposing the landlordism that has emerged since the original 
occupation of the land. Only a few salon operators own their building if they had 
been able to secure a portion of the land. Being generally more introverted spaces, 
salons rely on outward visibility of the services they offer. They often face the street 
or pedestrian corridors, and display services rendered and contact details on their 
building. As a highly personal service, established hair salons and barber shops 
generate a regularity of returning customers – as long as the hair is done well – 
which benefits the mall as a whole as customers often frequent shebeens or food 
vendors before or after their visit. Generally, salons are largely dependent on formal 
retail for products and are part of city-wide networks of distribution that cut across 
scales of formality. The interviews with hair salon operators further revealed that the 
legitimacy of the traders’ committee’ is not equally accepted by all, and certainly is 
of little consequence to those who rent. 
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Figure 39: Socio-spatial diagram of female hair salon.  
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6.2.5 The Herero Mall as one-stop shop 
Vignette: the mall and the world 
While looking for Utaara at his car repair and welding workshop, an elderly 
man introduced himself to me in German, assuming that I was from 
Germany.207  After introducing myself to him and explaining my research he 
tells me that he owns a bar at the mall. His Nissan Double Cab (pickup) 
was in for repair. Utaara is his friend and repairs his three cars. He does 
not come to the mall to drink, he tells me: just to visit. He also buys 
lekkebaks (cattle feed troughs), gets his tyres repaired, and sometimes he 
buys meat and Herero food. “All hierdie mense is mij kinders” (all these 
people are my children) he tells me in Afrikaans. He also goes to the 
Commando, and the Red and Green Flag.208 He now farms with “bokkies” 
(goats), sheep and cattle near Okahandja,209 but lives in Ovitoto.210 He says 
it’s better to live at Ovitoto, as he does not need to pay anything there and 
people can help him if he gets older. He is also a counsellor at Ovitoto. We 
establish that he knows a good friend of mine whose family “owns very 
large [commercial] farms” bordering Ovitoto. He sometimes buys meat 
there. When I told him that I work at the Namibia University of Science and 
Technology he mentions that his father was related to the Tjivikuas.211 His 
wife of 36 years is from Aminuis212 and his family lives in Windhoek where 
they have a house in Soweto, not far from the mall, and in Hochland 
 
 
207  He told me his life story: He was born in Omatjete in 1946 and moved to Windhoek’s Old Location in 
1957. “We needed a pass to go to town, and [we] could not drink wine”. He says only lighter skinned 
people got a permit for wine, so he sold self-made “tombo”, which was banned by the authorities. In 
1963/4 he moved to Katutura when he started to work as a wholesale representative for a local 
company, which he did for the following 35 years. 
208  Different Ovaherero Royal Houses are identified by different flags including the red flag (Maharero Royal 
House), and the green flag (Ovambanderu Royal House). 
209  Okahandja is a small town about 80 kilometres north of Windhoek where the Paramount chief Maharero 
and other central Ovaherero figures are buried. An annual commemoration, the Red Flag Day, takes 
place at Okahandja. 
210  Ovitoto is a small communal reserve about 45 km north of Windhoek that was first established as a 
Native Reserve by the South African Administration in 1923. 
211  Professor Tjama Tjivikua was the founding Vice Chancellor of the Namibia University of Science and 
Technology, the former Polytechnic of Namibia, from 1996 until 2019. He is one of 11 surviving siblings, 
many of whom have high ranking positions in Government, Public Enterprises and the Military (Us 
Namibia Magazine, 2017, p6–7). 
212  Aminuis is a town within the communal area of the same name and former Herero reserve in the east of 
the country, bordering Botswana. 
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Park.213 His sister lives in Washington DC and his daughter lives in London, 
“kissing white guys like you”. If they send a little money home, he says, it is 
a lot here because of the exchange rates. Utaara asks him N$100 to fix his 
bumper which is loose from driving on the gravel road to Ovitoto. 
 
As mentioned before, the conception of the Herero Mall as an informal market is 
misleading, and the idea of a mall appears conceptually more fitting. As the 
interaction with the elderly farmer suggests, the mall is an important central place 
for Ovaherero people far beyond the neighbourhood and the city. As a business 
owner at the mall he receives income from there, he gets supplies for his farm, has 
his cars repaired and eats and socialises with his community, or attends cultural 
and traditional events. This speaks to the principle that popular economies thrive 
on spatial, social and economic interrelationships. Nduezu, the owner of the car 
wash, defined it most clearly: 
There are shebeens, welding, kapana, hairdressers: we call it a one-stop shop. 
Without each other the businesses will suffer. We need each other, otherwise 
there is not a chain, connected in delivering to the customer. Us Hereros love 
cattle, so the welders make cattle brands, troughs for lick, tyre repairs. People 
feel safe, at home, together: there is no tribalism troubles. We are family. The 
difference with this car wash and the ones in town, where you book your car 
and come back: here it takes 40 minutes to 1½ hours to wash. So, to release 
after hard day’s work [you] grab a beer, a piece of meat… it’s one concept. 
You should feel at ease.  
It is a trope that I have heard often at Herero Mall: “After going to a [hair] salon, 
people want to eat” as I was told by Uzuva. The availability of alcohol in particular 
is often thought to play a significant part in the popularity of the mall, opposed to 
 
 
213  See footnote 148, p200. 
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formal municipal markets where sale of alcohol is not allowed: Kaumbe, who owned 
a number of shebeens around the city,214 including the mall, put it this way:  
Compare the mall to Soweto [market], especially on Saturdays, when there is 
very little movement at Soweto. Oshetu [official name for Single Quarters 
market] is only busy because of the meat. Or look at Khomasdal market, where 
not much is happening. If you put Kapana here [at the mall] alone, [it] is like 
Khomasdal. [This] is a car wash, hair salon, people want to eat and drink. 
As elaborated above interdependencies between shebeens and food vendors are 
amongst the most discernible symbiotic relationships, both spatially and 
economically. But these are not the only ones by far: often the jukeboxes and 
gambling machines inside shebeens are rented out by owners to be operated by 
someone else, which can be a profitable business as Sukona and Harry explained 
to me. Meat cutters cut meat for food vendors. And people waiting for their turn at 
the hair salon would spend such time at a nearby shebeen having a drink and a 
chat. In the same vein the local welders work for business owners that want to 
repair or transform their structures or manufacture equipment for food vendors. 
Beer wholesalers supply the shebeens that are not able to organise their own 
transport. Bottles and cans are collected by boys who sell them elsewhere for 
recycling. Figure 40 shows a map of different businesses which was developed 
through a participatory workshop that will be elaborated in the next chapter below, 
revealing the diversity of adjacent businesses. 
 
But the concept of a one-stop shop, understood as entry point, makes sense at 
another level: as an economic central hub, the Herero Mall provides a model of 
 
 
214  Kaumbe told me he owned shebeens in Okuriangava, 8ste Laan, Wanaheda, and he also had a hardware 
store at Gam. Also see footnote 162, p205. 
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development that is not alienating to the residents who still often have rural 
backgrounds as Nduezu explained:  
You need to bring development to the people, not like Maerua Mall.215 People 
are used to this life, they are happy, they will be afraid of high-end 
developments […] All the politicians come here because they were born here, 
and their families are here. Some people come here because the place is like 
the village. 
Here he clearly distinguishes the Herero Mall from formal commercial 
developments that might alienate people whose references and mental 
conceptions are more thoroughly embedded in memories of rural life. This point 
was also made in conversation with a customer who also suggested that to 
empower informal businesses formalisation needed to happen gradually over time: 
“it can’t be once off”. As such the Herero Mall provides a transition space, 
historically and personally, for people who have their roots in rural areas and are 
first time urbanites.  
 
As a space of transition, the mall also holds more controversial social struggles. 
One afternoon at Tjikaa’s, a slightly drunk young man approached me to tell me 
that there is a need for safe spaces for LGBTI (lesbian, gay, bisexual, transgender 
and intersex) people, especially amongst the Ovaherero.216 He said gay people did 
not feel comfortable at the mall “because acting straight all the time is exhausting”. 
According to him homosexuality was taboo in Ovaherero culture, but people were 
becoming more accepting, partly owing to social workers. He was accompanied 
by a number of friends and seemed to be well-known. In a joyful discussion – 
seemingly without much stigmatisation – they elaborated the meaning of the LGBTI 
 
 
215  Maerua Mall is a shopping mall in the central high-income areas of Windhoek. 
216  He was a clerk working for the Ministry of Health and Social Services. 
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acronym and clarified the meaning of the various labels. He clarified to the group 
that he is a gay man. His younger sister told me that their parents did not accept 
him, and another man told me that “people want to kill gays, like the founding 
[president]”217 because to them it is not masculine enough. I was surprised by the 
open and uninhibited tone of the debate amidst other customers and visitors at the 
mall. It revealed the possibility of a future where sexual orientation could be freely 
lived even in spaces that seem to be socially conservative. On several other 
occasions I observed outwardly queer people frequenting the mall without 
apparent victimisation.  
  
Figure 40: Map of functions established through a participatory workshop with traders in 
2015. Source: Lühl, Delgado and Kozonguizi, 2016, p6. 
Traders clearly articulate the interdependency of the Herero Mall economy, while 
the concept of the mall, instead of the market, has firmly taken root in the popular 
imagination of the place. They also assert that its gradual process of transformation 
creates a sense of familiarity instead of the alienation caused by ‘development’ that 
 
 
217  Founding President Sam Nujoma made homophobic public remarks in the early 2000s that were widely 
reported and echoed by some government ministers. 
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is associated with ‘town’, in other words with the European-derived urban construct. 
In combination with the ongoing transformation of surrounding residences that 
increasingly house shops, restaurants, businesses, churches, and rental 
accommodation in addition to their supposedly primary function of residential 
dwellings, the mall thus provides a diversified urban economy that the 
neighbourhood was denied in its original colonial design. The mall also allows room 
for non-conformity in terms of gender and sexuality to exist side-by-side with more 
traditional ways of life and thus provides a space of difference that characterises 
urban life. As such this process of urban and social transformation can be argued 
as a process of decolonising the township from the ground up, within the cracks of 
the established order. 
6.2.6 Conclusion: making the city work 
In the first section of this chapter I aimed to show how traders established, 
materialised and defended their presence at the mall. In this section I aimed to 
shed light on the ways that traders pursued an array of livelihood strategies which 
literally make the city – particularly this former dormitory township – work for those 
who do not have access to a formal job. Through its occupation the land has been 
re-configured as a communal resource for economic activities that span the 
spectrum from survivalist to entrepreneurial strategies (the both extremes of which 
I have illustrated in Figure 39 and Figure 38 respectively), including the 
opportunism of extracting rent from public space. Ambiguous governance by the 
municipality overlaid with the influence of traditional authorities and partial self-
organisation of traders has created varying degrees of vulnerability amongst 
traders. The hierarchy in descending order of vulnerability includes owner-
operators with employees, owner-operators without employees, tenant-operators, 
informal employees, temporary vendors, hawkers and zula boys. The higher up one 
goes within this hierarchy, the more traders are visible to the local authority and 
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thus need to negotiate formal requirements and observe regulatory compliance in 
order to not jeopardise their livelihood.218 But such challenges also lead to spatial 
innovation, with particular reference to making infrastructure removable to mitigate 
the lack of secure tenure. Popular economies further thrive on the principle of 
shared spaces which act as social condensers for an array of recreational activities 
that weave together an interdependent and diversified urban economy. This 
economy provides necessary amenities, work opportunity, specialised 
commodities, generates rural-urban and city-wide circuits of distribution with 
substantive dependency on formal retail but also enables non-monetary forms of 
distribution at the neighbourhood scale (see Figure 41). Following Cruz’s concept 
of density of social relations (2015), popular economies establish a density of social 
and economic relations which render the spaces they inhabit essentially urban.  
 
Popular economies also provide entry points and spaces of transition for rural 
migrants into the city. Familiarity is created through the articulation of cultural 
difference, which provides for a gradual transformation – a process of becoming 
urban – that is not otherwise accommodated in statutory urban development 
protocols. Here, social transformation extends to questions of cultural heritage and 
tradition, sexuality and gender, as well as local and world politics, all of which are 
mediated in this space. This type of urbanism thus contains a nascent and globally 
networked metropolitanism. Given the original colonial conceptualisation of what 
the township was ought to become, these urbanising processes observed at the 
mall could be considered decolonising the township from within. 
 
 
218  This could also explain that I mainly had access to the owner-operators who are members of the traders’ 
committee, which became a limitation of this study. 
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Figure 41: Learning from Herero Mall: spatial diagram of popular economies and their 
relations to wider economic and spatial scales.  
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6.3 Reflections on being a white Namibian at the mall 
Vignette: the past, the present and the future 
Edison219 calls me over when passing by Uajenenisa’s place where he is 
sitting with a friend. It’s a Sunday afternoon. He wants to know why I am 
here? Did I get a tender?220 What would be my interest? I tell him my story. 
Once he understands I am a German-speaking Namibian he wants to 
know if I am interested in the “German / Herero dispute”. I explain that my 
research is focused on the Herero Mall economy but that the politics of the 
ongoing genocide reparation negotiations are part of the whole. He tells 
me that the Ovaherero were supposed to be a big group, “a large family”, 
but because of the genocide they are now a minority in independent 
Namibia. They thought the Aawambo were on “their side” as black people, 
but they are “making us skelm” [they are deceiving us]. According to him 
the disunity amongst the Ovaherero is because of tribal lineages, where 
people become chief due to their lineage, not because of their capacity. 
He says German Namibians do not get involved in politics because they 
got “the better deal”.221 But, he assures me, “we are not going to do to you 
like in Zimbabwe”.222 He asks if in my family it would be ok to marry a black 
person? While I answered affirmative, I added that it is likely not the case 
for the majority of white families. He tells me that Ovaherero are not keen 
on intermarriage of their children. He says it’s complicated, because it is 
about money and cattle, but in the end, it is the child’s choice. He has a 




219  Edison told me he is Tjikaa’s “peer”. The “Omakura” is a Herero tradition describing the group of men 
(peers) that were circumcised around the same period of up to 3 years. Boys are circumcised between 
the age of 6 months and a year. Each Omakura is named after the most important historical happening 
during that time. The Omakura meet at the beginning and at the end of the year to open and close the 
year respectively. They cannot fight or insult each other, he told me, otherwise they are punished and 
have to slaughter a cow as a sign of reconciliation. 
220  It is interesting to note that my first venture to the Herero Mall had indeed been because of receiving a 
tender to conduct a feasibility study on the development of the mall. 
221  Edison was referring to the fact that after Independence no structural transformation of economic and 
landownership was pursued, leaving colonial inequalities intact. 
222  He referred to Zimbabwe’s fast track land reform of the early 2000s when war veterans occupied large-
scale commercial farms and expelled their white landowners, which was later sanctioned by the 
Government as land reform. 
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My representation of the Herero Mall will necessarily be coloured by the fact that 
as a white Namibian of German ancestry who lives on the other side of the enduring 
apartheid city divide, my presence at the Herero Mall was an anomaly that 
impacted on social dynamics. My social and cultural formation, and the lack of 
Otjiherero language skills might have led to partial – if not outright wrong – 
perceptions about what is unfolding in this particular space. But this is not to say 
that my encounters were less authentic. Instead, they are part of the larger, more 
complex reality of post-independence Namibian urban life. In some ways these 
interactions opened up lines of conversation that would have otherwise not easily 
emerged, as can be seen in the vignette above. They exposed deeper layers of 
connection between me and the mall, the Ovaherero people and post-
independence realities. Indeed, I come from German settler families that have large 
cattle farms, some of which are in parts of the country that used to be known as 
Hereroland. The generational wealth my family was able to accumulate has as its 
flipside the generational poverty and trauma of the genocide and the entire colonial 
history of this country. In some of my encounters this issue was directly addressed: 
after jokingly asking me to marry her, a woman enquired “when will you pay 
reparations [for the genocide]?” Two other women asked me if I was German and 
when would I pay them “[their] money.” There are few spaces in the city where I 
would be confronted about my personal implication within relations of inequality in 
such a frank manner. The usual spaces of encounter which I frequent, such as the 
university, professional practice or public debates, or in general those areas of 
town that whites conventionally access, are modelled on the image of European 
modernity and never fundamentally question ‘whiteness’ (Fanon, 2008 [1952]; 
Memmi, 2003 [1957]). For the first time, I had entered a space in the city where my 
personal armour of privilege could be easily breached. This is not to say that my 
privilege dissipated, as I retained my freedom and ability to remove myself from 
this setting at any time. Unlike more academic settings, where theoretical 
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arguments can easily be removed from personal implication, here I could not 
escape that direct scrutiny, and the adage that the personal is political made more 
sense than ever. 
 
I often got asked where I was from. Some thought I was British, some American, 
but usually it was assumed I was from Germany.223 A young woman, who had 
imagined I must be American, apologised for having “judged” me. It seemed 
improbable to most people I met at the mall that I would be from Namibia and 
despite knowing the place well, I could never rid myself of a feeling of not 
belonging. Some people would ask me in passing, and then move on. Others would 
call me over to enquire what I was doing at the mall, like Edison had done. To 
‘justify’ my presence at the mall I often explained that I was working with the traders’ 
committee on the development of the mall, and that I was doing research. Only 
such pragmatic explanations seemed to provide ‘legitimate’ reasons for me to be 
there. Another woman inquired why she saw me so often around the mall. After 
giving my usual explanation she told me that she had not seen white people 
“getting involved”, but that they would usually just pass through, looking at the 
place “like tourists”. My experience of not fitting in and the conceptualisation of 
white people as tourists in this space is indicative of the depth of the colonial project 
of spatial segregation, reserving certain parts of the city for certain people. This 
might partly explain the tenacity of the formal / informal binary in Namibia: the formal 
former white city versus the informal former township. 
 
My presence in this space did seem to raise varying expectations. I often got asked 
to buy someone a beer, so much so that I thought I should budget research money 
 
 
223  Tjikaa once explained to one of his customers that I am German, but that I was born in Namibia: “Then 
you are Namibian!” was the response. 
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for buying beers. It seemed more appropriate with people I had come to know: one 
beer for the other person and one for me. Beer is consumed in 750ml “quarts” here, 
so it was usually an investment in a longer conversation. Now and then I got invited 
as well, so it was not a one-way street. Besides the committee members, with whom 
I had long established an essentially transactional relationship, buying drinks 
facilitated access where it was otherwise difficult to achieve. But beyond aiming for 
a free drink I was approached by various people with requests for assisting them 
in some way or the other. One adolescent, Alejandro, approached me at a shebeen 
and told me that he is in his second year of a fitter and turner course at a vocational 
training college. He said he needed to get involved in doing something “for the 
community”, but also to earn money, and therefore wanted to be “associated” with 
me. Another man, a teacher by profession, brought me his CV and a number of 
reference letters so I could help him find a job. Once I was asked by a middle-aged 
man which plots of land he could register for. He must have assumed me to be an 
official listing people’s names for land redistribution purposes. A woman asked me 
when I would come and visit Otjomuise 8ste Laan,224 the neighbourhood where she 
lives, as they “also have a Herero Mall there”, implying that I should also assist her 
neighbourhood to be developed further. On another occasion, while walking 
through the south thoroughfare where the car mechanics are, I witnessed a man 
having what must have been an epileptic seizure, bleeding from the mouth and 
making groaning sounds. Bystanders mentioned that he was one of the mechanics 
and that this had happened before, and that he probably drank too much.225 One 
bystander immediately approached me and told me to put a first aid station on 
“[my] list”, seemingly assuming that I was there for some kind of imminent 
 
 
224  Otjomuise is the original Otjiherero name for Windhoek. Now it is the name of a post-independence 
middle-class suburb to the west of the city. 
225  Someone had turned him onto his side and stuck a spoon into his mouth to avoid him biting his tongue. 
An ambulance that someone else had called was there within 10 minutes. 
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development. Perhaps it was the notebook I carried that gave me away? Beyond 
these random encounters, in my regular interactions with traders I was often asked 
to assist them with accessing loans, finding donors or lending money. There was 
thus a general perception – not unfounded – that I should have access to 
opportunities beyond those available to most people at the mall. Ferguson (2015) 
argued at length why seeking out such seemingly counter-intuitive “relations of 
dependence” are rather common in Southern Africa. He argues that in a post-job 
society, dependence can provide the basis for making successful claims on 
someone else’s resources. 
 
At the same time, reactions to my presence at the mall revealed its 
cosmopolitanism. The relationship to Germany, and the world, went beyond merely 
historical traces and seemed to run deep in ways that I had not anticipated. On 
several occasions visitors at the mall would converse with me in German. In a 
number of cases this was because they had lived in Germany either for studies or 
because of marriage. A nephew of Utaara, whom I met at the mall, had been a 
professional soccer player for Werder Bremen in northern Germany, where he had 
lived since he was 14 years old, after which he had played a few seasons in Turkey. 
In one case the surname of a visitor who spoke to me in Bavarian dialect suggested 
a partially German ancestry.226 Often these were seemingly middle-class people 
living in other parts of the city who frequented the mall because they were 
Ovaherero and enjoyed the familiarity of the place. Unlike in my experience, their 





226  Many Ovaherero have German ancestry that dates back to sexual assault of Ovaherero women by 
German soldiers and settlers during the German colonial period. 
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However, rather than foregrounding all these episodes as purely personal 
experiences, I am interested in this aspect as it relates to the possibility of a de-
colonial urban future: a space where whiteness is the anomaly, where white 
privilege is fundamentally challenged, and where as a white person I feel alienated 
perhaps embodies the seedlings of a de-colonial urban modernity that does not 
take as its reference an imagined Eurocentric universalism. That might explain in 
parts why many cannot see beyond the deprivation and underdevelopment of 
‘informal urbanisation’ because they cannot access this space beyond ‘solving 
problems’ based on their pre-conceived notions of development.  
6.4 Conclusion: the Herero Mall as alter-urbanisation 
The name Herero Mall suggests that it is popularly conceptualised as a mall rather 
than an ‘informal’ market, as it is generally designated by the local authority. 
Authors like Charman et al. have used descriptors like leisure economy (2017) or 
township economy (2020) for describing their insights about similar settings. 
Although the Herero Mall could very well be described by either of these two terms, 
they seem too restrictive in their framing of the range of economic activities as 
leisure and their setting as the township. By essentially relegating such 
descriptions to niche activities or spaces, they fail to capture the latent potential – 
not restricted to a positive sense of the word – of these economies and the mode 
of urbanisation that they embody.  
 
The Herero Mall is a relevant case of urban development that was “not planned 
that way” but turned out the way it did “because of planning” (Bhan, 2012). Leaving 
vast open spaces in between a generally very low-density suburban fabric, 
apartheid planning unwittingly provided room for radical future transformation of 
the colonial city from within. The mall is a specific instance of that transformation 
where such open land was appropriated and transformed by ordinary citizens into 
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a space – in all its spatio-temporal dimensions – that I argue provides a rupture 
with colonial urban logic and holds the potential for a de-colonial urbanisation in 
Namibia. In Table 3 below I mapped my methods and related findings about the 
Herero Mall adapting Harvey’s matrix of spatialities (see Table 1, p9). This mapping 
should not be understood as an attempt at categorisation, but rather as a device 
to support my re-conceptualisation of what is usually labelled ‘informal’ as a unitary 
spatial practice. I have shown above how traders have enacted their presence 
within this space of rupture, to the extent that they have gained legitimacy in the 
eyes of hesitant authorities that are now pressed to find more inclusive solutions to 
the development of the place. In the process traders have successfully exploited 
the ambiguity of policy-implementation gaps to safeguard their livelihood 
strategies, especially in the light of moral objections against the sale of alcohol, but 
also in terms of securing provision of basic services. 
 
In filling the gap that conventional planning had left in the spatial and economic 
sense, traders developed bottom-up popular economies that range from survivalist 
to entrepreneurial strategies with dense and multi-scale circuits of distribution and 
varying levels of interdependency. It is this interdependency that traders identify 
as the central aspect of the mall’s success. While hierarchies of vulnerability exist 
and continue to be reproduced, local forms of social support are maintained. In 
this setting statutory labour rights are difficult to implement, which lends urgency 
to calls for more suitable forms of state-support.227 Visualised through socio-spatial 
diagrams, I argue that the denser the networks of interdependency are, the more 
 
 
227  As I am reviewing this text before final submission, an Emergency Income Grant for informal traders 
and workers is being implemented as part of the Covid-19 economic relief measures taken by the 
Namibian Government. This is in my view the first time that the informal sector is fully acknowledged in 
a wide-reaching state-led economic intervention. In addition, this approach is more in line with the notion 
of presence, instead of requiring various forms of pre-determined means testing to qualify for support. 
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stable the economy, reminiscent of Latour’s argument that stability derives from the 
extent of established connections (2005). This is an economy thriving on a 
transactional logic as opposed to a fixed, pre-conceived land use planning-driven 
paradigm.  
 
In this setting traders have also accomplished spatial innovation to support such a 
process-driven urbanisation with an architecture of material austerity, shared 
space and mix of functions as its defining characteristics. Such process-based 
spatial development does not only allow for independent, incremental economic 
development, but also provides room for the transition of rural migrants to gain a 
foothold in the city and become urban. This transformation happens amid the wider 
transformation from labour-scarcity to labour-surplus in Southern Africa and the 
general decline of a job-based political economy that Ferguson and Li have 
observed (2018). That larger transformation requires us to reconsider what 
urbanisation means in order to re-direct planning practice to support such 
processes instead of hampering or erasing them. For this we need to see the 
present and value it for its contribution amid failing or partial capitalist 
development, instead of imagining and planning for a future based on inherited 
and often inadequate principles of the spatial and social organisation of industrial, 
productive and growth-based economies. In this hybrid field, regulatory 
formalisation can only be one amongst many strategies for development. 
 
Learning from the Herero Mall, I argue, is to rethink the idea of being urban away 
from a place-based, material definition of urbanity towards one that includes the 
former but emphasises the density of relationships, both social and economic. In 
this view the urban-rural distinction is not a binary one, but one that is perpetually 
re-assembled, with changing degrees of connections to other networks and scales. 
This also means that instead of seeing urbanisation as the growth of that place that 
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has been designated urban, which then requires planning for extending that space 
according to set principles, this new form of urbanisation includes the process of 
people becoming urban in space and through the process of making and 
inhabiting space as I have attempted to show in this chapter. Once this is better 
understood and accepted it could become the basis for a different form of spatial 
practice, glimpses of which I will elaborate on in the following chapter. 
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Table 3: The Herero Mall conceptualised as everyday socio-spatial practice using Harvey’s 
matrix of spatialities (2006: 135). 
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CHAPTER 7 REFLECTIONS ON SPATIAL CO-PRODUCTION 
I have argued in the previous chapters that ‘informality’ has been historically 
produced and is discursively reproduced to reinforce heavily skewed power 
relations in a post-colonial setting, thereby stabilising capitalist development. I 
highlighted the contribution of planning as technology of power, and by extension 
the entanglement of planning professionals, including architects in perpetuating 
socio-spatial inequality. I also argued that the spatial practices that animate the so-
called informal realm can be read as resistance to capitalist enclosure through 
formalisation, and that they should be considered as a form of alter-urbanisation 
that points to an alternative urban future than typically envisioned by planners and 
the political class who are firmly situated in the formal paradigm. 
 
In this final chapter I will expand on my ongoing professional involvement with the 
traders’ committee at the mall over the past seven years and how my role evolved 
during that time. I will use this case to reflect on the urban politics of post-colonial 
Namibia, as a space where the discourse of ‘informality’ and everyday practices of 
enacting presence are negotiated. On this basis I will reflect on the potentials and 
limitations of spatial co-production and the implications for professional spatial 
practice that arise. As outlined in the research objectives (see 1.2), here my 
practical objective was to bridge the distance between myself as a spatial 
practitioner and traders at the Herero Mall to allow for not only the production of 
new knowledge about that realm but also to co-produce spatial interventions that 
could point to an alternative spatial practice that might be better understood and 
traceable as an actor network.  
 
In the first two sections of this chapter I trace the evolution of my own work at the 
Herero Mall from professional consultancy for the municipality to professional 
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support on behalf of the traders. In many ways this doctoral research grew out of 
my personal frustration with this process. While reflecting on this transition I aim to 
relate it to the arguments of earlier chapters, showing that conventional 
professional spatial practice has fundamental limitations in engaging within such 
urban politics. In the third section I trace the co-production of a spatial intervention 
at the mall, which formed part of this doctoral research. This required a broad array 
of activities as outlined in the methods of data collection section (see 1.7.4). For 
this chapter I draw primarily from my personal archive of the Herero Mall project 
(including the period prior to embarking on my doctoral research), notes of 
meetings held with the HMTC and the municipality as well as publicly available 
information. 
7.1 A contested participatory process 
At the beginning of this thesis I briefly outlined how I first got involved at the Herero 
Mall (see 1.1). I was part of a consultant team, led by LaRRI in collaboration with 
the then NUST that was commissioned by the CoW to conduct a feasibility study 
for the development of the mall. The timeframe of two months that the CoW 
prescribed for the feasibility study228 was in stark contrast to its ambitious terms of 
reference that included, amongst others, a participatory survey of stakeholders, an 
architectural design and cost estimate, and an implementation plan. The timeline 
diagram below (see  
Figure 42) exposes the disjuncture between the minimal time allocated for 
engaging the traders and residents in order to fulfil the scope of the study versus 
the time taken for municipal processes of procurement and decision-making. We 
 
 
228  The timeframe seemed to have been dictated by the CoW’s financial year end in June, by when 
budgetary provisions have to be spent.  
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were also made aware of the municipal council resolution prohibiting light industrial 
activities and sale of alcohol in the future market in line with standing municipal 
market regulations. 229  However, as I have shown previously, such activities 
provided about 73 percent of economic activities at the mall (see CHAPTER 3 and 
6.2.1). A fundamental decision about the future development with an immediate 
adverse impact on the majority of the existing traders had already been taken at 
council level. This clearly limited the scope of developmental potential that the 
participatory process was supposed to unearth. The participatory aspect of the 
study was thus meant to legitimate those decisions in similar ways that Mayer 
(2010) has argued with regards to urban social movements (see p49). The attempt 
at prohibiting ongoing activities at the site would not only render those activities 
illegal but also delegitimise residents’ earnest efforts to create a livelihood in the 
context of scarce alternatives. This correlates to my argument that the ‘informal’ is 
delegitimised and othered (see 5.1.3). Through my interactions with traders over 
the years I can certainly account for the anxiety that this resolution caused about 
their future at the mall.230  
 
Our original proposal for the feasibility study had included the creation of a 
permanent presence in close proximity to the site throughout the study thus 
allowing the team to interact closely and on an everyday basis with traders and 
visitors at the mall.231 We had approached the traders’ committee regarding a 
rentable space at the mall and were shown a small room where the central 
electricity meters are located. The structure was made of shutter board and 
 
 
229  See also footnote 143. 
230  In one case the trader decided to rather invest money on his farm as he was ensured of his ownership 
and thus the security of his investment. See footnote 151, p214. 
231  “The Market Place: A study on the feasibility of developing an informal market on Erf R/6296 and 6300 
in Katutura (‘Herero Mall’)”. Feasibility study proposal by Guillermo Delgado and author, dated February 
2013. 
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required some renovation for it to become usable as a field office. We proposed 
paying for the renovations in return for using the space for the duration of the study. 
Afterwards the committee would have been able to use the space for meetings. 
Although this had been included in the original proposal to the CoW, expenditure 
for the renovation was not permissible under the municipal spending regulations 
for feasibility studies and we could not proceed as planned. This episode 
emphasised the narrow definition of participation as consultation by the 
municipality, and the influence of public procurement regulations on more 
experimental participatory processes. The importance of spatial proximity of 
consultants and stakeholders to enable the co-production of “spaces of liberated 
speech”, as Petrescu (2005) calls it, was not considered a priority by the 
municipality. 
 
The inability to fulfil our promise only increased the mistrust the team was facing on 
behalf of the traders’ committee. It turned out that the municipality had not officially 
informed the committee about the feasibility study. An independent study had been 
undertaken a year before by a town planning consultant, who had been 
commissioned by the traders committee through NISO and funded by a German 
development organisation. The municipality, however, did not acknowledge the 
recommendations of that study, as the CoW had allegedly not been engaged in the 
drafting of its terms of reference. Instead, the municipality publicly advertised a 
tender for a new feasibility study and commissioned our team. This did not sit well 
with the traders’ committee and NISO who felt that their pro-active initiative had 
been disregarded. We were informed by the committee that the traders would not 
engage with our team directly. 
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Given the time pressure, this meant that we could rely only on secondary sources 
with regards to economic activities at the mall, notably the NISO study (Kozonguizi, 
2013), while engaging other relevant, yet secondary, stakeholders directly. Despite 
reiterating our institutional independence of the municipality and our opposition to 
the standing council resolution to prohibit shebeens and light industrial activities 
we were perceived by traders as an extension of the municipality with which they 
had a troubled history that I outlined above (see CHAPTER 3). This culminated in 
the committee chairperson stating at our closing presentation that although traders 
largely agreed with our proposals, they would not officially endorse the study.232 
Traders thus effectively denied the legitimisation of the municipal process and 
thereby created a space for negotiation with the municipality. Following their having 
established a physical presence as I showed in CHAPTER 6 this was an affirmation 
of their political presence. 
 
Under pressure from the traders’ committee the municipality called a meeting in 
January 2015 for the two consultant teams to present their respective studies to the 
traders and to staff from the CoW Department of Economic Development and 
Community Services (DEDCS) (also see  
Figure 42). 233  The presentations showed that the recommendations of the two 
studies were largely comparable in their aim to strengthen existing economic 
activities of traders at the site, even where they contradicted the standing council 
resolution.234 It was agreed at the meeting to combine the two studies into one 
report for submission to council and in May 2015 the municipality requested the 
 
 
232  “Minutes of first meeting with Herero Mall Traders’ Committee HMTC”, dated 18 June 2014 
233  “Consolidation of the two independent feasibility studies for the development of a market on Erf R/6296, 
Katutura”. Letter from CoW DEDCS, dated 11 June 2015. 
234  See footnote 143, p199. 
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two consultant teams to submit a joint concept proposal to this effect. After further 
delays related to procurement processes the joint team undertook three 
participatory workshops with traders in October and November 2015 to: 1) review 
the combined recommendations and agree on a proposed governance structure 
for the mall; 2) co-design the spatial intervention using a large-scale model; and 3) 
review the final design concept and report.235 Because of the long delays since the 
studies were first undertaken, and once approved by the council, the participatory 
exercise was done – again – under immense time pressure with only two weeks 
between workshops, which was reminiscent of the predicament of our first study. 
 
Figure 43: Workshop 2, November 2015: defining the existing situation. Photo by Nangula 
Shilongo. 
The second workshop to co-design alternative spatial arrangements was 
particularly insightful. Our team had installed a 1:20 model of the mall in the 
community hall where the workshop was taking place. Traders assembled around 
 
 
235  “Herero Mall market roadmap towards Windhoek City Council (WCC) joint submission”. Letter to CoW 
DEDCS, dated 16 June 2015. 
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the model and in a first step we collectively defined the current spatial arrangement 
(see Figure 43) and requested traders to indicate existing functions. This exercise 
proved to be useful to orient participants and for our team to exemplify possibilities 
for densification and spatial re-arrangement. This exercise also allowed us to map 
the various businesses by asking traders to indicate the nature of their business on 
the model with coloured stickers, resulting in the map presented above (see Figure 
40).  
 
On the other hand, it was not useful, given the lack of time, to meaningfully co-
design a future market. The conceptual spaces we had developed in the large-
scale model (see Figure 44) did not correspond close enough with the final concept 
design (see Figure 45 and Figure 46). We had aimed to embraced the full potential 
of the Herero Mall as a civic centre at the neighbourhood scale, opening up to and 
including the neighbouring institutions, both spatially and in its envisaged 
governance structure that included surrounding institutional and residential 
stakeholders, as well as the local authority (see Figure 47). The design included a 
public park, a large square for temporary traders and cultural manifestations 
covered with solar panels to generate electricity, spaces for formal retail anchor 
stores, entertainment spaces restaurants, industrial workshops, cold storage for 
meat distribution, public educational spaces and some housing units. It was 
designed to be built in phases so that traders could be temporarily relocated on 
the site during the construction process. 
 
However, traders were visibly unhappy when I presented the final concept design 
at the third workshop. As most of the discussion was in Otjiherero, and the concerns 
were not translated in English, I could only sense the disappointment from the 
atmosphere in the room and the heated discussions. Our team had used its own 
design sensitivity to make design decisions that had altered the spatial concept to 
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such an extent that it was not recognisable for participants of the previous 
workshop, and no time for additional iterations was available. Yet, at the end of the 
meeting participants approved the proposal for the sake of progress,236 which 
underscored the coercive nature of the participatory process as it was framed then.  
 
In addition, the required capital investment which the quantity surveyor had 
estimated based on the concept design amounted to N$ 33 million (GBP 
1,736,842),237 which was about 10 times as much as the investment in a recent 
municipal market under a highway overpass in the CBD.238 We had recommended 
alternative financing measures, including raising external funding, as well as 
phasing the project implementation over a period of 10 years. Nevertheless, the 
size of the required investment meant that the design had entered the realm of 
utopias of form (see Swyngedouw, p59). Here, participation framed as open 
consultation, combined with the municipality’s reluctance to set clear budgetary 
parameters for the project beforehand, resulted in an ambitious spatial 
representation of a long wish-list of facilities and amenities that the neighbourhood 
clearly lacked.  The cost-recovery stance of the municipality (see p147) and the 
fact that an investment in public infrastructure of this magnitude could evidently not 
be recovered from trading activities had not been reconciled. 
 
 
236  “Minutes of Workshop 3 on the redevelopment of market on Erf R/6296 (‘Herero Mall’)”, dated 2 
September 2015 
237  “Preliminary project estimate – new market on Erf R/6296, Katutura”. Cost estimate by Hendrik 
Herselman Quantity Surveyors, dated 21 September 2015. 
238   Also see footnote 241. 
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Figure 44: Workshop 2, November 2015: developing an in-situ concept model for the future 
market indicating the potential for densification of economic and social activities. Photo by 
Nangula Shilongo. 
 
Figure 45: Final model of concept design for new market. Source: Lühl, Delgado and 
Kozonguizi, 2016 (design and model by author). 
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Figure 46: Final concept design: floor plans with uses indicated. Source: Lühl, Delgado and 
Kozonguizi, 2016 (drawing by Guillermo Delgado). 
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The resultant report (Lühl, Delgado and Kozonguizi, 2016) was submitted to the 
municipality in January 2016. It included general recommendations, a proposed 
governance structure (see Figure 47), the concept design (see Figure 45 and 
Figure 46), a cost estimate and a phased implementation plan. Subsequently, I 
held a presentation for the city council in June 2016, shortly after the town planning 
consultant had tragically died in a car accident. The proposed self-management 
of the public infrastructure by a traders’ cooperative (see Figure 47), as well as the 
proposal to permit sale of alcohol as well as light industrial activities, dominated 
the debate amongst councillors, who were more familiar with the conventional 
municipal market model. 239  Nonetheless, the minutes of this council meeting 
indicated a slight shift in the stance of the council on these matters:240 
- […] the option of setting up an ordinary market like the Soweto Market might not 
be viable due the mixed activities taking place at the site (Erf RE/ 6296 Katutura), 
which mainly consist of alcohol 43%, food 30% and light industry 27%.  
- Traders should be encouraged to identify alternative products to sell at the new 
market; the main focus should not just be on alcohol [my emphasis]. 
- The City of Windhoek should consider the option of managing the market for a 
period of five (5) years after completion and while the traders are being 
capacitated to take over the management of the market. 
- That the development of markets be considered as a social responsibility project 
and that cost recovery not be expected within short term. 
The meeting also resolved that the DEDCS should arrange a familiarisation visit to 
the Horseshoe market, a community-run market originally developed with donor 
funding, not far from the Herero Mall. We had presented this market this as a local 
precedent of trader self-management. The visit seems to have further convinced 
 
 
239  Conventional municipal markets are administered by market managers and cleaning staff employed by 
the city and the infrastructure is maintained by the municipality. Permitted activities are restricted and 
traders pay a fixed subsidised rent to the municipality. 
240  “Minutes of meeting held with the councillors to discuss the feasibility study for the development of the 
‘Herero Mall Market’”, dated 25 July 2016. 
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the DEDCS of introducing a “self-management concept at the municipal 
markets”.241 
  
Figure 47: Proposed organisational structure of the future market. Source: Lühl, Delgado, 
and Kozonguizi, 2016 (drawing by author). 
A year later I held a second presentation to council without there having been any 
obvious progress made at the municipality. The Herero Mall proposal has been 
under consideration by the council ever since July 2016 and to date no clear 
instruction regarding the way forward has been provided. In early 2020 I received 
the draft Terms of Reference for Basic Informal Market Design Models for the 
integration of the Informal Economy within [the] Spatial Development Framework 
[of] the City of Windhoek from the DEDCS for consideration. The document 
included the Herero Mall amongst the sites to be considered for such ‘market 
 
 
241  “Minutes of meeting with Horse Shoe Market Committee”, dated 3 August 2016. The economic 
development officer had confirmed in my interview that the municipality’s approach was changing from 
being responsible for the management of municipal markets to traders being “fully involved in managing 
the market facilities”. He noted that in a recent market development in the Windhoek CBD, funded by 
the municipality together with a private developer of the adjacent shopping mall, operators would be 
taking full responsibility for managing the market, while the CoW would only retain the responsibility for 
maintenance of the infrastructure, towards which the traders will contribute with “monthly small fees”. 
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design models’, which indicates that the earlier proposal is being re-thought in 
favour of a more generic city-wide approach.  
 
The process of the feasibility study revealed that the local authority, legally backed 
up by its ownership of the land on behalf of the ‘public’, considered itself to have 
overriding power to decide on behalf of traders and residents in its jurisdiction and 
that any decision making power lay solely with the city council.242 Such a stance 
was able to emerge in a setting where, in the eyes of the local authority, the ongoing 
‘informal’ activities were deemed illegitimate; the municipality as the formal land 
owner had full discretionary powers; participation was conceived merely as 
consultation; and any official engagement with traders was considered charitable. 
In that setting, as consultants we were expected to proceed based on existing 
policy, not to challenge it. We were deemed to be answerable to the client – the 
municipality – instead of the everyday users – the traders and their customers.  
We had imagined the future mall in terms of Negri’s proposition of a “common” 
under communal management, instead of the dominant state-centred notion of 
public ownership on behalf of citizens (see p45). 
 
This process laid bare the politics in the sense that Mouffe defined it (see p58): on 
the one hand a local authority, legitimised through representational democratic 
processes, seeking to transform an ‘informal’ place into an orderly and regulated 
space using a top-down planning logic. On the other hand, a loosely organised 
group of residents, self-legitimised through their presence (see 6.1), which resisted 
this kind of formalisation as it would disrupt their opportunities to earn a living. By 
 
 
242  A “top-down” procurement process for public commissions had also been identified by the architect I 
interviewed as one of the major obstacles to a participatory spatial practice that would engage end-
users effectively in the design of public buildings. 
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denying the validity of the municipal-driven consultative process traders essentially 
turned their daily enacted physical presence into a political one, challenging the 
re-production of colonial-inherited spatial hegemony. In this setting, as professional 
spatial practitioners we found ourselves to be mediators of the differing positions.  
 
However, the traders’ political leverage did not fundamentally alter the participatory 
process itself. Despite our efforts to expand the possibilities of a participatory 
process, it remained framed in a conception of ‘participation’ as consultation and 
was thus restricted in its potential. Project timelines were related to budgetary 
constraints instead of being guided by methodological considerations. To speak in 
the words of de Carlo (see p49), as architects we were expected to resolve how to 
formalise the market, while leaving the question of why to formalise the market 
unanswered. In other words, we were not expected to rearrange socio-economic 
relations, as Cruz and Forman have argued is required (see p50). The municipality 
considered traders as beneficiaries of a product instead of participants in the 
process. Without a well-defined formulation of the financial parameters and scope 
of the participatory process, it was clear neither to municipal staff, nor to us as 
consultants, let alone to the traders, what we could expect as an outcome. While 
we had managed to expand what de Carlo (see p50) calls the organisational 
hypothesis and spatial configurations beyond what the local authority had 
anticipated, in terms of the physical project these were shattered as unrealistic 
expectations. At the same time, I argue that the process generated a change in 
attitudes, both at the local authority level and amongst traders, that I will turn to in 
the next section.  
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7.2 The necessity and limitations of mediation 
What seemed a breakdown of the feasibility study process transformed my role 
and approach to the project. The untimely death of the town planning consultant 
practically left the traders with me as the only ‘consultant’ with the support of NISO 
to advocate for their case and changed my relationship with the committee. In the 
meantime I had embarked on this doctoral research in September 2015, using the 
Herero Mall as my case study, which allowed me to continue working with the 
traders’ committee independently of the municipality.243 Following my presentation 
to council in June 2016 I met the committee to brief them about the discussion.244 
The fact that they had been waiting for so long – more than one and a half years 
since the decision was taken to combine the two studies – led to heated 
discussions.245 Councillors change too often, one trader remarked, and suggested 
that perhaps this was a strategy to prolong the process.246 The option of a protest 
march to increase pressure on the municipality was raised, with Kaumbe 
attempting to mediate: he argued for the processes to take their course, in order 
not to jeopardise progress made, and convinced the other members to instead 
send a letter to DEDCS to request official feedback.247 The discussion soon turned 
to more urgent matters: the lack of toilets. “Can’t we provide them ourselves?” was 
the central question. As a mains sewer line extended across the mall, enabling 
adequate sewage disposal, the major remaining challenge was to access water, 
 
 
243  “Request for Meeting with HMTC to present Herero Mall Research Proposal”. Letter by author 
addressed to HMTC chairperson, dated 12.10.2016. 
244  Personal notes of meeting with HMTC at Mukupua’s place on 15.06.2016.  
245  Sukona remarked that she even “had a baby” in the meantime. 
246  The informal sector activist had also narrated his forty years involvement in the informal sector in 
contrast to political office bearers, who often do not understand the environment because they are 
elected every five years. This can cause major frustrations and setbacks, “because as an activist you 
work so hard, but then an elected policy maker comes and says: who are you?”. 
247  “Request for Meeting with City of Windhoek Economic Development and Environment Division 
regarding development of Herero Mall”. Letter drafted by author for HMTC, dated 20.06.2016. 
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which currently was only provided to the car wash (see 6.2.2). One trader offered 
to weld the enclosures. This engagement with the committee revealed the 
disjuncture of the ongoing everyday struggles of traders at the mall where the lack 
of water and sanitation provision required all kinds of self-help measures mentioned 
earlier (see 6.1.5), and the slow and fragmented process of decision making 
regarding the overall project. This all-or-nothing approach to formalisation 
prevented even the most urgent temporary infrastructure measures to be taken.  
 
The debate shifted towards arguing that it might be better not to wait for the city 
council, but to self-initiate projects that would bring relief to the most pressing 
issues such as lack of sanitation and the proposed security fence to improve the 
situation incrementally. The committee requested me to write a letter to the 
municipality, proposing that they would install temporary sanitation facilities and a 
security fence themselves if the municipality would grant approval.248 After some 
months without receiving feedback I met the committee again in March 2017 to 
discuss the design and select suitable sites for the temporary toilets and the fence. 
It was proposed that the construction be of steel and corrugated iron such that 
local labour could be used to build the structures (see Figure 32). We agreed that 
I should present a proposal on behalf of the traders’ committee, and that the 
municipality would contribute the required materials while traders contribute their 
labour. The lack of progress of the municipal-driven process induced a gradual 
shift within the HMTC away from an emphasis on state-dependency towards a 
position of negotiation with the state represented by the local authority. Within this 
process my own role as consultant for the municipality shifted towards a focus on 
professional support for traders. While I did not undertake this work formally as 
 
 
248  “Proposal to develop temporary security fence and sanitation facilities at Herero Mall”. Letter drafted by 
author for HMTC, dated 08.09.2016. 
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university lecturer, my employment at a well-known public university enabled this 
shift as I was not considered to be furthering any private interests. 
 
In July 2017 I was invited to yet another full council meeting in which I presented 
the temporary sanitation proposal including a quotation for the required materials 
which amounted to N$ 66,000 (GBP 3,474), which the municipality was requested 
to contribute.249 I also proposed a way forward for the overall project that would rely 
on incremental development and spatial co-production with traders and the 
municipality instead of the original concept design for a formalised market. Instead 
of a once-off capital investment this would require an annual development budget 
over a number of years which would allow an ongoing process of co-production at 
the site. I presented experiences from Durban, where an area-based management 
approach was introduced within the municipality to support informal traders in the 
inner city (also see p53), as a best practice that could inform the further 
development of the Herero Mall. Given that the prohibitive capital investment 
required for the original design proposal seemingly prevented any progress, 
including for temporary measures, the suggestion to move towards an incremental 
process of co-production seemed necessary. 
 
In July 2017 a public meeting was held at Katutura Community Hall where it was 
announced that council had approved the traders’ request for temporary sanitation 
facilities, the fence and a pre-paid water point at a cost of N$245,350 (GBP 
12,913).250 The city also announced at the meeting as well as in newspaper adverts 
 
 
249  “Temporary Sanitation and Security Solution for Herero Mall”. Proposal developed by author in 
collaboration with HMTC for CoW Council, dated 15.03.2017. 
250  Notes of public meeting at Katutura Community Hall drafted by Martin Namupala, dated 22 July 2017. 
Notice the discrepancy between the amount budgeted by the municipality and the originally proposed 
N$66,000.00 in our proposal.  
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that an overall capital budget of N$ 2 million (GBP 105,263) had been allocated for 
the development of the mall for the financial year and that it would be spent in 
phases. As no details were provided to this effect, the committee requested me to 
draft a letter to the DEDCS requesting detailed feedback regarding the project 
status and way forward.251 Without a response having been received from the city, 
an external contractor commenced to cast concrete foundations for toilets without 
the knowledge of the traders (the installation of the toilets has been dealt with on 
pages 189-191). The committee requested me to draft a second letter, this time 
addressed to the CEO of the municipality. They requested an audience with him to 
discuss traders’ concerns regarding their lack of inclusion in the municipality’s 
plans for the development. Specifically, a concern was raised that “construction 
tenders were not offered for local construction companies but to ‘outsiders’, [and] 
no local labour was used”. 252 Despite these concerns over the execution of the 
project, the eventual installation of the toilets and security fence at the mall was a 
result of my sustained mediation between traders and the local authority. Still, the 
experience highlighted the limitation of such advocacy to alter the design and 
procurement processes and thus reduced influence over the spatial outcome. 
 
This phase of the project is best defined by mediation and brought to light some 
limitations of mediation as strategy. As a reaction by traders to slow progress, 
linking up with strategic professional allies to further a more autonomous agenda, 
was a reasonable step to take. The fact that I did this work under the guise of the 
community service mandate of the university, opened doors and allowed me to 
mediate between various stakeholders in spatial production. However, the 
 
 
251  “Proposal to develop temporary security fence and sanitation facilities at Herero Mall HMTC”. Letter to 
the acting Head of DEDCS, drafted by author for HMTC, dated 22.07.2017. 
252  “Request for official meeting”. Letter to CoW CEO, drafted by author for HMTC, dated 27.10.2017. 
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experience showed that mediation might be useful in asserting pressure on the 
local authority to take action, but it did not alter the process of the production of 
space in fundamental ways. Mediation seems inevitable within a context of 
resistance against formalisation coupled with the aspiration of development, but for 
it to lead to alternative socio-spatial realities it must be part of an overall strategy 
for transformation. This episode emphasised the need to re-think methods for the 
spatial intervention that I had planned as part of this thesis.  
7.3 Building a meeting space for the traders’ committee 
Vignette: the show must go on 
I am sitting at Sukona’s shebeen, waiting for Utaara to discuss the next 
steps for the construction of the new office and meeting hall. The main 
structure is well advanced, and he is still busy with the electrician to re-
position the electricity distribution board, fixing it to the wall of the new 
office. As I am discussing the payment for the electrician with Sukona, I 
notice a few men crossing over from the barber shop to the new office 
carrying a chair and a large mirror. Without giving it more attention, I 
continue my chat with Sukona until Utaara arrives for our meeting. He had 
to assist the electrician who is now finishing up and re-connecting the 
distribution board for the electricity to be switched on again. We finish our 
discussion and I accompany Utaara to check the progress. As we enter 
the office it all becomes clear to me what had happened: inside the office 
the men had set up a full barber station, mirror and all. There are about five 
people, including the client and the barber going about his work, and it 
seems from the conversation that they are in good spirits. They had 
arranged with the electrician to connect an extension lead directly to the 
main electricity supply, enabling them to user their electrical clippers 
during the hour that the electricity had to be temporarily switched off for 
the part of the mall that includes their barber shop. 
 
I will now turn to the final part of the thesis to elaborate on the spatial intervention I 
co-produced with the traders’ committee at the Herero Mall. In February 2017 had 
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received GBP2,000.00 (N$38,000.00) from the University of Westminster 125 
FUND which I had applied for to procure furniture and equipment for a field office 
for my research and meeting space for the traders’ committee.253 The committee 
had granted me the right to use one of the vacant spaces at the mall to convert into 
a field office in June 2017 as my fieldwork had been scheduled for the second half 
of 2017. 254  I had purchased a table and chairs which were donated to the 
committee for their independent meetings. Already towards the end of 2017 the 
owner of the structure requested an increased rent which made the office 
unsustainable for its purpose. The rent was discontinued, and it was agreed with 
the committee to look for an alternative solution. Because of the slow progress of 
the municipal approval process the committee had held a meeting with traders on 
June 2016 to initiate a monthly individual contribution of N$200.00 (GBP10.50) that 
would be used to hire security guards and for the cleaning of the proposed 
toilets.255 In addition, the formation of a neighbourhood watch was initiated in liaison 
with the City Police as part of the policy of promoting self-policing. Traders were 
thus actively taking steps towards improving their self-administration. 
 
Because the committee did not have an independent space to gather and keep its 
administration it was dependent on using individual member’s spaces and 
entrusting individuals with handling of documents and money, which had already 
caused controversy. The committee member who had initially collected the N$200 
 
 
253  The 125 Fund Award 2016/17 Terms of Agreement, dated 12.02.2017 
254  In July 2017 I used the field office as the base for a week-long vertical studio workshop on Informal 
Economies and the Future City, with NUST Bachelor of Architecture students. Students explored the 
Herero Mall and surroundings to uncover the ways in which people establish and sustain popular 
economies in the city, interacted with the various traders and drew up the spatial settings that were 
created to cater for the specific activities. 
255  I was not part of this process but was briefed by a committee member about the initiative.This also 
required the opening of a bank account and the committee proposed that in addition to two signatories 
from the committee, one independent trader should have signing rights for oversight. 
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contribution by traders for safekeeping in the absence of a collective bank account 
had spent some of it on personal items. This led to heated discussions amongst 
members about how to approach the person to retrieve the money. 256  I was 
requested to draft a letter for the committee chairperson to request the member to 
return the money to the committee or else risk having his businesses’ electricity cut 
and being suspended from the committee.257 A concern was how to regain the 
traders’ trust in the committee, if the money of the first monthly contribution 
remained partly unaccounted for. More generally, members bemoaned the fact that 
committee members were not committed enough to be punctual for meetings, that 
they had individual business activities to attend to and would leave meetings 
without apology. The general agreement was that better administration was 
required if the committee was to convince the municipality of its ability to self-
administer the market. 
 
As the largest part of the 125 Fund budget for additional equipment had not yet 
been spent, I proposed to the committee to use the remaining funds to build an 
office and meeting space for the committee. The committee welcomed the idea of 
the office as members felt it could facilitate the process of consolidating the self-
administration of the mall by providing an independent space that would not be 
subject to the daily contingencies of individual businesses of the committee 
members and other undue external interference. At the same time the process 
would allow me to realise the spatial intervention that I had planned as part of this 
research. During a meeting with committee members we agreed to design the 
structure with materials and methods in mind that could be locally constructed 
 
 
256  Sukona expressed some sympathy, saying others should not judge too harshly as they do not know 
how they would act with the temptation of handling such an amount of money. 
257  “Money collected from traders for improvements of Herero Mall”. Letter drafted by author for HMTC 
chairperson, dated 02.11.2018. 
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without the need of a contractor, similar to the original proposal for the toilets. I 
proposed to use the 125 Fund budget to buy materials for the structure, while the 
traders would contribute their labour either in kind or through contributions. On a 
walkabout of the mall the committee made it clear that the site for the office had to 
be where the main municipal electricity distribution box was located. Enclosing the 
electricity box, which had been unprotected, would provide the committee with an 
effective governance tool (see p192) to exercise control over the provision of 
electricity to businesses that did not adhere to established closing times of the mall 
or were in arrears with their payments.  
 
Based on the spatial constraints of the chosen site I sketched a design concept 
that was discussed with the traders’ committee in a follow-up meeting. The design 
was based on four spatial elements (see Figure 48 and Figure 49): an office (A) as 
the most secure space enclosing the electricity distribution board; the committee 
meeting hall (B) with a large sliding door which would allow the space to open up 
to a forecourt (C) for meetings with traders; and a billboard (D) that would increase 
visibility from within the mall and from the main street while also shielding the 
electricity substation from view. The spatial arrangement was inspired by the 
generic shebeen typology that I described earlier (see p179), including a secure 
core space with a an adjacent social space with large openings to the outside for 
increased flexibility of use. Although separated from the street by the new and 
supposedly temporary security fence, an opening was made that could become a 
door towards the street if the need or opportunity should arise.  
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Figure 48: Sketch plan of the office and meeting hall used for discussions with the traders' 
committee. Office (A), committee meeting hall (B), forecourt (C), and billboard (D). 
 
        
Figure 49: Perspective sketch of the office and meeting space seen from the mall (left) and 
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The construction methods for the three built elements were based on the current 
construction methods at the mall that I described above (see 6.1.2). The office was 
designed comprising panels with a steel hollow section frame onto which 1.6 mm 
mild steel sheets were welded.258 The panels were designed so that they could be 
thermally insulated from the inside for improved comfort at a later stage and if 
additional funding became available. The window is made of a top-hinged steel 
sheet panel that opens up to the outside and can be locked from the inside when 
closed. The larger and higher meeting hall was designed as a much lighter 
construction. It has an in-situ welded steel frame that is clad with corrugated iron 
sheeting for the walls and the roof and expanded metal mesh for ventilation and 
daylight openings. The billboard was designed as a spatial marker with a sturdier 
steel hollow section frame and was planned to be clad with polycarbonate sheeting 
with LED lights inside to provide lighting and presence also at night.259 
 
As the committee chairperson Utaara was the only welder amongst its members, 
the committee proposed that he would do the construction work for which a week 
had been originally set aside and which was to be paid from the earlier collected 
contributions from traders. He proposed engaging two unemployed youth from the 
neighbourhood as assistants. It quickly became clear that the timeframe had been 
too ambitious as he needed to keep his car repair business afloat in the meantime, 
and the project eventually took four weeks until completion. We bought most 
construction materials directly at a large construction steel supplier where Utaara 
had an account and the rest at the local hardware store. Materials were delivered 
to the site and Utaara stored them in his 40ft shipping container that was awaiting 
 
 
258  This construction provides increased security compared to the corrugated iron sheeting that is easily 
bent. 
259  The cladding and lighting of the billboard as well as the paving of the forecourt remain outstanding 
owing to lack of funding. 
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to be turned into rentable shops. In the following pages I will present an annotated 
visual and chronological documentation of the construction process (see Figure 50 
– Figure 57) before concluding on the implications of spatial co-production as 
method. 
 
Figure 50: The electricity distribution box during the setting-out of works. 
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Figure 51: Prefabrication of the billboard steel frame on the concrete surface of the disused 
car wash (left). The concrete mix recipe written with chalk on the door of the neighbouring 
building (right). 
        
Figure 52: Prefabricated wall panels of the office during assembly with billboard frame 
already in place (left), and construction of the frame of the meeting hall (right). 
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Figure 53: The frame of the meeting hall partly clad on the street facade. 
 
Figure 54: The frame of the billboard seen from one of the entrances to the mall. 
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Figure 55: The interior of the meeting hall with an opening towards the street (left) and the 
door into the office (right).  
 
Figure 56: The concrete floor of the meeting hall being cast and finished. 
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Figure 57: The HMTC office and meeting hall with the yet to be clad billboard seen from 
Clemence Kapuuo Street.  
The HMTC office and meeting hall emerged out of the efforts by the traders’ 
committee to advance its independence and prove to the local authority that it was 
capable of self-administration of the mall. The siting of the building was strategic 
to enclose the electricity distribution box and thereby assert the committee’s power 
over the mall’s governance. At the same time the building with its 5m high billboard 
created a physical presence to those using the main street passing the mall (see 
Figure 57). The design and construction methods were entirely derived from the 
locally prevailing way of producing space, drawing on local typologies, 
construction methods and design detailing. Where possible, the aim was to 
improve these construction practices if even minimally. For example, to ensure that 
the load-bearing structure and the internal floors were level required my presence 
and direct intervention during the critical stages of the construction. In some cases, 
what I had imagined to be a self-explanatory was interpreted differently, leading to 
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material wastage or superfluous construction elements. In this way, the process of 
building taught me about the potential of the architecture of Herero Mall to inform 
a future spatial development that could be more in tune with the socio-spatial 
dynamics that I have described throughout this thesis. 
 
However, the process also galvanised discussions around the governance of mall 
and the traders’ committee. By requiring concrete decisions to be taken and 
actions to be followed through, it exposed separate interest groups within the 
committee. The leadership of Utaara (the first trader to occupy the site), was 
challenged and the discrepancies between the interests of active owner-operators 
and rent-seeking business owners as well as those of tenants were foregrounded. 
My attempts at introducing clearer administrative processes and guidelines in the 
form of a constitution for the traders’ association was supported by younger 
committee members while others resisted it in favour of the more open-ended 
method of talking things out in lengthy meetings. How the availability of the office 
and meeting hall is affecting the traders’ committee dynamics in the longer term 
and the further development of the mall generally remains speculation at this stage.  
7.4 Conclusion: building as method 
In this chapter I reviewed my practical involvement at the Herero Mall over the past 
seven years and contextualised it in the arguments of the earlier chapters of this 
thesis. I showed that the municipality of Windhoek retained a heavily top-down 
administrative structure that is slow to react to changing urban conditions and 
continues to treat residents – specifically the urban poor – in paternalistic terms. In 
such a setting, professional consultants are meant to assist the local authority to 
advance the project of formalisation to bring all activities under the control of the 
state. However, as I have demonstrated in CHAPTER 6, residents resist this formal 
enclosure and instead enact alternative urban forms and practices that answer 
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their immediate needs, rather than policy-prescribed, prohibitive standards and 
requirements of the formal city. 
 
In the case of the Herero Mall, I have demonstrated how the traders successfully 
asserted their political leverage in the municipality-driven re-development process. 
However, I also showed that this did not fundamentally alter the process of the 
production of space itself, which remained framed in an expert-driven consultancy 
process. I further explored how my role changed towards a position of mediating 
between the traders and the local authority, which, though partially successful in 
achieving some sanitary improvements, did not produce a different spatial 
outcome. Nevertheless, I also argue that sustained advocacy for alternative 
approaches to ‘informal’ economy development seems to be slowly showing results 
within the municipal hallways and must thus be considered a supporting activity 
for any critical spatial practice. 
 
In the final section of the chapter I demonstrated how in collaboration with traders 
committee I adopted the prevailing practice of appropriating and building to co-
produce an office and meeting hall, through which its presence was spatially and 
administratively asserted. The lessons learnt from this process complemented my 
insights into the architecture of popular economies that I had previously described 
only through observation. It clarified for me the real potential that lies in this form of 
construction for the purpose of accommodating popular economies within the 
urban fabric, as well as the pitfalls that need to be avoided. In Figure 58 I 
diagrammatically show how these different aspects of spatial practice interrelate 
with the spatio-temporality of the Herero Mall. 
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Figure 58: Diagram of my involvement at the Herero Mall, negotiating the tension between 
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CHAPTER 8 CONCLUSION: DECOLONISING INFORMALITY 
I now turn to conclude my thesis beginning with reviewing the objectives that 
guided this study. My realisation was that the socio-spatial realities of a majority of 
citizens in Namibia – the black urban poor – remain largely unaffected by 
professional architectural practice and are hardly explored in the education of 
future professionals. Instead, these realities are relegated to the conceptual black 
hole called ‘informality’. At the same time, my personal lived experience of 
generational white privilege in a post-colonial context of extreme inequality and 
enduring spatial segregation allowed me to live in a parallel reality that is deeply 
rooted in a Eurocentric colonial modernity. To explore progressive professional 
engagement with the world of the ‘informal’ meant that I needed to understand 
these socio-spatial conditions better in order to challenge their pre-dominant 
conceptualisations in urban theory. My hypothesis was that in these forms of 
everyday socio-spatial practice lies an alternative and potentially more socially just 
urbanism, rather than in the formal urban development patterns and practices that 
have been instrumental in shaping not only the capitalist-colonial past but that 
continue to shape imaginaries of an urban future. This required to challenge these 
urban imaginaries by offering an alternative that departs from asserting the 
legitimacy and viability of situated everyday practices irrespective of their position 
on the formal – informal spectrum. 
 
In practice, my on-going involvement in the redevelopment process of the Herero 
Mall provided me with an entry point into such an ‘informal’ reality, while this 
doctoral study offered a frame for theoretical reflection. Methodologically, 
engaging with traders at the mall in the co-production of a spatial intervention 
allowed me to gain knowledge of their everyday practices while actively 
contributing to the transformation of their spatial conditions. In parallel, my linkages 
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to professional spatial practitioners in the private, non-governmental and 
government sectors enabled me to explore the ways in which the discourse about 
‘informality’ is constructed locally. While I presented these three aspects of the 
study separately above, I will now seek to relate them to each other in this 
concluding chapter. I will first address the research questions that have been 
discussed throughout chapters 4, 5, 6 and 7, and offer a reflection on theory and 
methods. This will be followed by my contribution to knowledge, the pathways for 
generating impact, the limitations of the study, and finally by outlining the potential 
for further research. 
8.1 Answers to research questions 
8.1.1 The new ‘other’: how to delegitimise the majority in the post-colony 
In this section I respond to the research question of how the discourse of informality 
is constructed through the language and practices of activists, professionals, state 
officials, the media and other actors in spatial production in Namibia. The question 
was aimed at revealing the political dimension of this discourse by situating it 
historically, exploring its ideological underpinnings and reflecting on its 
implications for contemporary urbanisation in Namibia. 
 
I have established in CHAPTER 4 that urban areas were the locus of an 
exclusionary colonial modernity, while the majority of Africans was restricted to 
underdeveloped rural reserves. Gradual decolonisation, beginning from the late 
1970s, and the relaxing of movement restrictions for Africans allowed rural-urban 
migration in search of upward social mobility to gather momentum despite an 
increasing lack of formal urban employment. This led to symptoms of 
underdevelopment becoming increasingly apparent in urban areas from the 1980s 
onwards, including slum-formation, rising unemployment, and increasing 
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survivalist economic activities. In the process, urbanisation became correlated with 
underdevelopment and a strong anti-urban bias persists at the political level today. 
I further showed how professional spatial practice remained expert-led and 
steeped in colonial-modernist planning ideology, thereby re-producing inherited 
structural inequality. Together, I argued, these provided the conditions for a 
formal/informal binary to take root. 
 
In CHAPTER 5 I have demonstrated how the formal, Eurocentric way of organising 
society, space and the economy were established as the norm for development 
during the colonial period and entrenched in its legal foundations. This formal 
developmental paradigm continues to be construed as progressive, aspirational, 
regular, regulated, predictable, measurable, legal and democratic. Yet, this realm 
remains inaccessible for a large and growing majority of citizens. At the same time 
the concept of ‘informality’ emerging in urban theory from the 1970s onwards was 
constructed as the photographic negative of the formal urban imaginary. I argued 
that the discourse of informality provided an outwardly depoliticised mechanism for 
othering those who were unable to conform to the dominant normativity – mainly 
the black urban poor – just as they were nominally unchained from colonial 
oppression. By delegitimising the majority of citizens’ aspirations and everyday 
actions towards improving their livelihoods and their real contribution to post-
colonial national development, dominant capitalist and Eurocentric modes of 
development and the elite interests they serve are entrenched. 
 
By continuously construing ‘informality’ as not formal, conventional developmental 
discourse and planning practice offer formalisation as the only way to legitimise 
development, upholding the imaginary of a modern and orderly city. However, this 
happens in the absence of matching public resources allocated to enable such 
often costly formalisation and thus effectively generates the conditions of 
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‘informality’. In the context of an extreme, historically produced social inequality 
that would require radical redistributive state intervention to redress, this must be 
considered an apparatus of exclusion. 
8.1.2 Asserting the right to the city: learning from Herero Mall  
In this section I respond to the research question how people inhabit the Herero 
Mall socially, spatially, and economically. I aimed to account in ethnographic detail 
for the everyday life and spatial practices at the mall in order to deconstruct binary 
conceptualisations of the world of the ‘informal’ and rather create a positive image 
– again in the photographic sense – of the case study site. This, I hold, is required 
if we want to re-orient imaginaries of the urban in the Global South.  
 
In CHAPTER 5 I have demonstrated how the discourse of informality delegitimises 
the urban subaltern. However, such delegitimisation does not go unchallenged. In  
CHAPTER 6 I sketched how traders at the Herero Mall have established legitimacy 
through enacting their presence spatially and economically and how they 
defended it politically. I described this process as retrofitting the apartheid city 
through inserting popular economies into the gaps that modernist economic and 
spatial planning had created. These gaps include literally open spaces in the urban 
fabric but also gaps in economic planning that continues to be framed by formal 
employment as the sole basis of livelihoods. Through appropriating common 
resources such as open land and municipal services traders effectively 
accomplished their collective self-legitimisation and a degree of spatial re-
distribution from the ground up. Following Roy (see p49), I argue that by elevating 
the use value of the land over its exchange value as property, traders asserted their 
right to the city.  
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The popular economy at the Herero Mall spans a spectrum from survivalist to 
entrepreneurial activities that are networked at various scales including with formal 
enterprise and operate within wider circuits of distribution that reach far into the 
rural hinterland. These networks also provide the conduits for rural migrants to enter 
the city and nurture a process of becoming urban through spatial practice. While 
certainly creating differing degrees of vulnerability and social stratification, what is 
common to these activities is a transactional logic of economic interdependence, 
expressed through spatial proximity and an inherent mix of uses. Hence the 
popular conceptualisation of Herero Mall as mall or in the words of Nduezu as “one-
stop shop”. The density of social and economic interrelations determines the 
success and stability of the business and thus fundamentally subverts the 
foundational premise of rationalist zoning and land-use planning that remains at 
the core of planning practice in Namibia. 
 
The architecture of popular economies is borne out of a process-driven mode of 
urbanisation. It is inherently improvised, incremental, lightweight, flexible, and 
permeable, and offers people the possibility of personalising their experience 
unlike in more formalised settings. The distinction between interior and exterior 
spaces are blurred, creating a spatial continuum that challenges Eurocentric 
modernist conceptualisations of rational separation of functions, spaces and 
ownership. The socio-spatial setting of the Herero Mall also mediates the 
articulation and transformation of cultural difference and value systems which 
effectively resist the delegitimisation that the discourse of informality implies. The 
architecture and economy of Herero Mall, I argue, represent a process of 
decolonising the township from within, and point, in the words of Brenner (see p7), 
to an alter-urbanisation that holds critical lessons for Namibia’s urban future. 
Acknowledging these processes as pointing towards a radically different urban 
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future requires re-directing architectural practice to engage with this reality, as I 
will discuss next. 
 
8.1.3 Prospects of a critical spatial practice  
In this section I respond to the research question on what the potentials and 
limitations of spatial co-production methods are for design in the context of colonial 
socio-spatial legacies and the discourse of urban informality. This question allowed 
me to analyse my personal involvement at the mall over the years which provided 
the basis for the more general question of what the implications of co-production 
for professional spatial practice are in such contexts more generally. 
 
In CHAPTER 7 I highlighted the limitations of spatial co-production with traders 
while being commissioned and answerable to a local authority that has not yet 
embraced the socio-spatial transformations that it is undergoing and that retains a 
paternalistic approach towards the urban poor. With a public client with 
entrenched, pre-conceived normative ideas, processes and solutions, our 
expansive, co-productive methodology led to alienating traders on the one hand, 
and on the other hand our frustration of (initially) not being able to convince the 
local authority of the need to re-think its approach towards ‘informality’. A specific 
constraint for co-productive processes are public procurement protocols that are 
prescriptive and not accommodating of practice-based research. I showed that to 
deconstruct such resistance to co-production requires mediation between 
stakeholders in spatial production and that the university is perceived as a neutral 
platform to pursue such mediation. I have shown in Chapter 6 that in postcolonial 
Windhoek many residents do not derive legitimacy from ownership of land, but 
rather from commanding presence over publicly owned land. Here, tactical 
mediation by spatial practitioners can contribute to legitimising such practices and 
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revealing them as alternative pathways towards a more inclusive urban 
development. I demonstrated that while in physical terms the project for the 
development of the Herero Mall remains unfulfilled, exposing the local authority 
officials and traders to the potential of communal management of common 
resources through a co-productive process can counter preconceptions and 
change attitudes, effectively altering what Petrescu calls the “resistance of the 
real”.260 
 
I have further shown how engaging co-productive methods of mapping and design 
through large-scale models amongst others can contribute to developing a shared 
understanding of space between professionals and traders. Finally, I showed that 
the collaborative method of building, embedded in close observation of existing 
socio-spatial dynamics, can contribute to bridging the gap between theory and 
practice by materialising hypotheses and testing them in one and the same 
process.  Collaborative practice-based research in this way facilitates the 
imagination and appreciation of the potential for a new architecture and city to 
emerge. 
8.2 Reflection on theory and methods 
Early on I referred to the theoretical framework and the derivative methodological 
considerations for this study as eclectic. However, as my aim was always to effect 
transformation in theory and in practice, drawing from an array of seemingly 
incompatible theoretical positions was pertinent. Critical urban theory was 
fundamental in framing my overall outlook on the urban question and my 
 
 
260  My external examiner Prof Doina Petrescu used this term during my viva on 18 June 2020. It resonated 
 a lot with my experience throughout this project.  
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positionality as a spatial practitioner long before I commenced this doctoral study. 
It essentially directed me where to look and influenced the choice of the case study 
and my engagement with traders. Yet I found that it did not provide me with the 
methods to undertake my actual research. In order to theorise the discourse of 
informality I was required to look elsewhere, and Foucault’s methodologies of 
genealogy and archelogy provided clearer tools for analysis and interpretation of 
my interview-based data. At the same time, I found this lens to paint an incomplete 
picture with regards to understanding the complexity of the spaces I was engaging 
in. My re-conceptualisation of informality as everyday spatial practice was 
supported by Harvey’s understanding of spatio-temporality as well as Latour’s 
actor-network-theory which assigns agency to human subjects and to material 
objects alike. Again, I was not interested in a pure exploration of ANT but rather its 
applicability towards the socio-spatial setting that I was observing and entangled 
in. While ANT facilitated my own understanding and the visualisations of socio-
spatial complexity, it limited their usefulness for the originally envisioned co-
production of urban knowledge with traders. Finally, the methods and tools of the 
architect to envision, visualise and construct alternative futures were useful to 
weave together the various aspects of the study. 
8.3 Contribution of the thesis 
As outlined in the research objectives (see 1.2), through this study I aimed to make 
a contribution to critical urban theory from a Global South perspective as well as to 
a situated critical spatial practice that is framed in the former. I consider the 
following aspects as the main contributions I was able to make. 
8.3.1 Exposing the discourse of ‘informality’ as mechanism of exclusion  
The socio-economic and spatial legacies of colonialism in Namibia and Southern 
Africa are well researched and understood. However, this study contributes to the 
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understanding of how  those colonial legacies are re-produced in the interest of 
contemporary elites in Namibia, in other words presenting a critique of power (see 
p7). I argue that ‘informality’ is akin to a false self-evident truth after Foucault (see 
p13) that was able to emerge during the process of decolonisation. It is 
conventionally understood as a ‘not-yet’ developmental stage that perpetually 
keeps alive an elusive promise of formal, Eurocentric development for all. This 
imaginary had firmly been established during colonial times. I further argue that the 
discursive practice of producing and re-producing ‘informality’ through policy, 
media discourse, planning regulations, professional spatial practice and 
governance amounts to an apparatus of exclusion of the urban poor. While the 
Namibian elite can no longer be construed as solely white, the urban subalterns 
are certainly still overwhelmingly black, and othering ‘informal’ traders or ‘informal’ 
settlers can thus be construed as an inherently racist practice. This mechanism 
has progressively replaced earlier forms of overt race-based exclusion under 
apartheid. In this way, the discursive construct of ‘informality’ represents one of the 
more lasting exclusionary legacies of colonialism in Namibia and remains a 
powerful technology to divide and rule. 
8.3.2 Re-framing everyday urban practices as decolonising the apartheid city 
Decolonising ‘informality’ then requires the re-grounding of our normativity (see 
p10) to see the potential for more socially just urban futures. Brenner (2012) 
reminds us that the urban is the site, medium and outcome of historically situated 
power relations (see p7) that are continually socially contested. While the discourse 
of informality outlined above is a powerful mechanism, the everyday spatial and 
economic practices of the subaltern resist such exclusion. Instead of framing these 
practices as the binary opposite of the formal, and therefore rendering them 
illegitimate, as most of the literature on informality continues to do, this study 
contributes to understanding these practices for what they are. I contend that these 
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are re-distributive practices of self-legitimisation, asserting the right to the city 
through the spatial, economic and social enactment of presence in the cracks of 
the decomposing colonial urban spatial order. In other words, what we witness is 
the ongoing process and spatial manifestation of decolonising the apartheid city 
from below. The emerging spatio-economic order is propelled by popular 
economies that have an inherently transactional logic and thrive on the density of 
social and economic relationships, spatial continuity, mix of uses, flexibility and that 
are in perpetual transformation. In the process, normative modernist principles and 
imaginaries such as an industrial production-based urban economy, property 
rights, land use-based planning, and state-centred provision of services are 
subverted and de-centred, opening up the potential for alternative pathways 
towards a decolonial urban development. 
8.3.3 Re-orienting urban imaginaries through practice-based research 
In the charged field of contemporary urban politics in Namibia that I have outlined 
above, professional spatial practitioners can position themselves on a spectrum 
from being enforcers of the formal, disciplinary paradigm to becoming allies to the 
subaltern who through their everyday practices remind us that the post-colonial city 
remains an exclusionary realm. Herein lie the core politics of a critical practice. In 
choosing the latter position, it is not enough to transform physical space through 
conceptualising alternative spatial distributions that fill the history books of 
architecture, and which remains the primary skill being taught at architecture 
schools the world over. Nor is it enough to expose to the citizenry the extent of their 
exploitation within the capitalist urban order (see p61). A critical spatial practice, I 
argue, has to shape urban imaginaries by thinking and engaging across spatio-
temporalities that are diagrammatically represented in Harvey’s matrix of 
spatialities (see Table 1, p9). I have attempted to achieve this throughout my 
research as I have shown in Table 3 (see p241). Professionally engaging with those 
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who are discursively construed to fall short of the norm, requires the practitioner to 
see and fully appreciate their everyday spatial practices as a legitimate departure 
point for a different production of space. This requires expanding the 
methodological repertoire of architects beyond their technical skills to include 
qualitative research methods, strategies and methods for co-production, critical 
engagement with policy and institutions of power, but also with everyday dynamics 
of complex social formations and their inherent politics. A co-productive, practice-
based research framed by a critical stance provides the opportunity to shape not 
only spatial outcomes, but also processes of knowledge production, modes of 
representation and discourse itself. I have shown that drawing from diverse 
theoretical positions and mediating them through a co-productive spatial practice 
promises to transform collective imaginaries of a radically different urban future. 
8.3.4 Decolonising ‘informality’ 
I consider the first two aspects as my contribution to a situated critical urban theory 
and as the main contribution of this thesis: on the one hand exposing the discourse 
of ‘informality’ as an exclusionary practice of power in post-apartheid Namibia, 
while on the other hand re-conceptualising the conditions of ‘urban informality’ as 
everyday practices of socio-spatial decolonisation. The third aspect of my 
contribution is the re-orientation of the dominant planning and developmental 
imaginaries by weaving together the previous two aspects through co-productive 
practice-based research. 
8.4 Relevance and potential for generating impact 
Having outlined above my contributions, I will now elaborate their relevance for 
different contexts, the potential impact they might have for different audiences and 
via which pathways such impact might be realised. The first contribution on 
informality as exclusionary practice has relevance for re-thinking the discourse of 
  286 
urban informality elsewhere in the Global South where colonial, Eurocentric 
modernity and its spatial manifestations have always been only partially realised 
yet continue to shape political and developmental aspirations. It will be mostly of 
interest to academic audiences who engage with urban theory more generally and 
the Global South in particular. But it might also be of use to practitioners and 
activists and those involved in challenging hegemonic notions. Chapter 4 and 5 will 
provide the core material for international academic publications that will position 
the lessons from the Namibian case within wider urban and planning theory. In 
addition, these insights will find their way into postgraduate programmes in 
architecture and planning as well as into the evolving research agenda of an 
emergent trans-disciplinary research centre focusing on ‘land, livelihoods and 
housing’ at my university. 
 
The second contribution on the emerging decolonial architecture and urban 
popular economies at the Herero Mall might seem at first sight to be of relevance 
only for Namibia. However, the urgency for spatial practitioners to see the urban 
future that already exists before their eyes, rather than looking elsewhere – and 
more often than not towards the Global North – for developmental models and 
theory is equally pressing if the right to the city is to be realised in other Global 
South contexts. The approach to practice that I have outlined in this thesis may 
thus be of relevance much further afield. The different methods I explored, largely 
contained in Chapter 6, will form the basis for international academic publications 
in the architectural and planning fields. To achieve local impact the insights will be 
processed into educational modules for a planned cross-disciplinary postgraduate 
curriculum centred around the issue of informal settlement upgrading. This 
programme aims to reach beyond academia to include community activists, private 
and non-governmental spatial practitioners and local and central government 
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officials, building on the expanded notion of spatial practitioners I advanced in this 
study.  
 
The aspect of re-orienting urban development imaginaries is an ongoing process 
in Namibia and elsewhere. By engaging local and central government, as well as 
organised trader groups an impact on the ongoing process of informal economy 
policy reform is expected. Again, the university is seen as a useful platform to 
advance this aim through various forms of public engagement. Certainly, the 
relationship with the Herero Mall Traders Committee will be a useful avenue to 
further this goal. The potential for an alternative professional spatial practice that 
flows from the various insights above I have only been able to scratch at the surface 
during this study. In the true meaning of the word, this potential will have to continue 
to be realised in and through practice. 
8.5 Limitations of the study 
At the end of an endeavour as long and complex as a doctoral research project, 
and certainly through the act of writing, its limitations are foregrounded. For an 
ethnography of this sort certainly my major limitation was the language barrier. Not 
able to speak Otjiherero created a filter even when I was deeply involved and 
present at the mall. I fully accept this as a legitimate check on my privileges and 
access as a researcher and understand it as an inherent aspect of the post-colonial 
urban politics that I was studying.  
 
Secondly, basing my participatory engagement at the site on my relationship with 
the traders’ committee allowed it to function, at times intentionally, as a gatekeeper. 
For example, throughout the study I did not manage to engage employees of the 
business owners, which certainly reflects in the outcomes of the study. The fact 
that the committee itself is not universally accepted as the rightful representative of 
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all traders also meant that my presence continued to be regarded with some 
suspicion. Again, I accept this limitation as a consequence of deriving a doctoral 
study from an on-going practice that is already compromised before the start of the 
project.  
 
Thirdly, it is also in the nature of practice-based research that it does not progress 
in tune with the academic cycles and rhythms of university life. While I highly 
appreciated the structured nature of my doctoral programme with its annual 
progress reviews, this often meant that during the periods leading up to a review 
my attention was primarily focused on writing. This often translated into prolonged 
periods of absence from the site with an impact on the potentials of the participatory 
project. 
 
Fourthly, although the University of Westminster External Research Degree Study 
Scheme allowed me to be based in Namibia for the full duration of my studies and 
thereby made this project possible in the first place, a limitation was that I could 
not benefit from the university’s comprehensive Doctoral Researcher Development 
Programme over the years. This study would have profited from receiving feedback 
on work-in-progress through academic exchanges, seminars and conferences. 
 
Besides these practical limitations, a more theoretical limitation was that my overall 
objective to re-conceptualise the vast and multifarious theme of ‘informality’ 
perhaps remained too broadly formulated. It is my conviction that it takes a 
generalist to engage with topics of contemporary urbanisation in their full 
complexity, which requires deciding which aspects of the research to include and 
which to leave out. From this flows the need for future research that I will elaborate 
on in the next and final section. 
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8.6 Opportunities for future research 
This study is part of a larger and on-going practice and further research on a 
number of aspects is required to lend depth to the picture that I have begun to 
trace in this thesis. These would include elaborating on the self-governance 
mechanisms of the traders’ committee including their relationship with the organs 
of state and other stakeholders; expanding on the social stratification amongst 
traders; tracing the internal processes within the local authority and other relevant 
state institutions that deal with developmental aspects; exploring the transition from 
traditional rural ways of life to ‘becoming urban’ and the ways in which places like 
the mall facilitate this process; examining the impact of the Herero Mall on its 
immediate neighborhood; investigating popular economic networks and their 
linkages at the scale of the city and wider territories which I could only hint at here; 
and finally exploring the economic measurability of popular economies. More 
importantly, beyond my own conceptualisation of popular economies presented 
here, it would be worthwhile exploring ways of reviewing and crafting these 
conceptualisations together with traders and others who have been involved in this 
study.  
 
The aspect of re-thinking architectural and planning practice leaves much room for 
further elaboration. On the one hand this can be done through studying other 
international and local co-productive spatial practices and their methods more 
widely. But given the implications for professional spatial practice of re-considering 
‘informal’ urbanisation as an ongoing decolonial process, the most fruitful avenue 
for pursuing an alternative spatial practice is through practice itself. This is the 
pathway that I am looking forward to. 
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APPENDICES 
A1 fold-out plan of Herero Mall in 2019, indicating the office and meeting hall that 
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A0 fold-out media review timeline 2007-2014. The media review was undertaken 
by the author as part of the feasibility study (Delgado and Lühl, 2014), and 
visualised by Guillermo Delgado.  
 
  
2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014
2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014
Jan Feb Mar Apr May Jun Jul Aug Sep Oct Nov Dec Jan Feb Mar Apr May Jun Jul Aug Sep Oct Nov Dec Jan Feb Mar Apr May Jun Jul Aug Sep Oct Nov Dec Jan Feb Mar Apr May Jun Jul Aug Sep Oct Nov Dec Jan Feb Mar Apr May Jun Jul Aug Sep Oct Nov Dec Jan Feb Mar Apr May Jun Jul Aug Sep Oct Nov Dec Jan Feb Mar Apr May Jun Jul Aug Sep Oct Nov Dec
Jan Feb Mar Apr May Jun Jul Aug Sep Oct Nov Dec Jan Feb Mar Apr May Jun Jul Aug Sep Oct Nov Dec Jan Feb Mar Apr May Jun Jul Aug Sep Oct Nov Dec Jan Feb Mar Apr May Jun Jul Aug Sep Oct Nov Dec Jan Feb Mar Apr May Jun Jul Aug Sep Oct Nov Dec Jan Feb Mar Apr May Jun Jul Aug Sep Oct Nov Dec Jan Feb Mar Apr May Jun Jul Aug Sep Oct Nov Dec
14.07.2011 Nuwe slag by Herero Mall
• Mr Katutire Kaura (DTA) complained about the police being biased in a conflict between Councillor Kandjii and the owner of Kapana Bar at HM, Mrs Sigwogedi
• Even though Mrs Sigwogedi laid claims first at the Police station, officers said they will get in trouble and that she should wait for the Station Superintendent (not sure about the real English term). 
• At 14:00 Mr Kandjii himself entered the Police Station to lay claims, after which Mrs Sigwogedi was briefly arrested for noise disturbance, crimen injuria (???) and physical violence
• Mr Kandjii was alleged to misuse his powers, and that he wants to close down HM in order to get people to come to his close-by shop, or sell the land to a millionaire to develop it "properly"
• Mr Kaura told Mr Kandjii that it will not be affordable for small scale traders if the land would end up in rich-man's hands
21.07.2011 Traangas bij Herero Mall
• Tear gas used by national and City police on saturday night to enforce 19:00 closing time
• Some residents claimed that the camouflage uniforms of Special Forces (???) were also present
• Tear gas landed in residential areas spreading fear
• Ben Kandundu claimed that enforcing closing times on HM is not right, as they suffer loss of income which is higher after 19:00
22.08.2007 Koning se seun sterf glo onder klippe, mes
• Man killed on 18.08.2007 after being attacked by about 30 people with rocks, Kieries and a knife
• Rodney !Nuwuseb was the 35 year old son of Damara King Justus //Garoëb
• Apparently the second murder at HM
14.12.2007 Stad redeneer oor Herero Mall
• Debate around sale of erven at Herero Mall distribution of electrical substation has been postponed during Municipality's monthly meeting.
• Originally it was decided that erf 6300 could be used as informal market and that erf R/6296 should be sold to the Ovaherero traditional authority and used as institutional purposes
• Currently there are 14 food businesses, 1 butchery, 1 video shop, 1 music shop, 4 vraghouers (???), 8 shebeens, 2 car washes, 2 shoe repairs, 1 wheel repair shop, 1 car repair, 2 welders, a panel beater, and a trailer hire
• In 1999 Municipality approved proposal to sell both erven to the Husea Kutako Foundation
• Sale of erf 6300 was undersigned on 27 September 2002, but before transaction of erf R/6296 was signed, Municipality discovered that there was a electrical sub-station on the erf
• Husea Kutako Foundation fell in arrears with payments for erf 6300 and so the sale was cancelled on 7 April 2006
• In 2006 the Ovaherero Traditional Authority applied to buy the two erven which was approved by the city on August 30th 2006
• First erf 6300 would be sold at a subsidized rate of N$ 32,66 per square meter (total N$ 44 937 plus 15% VAT), then the remaining erf R/6296 would be sold at subsidized rate of N$ 32,66 per square meter (total N$ 231 232 plus 15% VAT) upon implementation of town planning and cadastre procedures
• City Council member Benestus Kandundu claimed that the sale of the land to the Traditional Authority would prevent the development of an open market at HM 
03.05.2010 Steeds geen beslissing oor Herero Mall
• Concerned residents approached Municipality CEO to do something about HM: noise pollution, children and students cannot study, property values are decreasing, people cannot access their houses as HM clients park on the sidewalks, alcohol abuse, drunkenness, explicit sex, swearing, public indecency, fights
• City council recommends that erf 6300 with 1300m2 should be sold to Ovaherero TA for subsidized price of N$ 110 200 (it was evaluated for N$ 64 000 in 2002)
• All traders should be evicted
• Larger erf R.6296 needs to be subdivided to accomodate sub station
• Title deeds need to specify that TA needs to get Municipality approval in the case of future sale of the property
• Entrance from Clemens Kapuuo Str is not allowed
• 6 informal entrepreneurs started to settled at HM
• In 2007 there were already 37 businesses
• In 1999 Municipality approved the sale of two erven to Hosea Kutako Foundation
• There was disagreement with Municipality over the proposal by Ovaherero TA to re-zone the erven to residential use, which Municpality saw as a hidden agenda
13.08.2008 Uitsluitsel oor Herero Mall glo gou
• Bone of contention is the sale / lease of the two erven of HM
• City Council member Mr Claasen (UDF) said existing traders need to be taken into account: "It is lively and we cannot deprive people of their right to make a living"
• Municipality agreed that erf 6300 should be used as informal market, and erf R/6296 should be subdivided to accomodate the electrical sub station on a 52m2 erf and the remaining 7080 should be sold to Ovaherero TA for N$ 231 232
• Sale of erf R/6296 should be subject to conditions: Ovaherero TA should not use the land for residential purposes or business activities; sale should not be finalized until traders and residents are evicted; Municiplaity should be responsible for the eviction of traders and residents; applicant can lease the land for 10% of the sale amount with annual increases based in inflation
• It was also planned to rezone and subdivide both erven into residential and sold on tender basis
• Traders were supposed to be evicted, including those that trade only on weekends. They were requested to apply for alternative parcels
• Alcohol should be banned
03.08.2012 Herero Mall blij n kopseer vir stadsraad
• Shebeen owners petitioned CoW to extend business hours from its current 07:00 to 19:00 agreement. Proposal to extend hours to 07:00 - 22:00 and 07:00 - 24:00 on weekends
• CoW Strategic Committee for Economic Development and Community Service (translated from Afrikaans, not sure of official name) had no problem with extending hours, but no alcohol is allowed to be sold or consumed at Herero Mall
• Some council members complained about this decision, but Mayor Elaine Trepper insisted that since the intervention of the City and the police there were no more complaints
• Feasibility study will be commissioned by CoW to finalize the future of Herero Mall
• HM concerns include: excessive alcohol abuse, alcohol abuse by minors, explicit sex, swearing, public indecency (urinating in public ect) and unsafe structures.
26.07.2011 Herero Mall n doring in polisie-vlees
• 223 claims laid at police regarding HM over last five years
• 3 murders in the last 3 years
• Most recent incident was the death of a 23-year-old man allegedly killed by police officers (???) 
• Halfway through 2011 already 36 crime incidents incl. one murder, 7 serious injuries, 5 of opposition to a police officer, and 4 of demolition of property
• Kaima Riruako claimed that HM is being singled out by police while other places in the city sell alcohol 
28.07.2011 RDP bepleit orde by Herero Mall
• RDP press statement
• City fathers were urged to maintain order at HM in humane way, as HM is a microcosm of economic situation of the country
• Even though development in the area is informal and uncontrolled, they provide fertile soil for development of local economies
• The community suffers from high unemployment, uncontrolled urbanization, high levels of poverty and difficult circumstances for economic growth
• RDP requests Municipality to develop HM into economic business units, to enable community members to sustain their livelihoods
• The existing business conditions should be improved, not undermined
• Restrictions of opening times will lead to greater struggle
• Once Municipality erects appropriate structures it will be in state to control opening hours, and raise appropriate taxes and rates
• HM controversy should not be politicised
• Murder of Hange Ngisiro (23) on 10 July 2011 was not killed by police as reported erroneously
22.08.2011 SPYL se sy se oor Herero Mall, asgate
• SPYL recommends that government should give financial support to small scale entrepreneurs and avail access to markets
• NOTHING TO REPORT !!!!!
09.08.2011 Mall-geweld skud stad wakker
• A second violent confrontation between HM traders / clients and police in a month's time after years of inaction
• Councillor Ambrosius Kandjii petitioned city council to take a decision on the crime and noise hot-spot
• Two days after a meeting between HM committe and CoW CEO Niilo Taapopi the police again used tear gas against traders / clients that did not want to abide by the official closing time. Again, neighboring residents were affected byt eh tear gas
• Taapopi maintained that CoW does not have jurisdiction over the police, but that its mandate is to uphold law and order
• Some arrests were made
• HM committee alleged that it was not consulted about the restrictions of opening times by the Municipality
• The police was alleged to appear at different times each night, increasing confusion about the opening times
• In May 2010 CoW approved to sell a small erf to the Ovaherero Traditional Authority for a subsidized price for institutional purposes. The requirement was that illegal traders would be evicted, and the part of the Mall would be developed.
10.08.2011 Raadslid verwerp verpersoonliking van Mall-herrie
• Councillor Kandjii rejects allegations that the police handling of HM was alleged to be on his account
• Kandjii is of the opinion that the place need to be developed properly
• did not want to comment on the on going case against a Shebeen owner that he was involved in
• The media attention regarding the police handling of HM seems to be a organized attempt to delegitimize law enforcement according to Kandjii
11.08.2011 Stad soek vrede met Mall
• One of the options is to re-zone the erf
• NOTHING TO REPORT
16.08.2011 Werk saam bij Mall - Mbumba
• Minister of Safety and Security Nangolo Mbumba reiterated that the police has the constitutional mandate to maintain law and order in the country with reference to confrontation in the preceding months at HM
• He further stated that the HM incident has been unnecessarily politicized which takes away focus from social concerns surrounding HM
• The statement makes clear that HM is established on Municipal land and zoned for institutional use
• Activities that do not have the consent of the owner (CoW) are deemed illegal
• Crime at HM happens mainly after 19:00 
• Crime includes murder, rape, aanranding (???), theft, violation of traffic regulations, illegal tapping of electricity, illegal sale of alcohol
• Statement rejects violence against law enforcement officers
18.08.2011 Kommunistiese Party gee raad oor Herero Mall
• Communist party led by Mr Attie Beukes expressed unease about the police's handling of violent confrontations at HM
• He labelled the police actions as provocative, unjust, and discriminating against local entrepreneurs
• Meaningful dialogue can only happen in the absence of armed powers
• He alleged the police actions against HM traders to be racially discriminating one tribe while other tribes are not subject to similar clampdown
• He claimed that the mushrooming of shebeens and other small businesses to be a consequence of the deteriorating socio-economic condition of the densely populated areas of the country
• City council was asked to improve sanitation and security in the area
18.04.2012 Herero Mall: Nuwe klagte oor brutale polisie
• Chairman of HM committee Niklaas Tjikuzu alleged that police enforces closure of HM even before the agreed 19:00 closing time
• Jackson Kamaze alleges that lack of Afrikaans and English proficiency on the side of police officers increases misunderstandings
• Traders allege that the police enforces the trading hours on the basis of Namibian summer time (???)
• Traders request police to wear name tags to be able to be indetified
• HM Committee member claims that Municipality rejected proposal to erect a fence around the area to increase control
• Break-ins at the shops are left unattended by police
• Tjikuzu said that high-level talks with Head of City Police supt. Abraham Kanime, CoW CEO Niilo Taapopi, National Police Head lt. gen. Sebastian Ndeitunga, and Minster of Safety and Security Nangolo Mbumba did not unfold as expected
• The talks happend after Councillor Kandjii evades meeting with traders since July of the preceding year
• Traders proposed to organize a march to increase public awareness of the situation
06.11.2012 Parliamentarians visit trading areas in Windhoek
• Committee led by NUDO MP Arnold Tjihuiko (incl SWAPO MP Maureen Jankowski, SWANU MP Usutuajie Maamberua, and RDP MP Jesaya Nyamu) visited HM, Single Quarters and Eveline Street on Saturday 03.11.2012 BETWEEN 18:00 and 21:00
• Noticed that traders at HM operate under unhygienic conditions, concerned with noise pollution and disturbance of households and school children
• Committee happy about Single Quarters market and new kapana braai stands






14.12.2009 Raub - Autodiebstahl
• An Isuzu car has been stolen at the parking area of Herero Mall
26.07.2011 Gericht bestätigt Ladenschluss
• 5 business people based at HM filed a case at High Court, arguing that 19:00 - 07:00m curfew is discriminating and adversely affecting
• Previously business was open until 22:00 during weekdays and until 24:0 on Fridays and Saturdays
• Allegations were made that the curfew was initiated by councillor Kandjii.
• the case has been dismissed
26.07.2011 Strenges Auftreten gegenüber Barackenbars
• 2007 21 Police cases, 2009 74 cases, 2011 July already 36 case
08.08.2011 Übers Ziel hinausgeschossen (Editorial)
• Negligence and illegal behaviour of the Police Special Force that fired tear-gas beyond the protesters at Herero Mall deep into residential areas, affecting residents that were not involved in the conflict. 
• Allegations that tear-gas was intentionally fired at mainly Herero-speaking residential areas by mainly Oshiwambo-speaking Police Force
• 19:00 - 07:00 curfew installed by CoW does not apply to Single Quarters area dominated by Oshiwambo-speaking Shebeen owners
• CoW and Police should invoke fair and equal treatment
08.08.2011 Durch Tränengas vertrieben
• Police fired 30 tear gas "bullets" to disperse Herero Mall crowd, but also deep into residential areas to the north and east of Herero Mall
• Many neighbouring residents were already in bed at 21:00 when the tear gas was fired, and had to leave their houses due to the tear gas, some even throwing up as a result of the exposure to tear gas 
• Eye witnesses allege that bottles and stones were thrown at the Police
• Live ammunition was used to fire warning shots into the air
11.08.2011 Ermittlung fraglich
• Police deputies Major General Vilho Hifindaka and Major General James Tjivikua did not want to comment on the AZ inquiry into the use of tear gas at Herero Mall. They did not reveal if the matter was being investigated internally
16.08.2011 Mindestgewalt angewandt
• Minister of Justice Mbumba reacted to allegations of use of violence against residents and protesters at Herero Mall
• Claimed that police officers were "exposed to life threatening and direct attacks"
• Reminded the land of Herero Mall is not private but Municipal land earmarked for institutional use
• Society is negatively impacted by illegal trade according to Minister (alcoholism and noise pollution)
• Rising crime at Herero Mall includes murder, rape, fights, and car theft, disrespect of traffic rules, and illegal electricity connections
• Shebeen are only allowed on private and not on public land, only in solid brick buildings (not corrugated iron shacks) and they need to register to open beyond usual business hours (NEED FOR FURTHER RESEARCH)
• A curfew from 19:00 - 07:00 was agreed upon as an interim solution
• Minister regrets use of tear gas, but stresses that Namibia's reputation as constitutional state and Windhoek's image as clean city should be maintained
02.05.2013 Herero Mall zur Sanierung
• Study supported by Friedrich Ebert Stiftung proposes renovation concept
• Major interest group is NISO Namibian Informal Sector Organization
• Neighbouring residents complained about noise and criminal activity
• Shebeen owners - mainly women and youth - complain that other shebeen areas such as single quarters are not subject to harsh police treatment
• Study proposed large noise-insulated cultural and conference facility
• Study proposed to solve the hygienic problems
• The existence of shebeens was not questioned by anyone at the public meeting, incl. Khomas governor Laura McLeod
08.08.2011 Police and residents clash at HM (Nico Smit)
• Police clash with unruly crowds at HM who were operating without licenses
• Traders at HM refused to adhere to the work 7h00 to 7h00 rule 
• Police used teargas to disperse crowd, residents had to vacate their houses and wait for the teargas to dissipate.
10.08.2011 Swanu probes HM unrest (Nico Smit)
• Swanu sends two team man to investigate HM
• Following recent shootings of police officers previous Friday 
• Two HM traders appeared before Magistrate for assaulting  Police offices
20.08.2007 Namibian press agency (Nampa)
• A 35 year old, Rodney Nuwuseb was murdered at HM at round 04h00 in the morning after a quarrel with a group of other people. Nuwuseb sustained multiple head injuries.
31.08.2007 Let us tear down: HM (Alfredo Tjiurimo Hengari)
• Describes it a Booze mall, comparing it to Cosmopolitan Roppongi, a social entertainment area in Tokyo, a place that does help shaping a new positive Namibian Identity
• HM shows that youth at the mall are marginalised, hence the prominence  of young criminals
• CoW must tear down HM and provide those who frequent the mall a proper place for entertainment
07.09.2007 In defence of HM (Barney Karuuombe)
•  Defending against Hengari opinion piece on HM
• Inaccurate and fictitious written from a parochial tourist point of view
• Not everyone drinks alcohol, not may youths come there (Refutes all claims by Hengari)
• Did interviews with people at HM, who turned down calls to tear down HM
• Respect the diversity  of different groups of society, HM has its free for all atmosphere and is not only for the Ovaherero but for all People
• Tearing down HM is not the way to end all social evils
• Accused Maerua mall of being a spot for unruly youth who abuse alcohol, violent behaviour and crimes
• Most where unemployed and have gained a living at HM
14.09.2007 Last word on the HM (Alfredo Tjiurimo Hengari)
• Compares HM to Guantanamo bay, where allegedly terrorists are taken by the US goverment for interrogation
• It exists with good intentions but it cannot be justified
• HM traders have good intentions but noise pollution et cetera
• CoW should develop place
• Guard against becoming reclusive
21.09.2007 Cultural Inertia (Andrew Wright)
• Must work together as Namibians 
• Culture is dynamic
• Namibians should guard against becoming reclusive and framing issues exclusively in communitarian or tribal framework.
13.12.2007 City Council stumped by HM (Brigitte Weidlich)
• City councillors in a fix on what to do with HM space
• Over 300 illegal vendors trade in area
•  A decision to sell place  to traditional Authorities was considered and pushed to next year
• Councillor Benestus Kandundu urged the need for the views of HM traders to be heard before any decision was taken
• Deemed it as unfair to take the land away from people, despite the fact that the plot belongs to municipal
• Ovaherero Traditional Authority applied to buy the land which is not just a traditional body but a company
• Matter pushed to January for further discussions
14.07.2011 HM shebeen saga gets a political flavour (Selma Shipanga)
• Kandjii attacked by one of the traders, after he was summoned to address the noise emanating from HM
• DTA’s Katuutire Kaura involved in the quest to resolve issue about the assault
• One of the traders went to open a case, but held at bay until Kandjii opened against her resulting in her arrest
• Kandjii accused of using his power as a councillor to deal with the issue
• Case was postponed to August 11
18.07.2011 Police take action on HM (Shinovene Immanuel)
• Nampol decides to close shebeens at HM
• Ambrosius Kandjii involved in a brawl with shebeen owners
• Teargas affects children of residents living nearby
• Severe effects of teargas on women and children
• It’s a racial thing
• Why not eveline street, HM traders asked
21.07.2011 ‘Immoral’ HM in Katutura regulated (Denver Kistings)
• Niilo Taapopi, CoW’s CEO described HM as immoral, unsanitary place where prostitutions, homosexuality thrives.
• HM must operate within 7h00 to 7h00 for security reasons
• City to come up with a resolution  that would restore law and order at HM
• Rezone HM to a residential area, or a formal market
25.07.2011 HM case falls flat (Werner Menges)
• Attempts to get High Court to prevent the restriction of operating hours at HM were dismissed.
• Five had wanted to have the court issue an interdict against Inspector general Ambrosius Kandjii for  discriminating against six  traders on the basis of their ethnic origins
• Some admit to running shebeens without licenses
• Felt crackdown of their sheebeens is a racial issue
03.04.2013 Herero mall to be renamed (Nomhle Kangootui)
• The CoW has announced plans to re-name mallBlame for delay of development Namibian Informal Sector Organisation (NISO)
• Loss of trust in the CoW
• City promises development in six months’ time
• City to propose name
• Retaliation: opposing name change
17.08.2011 Police tackle HM problems (Staff reporter)
• Nangolo Mbumba appeal for law enforcement agencies to return HM back to the hands of its illegal occupants
• HM operates 7h00 to 7h00
• Use of teargas regrettable
• HM has been politicalised, concerns of nearby schools
• Safety and security issues raised
• HM was zoned for institutions that will positively shape community
• Condemnation of  police presence at HM
• Comparison of HM with eveline street, which is allowed to grow vigorously without any restrictions
• Accusations that police presence at HM is political discrimination against one tribe
03.10.2011 Katutura HM to become formal settlement (Nico Smit)
• Plans by CoW to develop HM
• HM won’t be allowed to run sheebeens after area is formalised
• City council passed a resolution to see a formal market developed at erf /6296 Katutura (HM)
• HM provides 70 traders business
• 32 of the 70 traders are shebeens traders
• Police used teargas, pepper spray to close place and dispersed people in July 2011
• August 2011, police used pepper spray and rubber bullets to subdue an unruly mob who pelted enforcement officers with rocks and glass bottles
• Light industrial jobs will not be allowed
• CoW will not be able to provide HM traders a temporary place to sell while development takes place
13.04.2012 HM traders want trading hours extended (Herman Kangootui)
• Call on CoW to reconsider trading hours
• Complains that business have gone broke because of the hour restrictions
• 40 business have closed down and 400 workers have lost their jobs
• Request for 10h00 to 22h00 during weekdays and 10hoo to 24h00 
• Police are accused of manhandling business owners and closing sheebeens at 18h00 
14.06.2012 Traders want more hours (Herman Kangootui)
• HM gives CoW a deadline to reconsider trading hours (June 20)
• Over 50 marched to WHK municipality to hand over a petition
• Mayor not there to receive petition out of town.
• HM has a committee (Chairperson Nicklass Tjikuzu) 
• Change hours from 7h00 to 24h00 on weekends
• Threatened to demonstrate everyday till their demands are heard.
21.06.2012 Police crackdown on sheebeens (Herman Kangootui)
• Police closes down illegal sheebeens
• Police confiscates alcohol at HM 
• Closes bars at HM
• Community members ask for gorvt to relax rules for small business
28.09.2011 RESOLUTION 271/09/2013
• Namibia Informal Sector Organisation (NISO) request for training through education sharing and community participation to Herero Mall traders with regards to crime prevention, law enforcement, social conduct and mutual respect is granted.
• Alcohol trade not accommodated and traders encouraged to identify alternative business opportunities or consider relocation to suitable trading premises.
26.09.2013 RESOLUTION 271/09/2013
• Council awards feasibility study to LaRRI
• No spray painting/mechanical activities and alcohol sale be allowed at the market
27.03.2013 RESOLUTION 66/03/2013
• A feasibility study is deemed necessary and the construction of the market commenced within six months after.
• The naming of the market should be reconsidered by the Street and Place Name Committee
31.07.2012 RESOLUTION 249/07/2012
• The feasibility study on Herero Mall is deemed a matter of urgency.
• The petition of extension of operating hours at Herero Mall not supported.
• The council deems allegation of acts on tribalism on behalf of the City in regards to the issue of Herero Mall un-substantive.
MEDIA REVIEW TIMELINE
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Participant Information Sheet 
  
PARTICIPANT INFORMATION SHEET 
 
RETHINKING ARCHITECTURAL PRACTICE AS AN ACTIVE AGENT OF DECOLONIZATION IN 
NAMIBIA  
 
Researcher:  Phillip Lühl (E: w1562465@my.westminster.ac.uk, T: +264 (0)81 679 8394) 
Supervisor:  Dr Lindsay Bremner 
 
You are invited to take part in a research study, which focuses on the development of 
"Herero Mall" informal market in Windhoek as a case study for understanding how traders 
and residents, as well as other stakeholders can be integrated in the development and 
design process in meaningful ways so that they become co-producers of their own living and 
working environment.  
 
This research is being undertaken as part of the researcher’s studies for PhD programme at 
the University of Westminster, London, UK. 
 
The study might involve you in: 
1. Unstructured, in-depth interviews 
2. Spatial mapping of the case study area 
3. Participant observation by the researcher 
4. Photographic survey of the case study area 
5. Spatial interventions in the case study area 
 
Please note: 
• Your participation in this research is entirely voluntary. 
• You have the right to withdraw at any time without giving a reason. 
• Wherever practicable, withdrawal from the research will not affect any treatment and/or services that you 
receive. 
• You have the right to ask for your data to be withdrawn as long as this is practical, and for personal 
information to be destroyed.  
• You do not have to answer particular questions either on questionnaires or in interviews if you do not wish 
to do so. 
• Your responses will normally be made anonymous, unless indicated above to the contrary, and will be kept 
confidential unless you provide explicit consent to do otherwise, for example, the use of your image from 
photographs and/or video recordings.  
• [NOTE: it may not be possible to maintain confidentiality in certain circumstances, e.g. where issues of child 
safety have been identified. You should seek clarification from the researcher and/or their supervisor if you 
are concerned about this]. 
• No individuals should be identifiable from any collated data, written report of the research, or any 
publications arising from it. 
• All computer data files will be encrypted and password protected. The researcher will keep files in a secure 
place and will comply with the requirements of the Data Protection Act.  
• All hard copy documents, e.g. consent forms, completed questionnaires, etc. will be kept securely and in a 
locked cupboard, wherever possible on University premises. Documents may be scanned and stored 
electronically. This may be done to enable secure transmission of data to the university’s secure computer 
systems. 
• Please notify the researcher immediately if any adverse symptoms arise during or after the research. 
• If you wish you, can receive information on the results of the research. Please indicate on the consent form 
if you would like to receive this information. 
• The researcher can be contacted during and after participation by email  
• If you have a complaint about this research project you can contact the project supervisor, Lindsay Bremner 
by e-mail L.Bremner@westminster.ac.uk or by telephone +44 (0)20 7911 5000 ext 66848 
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Consent Form 
   
CONSENT FORM 
 
RETHINKING ARCHITECTURAL PRACTICE AS AN ACTIVE AGENT OF DECOLONIZATION IN 
NAMIBIA 
 
Lead researcher:  Phillip Lühl (E: w1562465@my.westminster.ac.uk, T: +264 (0)81 679 8394) 
 
  
I have been given the Participation Information Sheet and/or had its contents 
explained to me.  
 
Yes     r No    r 
I have had an opportunity to ask any questions and I am satisfied with the 
answers given. 
 
Yes     r No    r 
I understand I have a right to withdraw from the research at any time and I do 
not have to provide a reason. 
 
Yes     r No    r 
I understand that if I withdraw from the research any data included in the 
results will be removed if that is practicable (I understand that once 
anonymised data has been collated into other datasets it may not be possible 
to remove that data). 
Yes     r No    r 
 
I would like to receive information relating to the results from this study. 
 
Yes     r No    r 
I wish to receive a copy of this Consent Form. 
 
Yes     r No    r 
I confirm I am willing to be a participant in the above research study. 
 
Yes     r No    r 
I note the data collected may be retained in an archive and I am happy for my 
data to be reused as part of future research activities.  I note my data will be 
fully anonymised (if applicable). 
Yes     r No    r 
 
Participant’s Name:     
 
 
Signature:       Date:   
 
This consent form will be stored separately from any data you provide so that your 
responses remain anonymous. 
____________________________________________________________________ 
 
I confirm I have provided a copy of the Participant Information Sheet approved by the 
Research Ethics Committee to the participant and fully explained its contents. I have given 
the participant an opportunity to ask questions, which have been answered.  
 
Researcher’s Name:  Phillip Lühl 
  
 
Signature:        Date:  
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Business survey guide 
  
PhD Phillip Lühl: Informal Economy Survey Guide  Date/time:  
1. General Info 
1.1.  Name  
1.2.  Age  
1.3.  Gender  
1.4.  Place of birth  
1.5.  Place of residence  
1.6.  No of dependents  
1.7.  At HM since when?  
 
2. Economic Activity 
2.1.  Business name  
2.2.  Business type  
2.3.  Labor status  
2.4.  Working hours  
2.5.  How long does the business exist  
2.6.  Land occupied  
2.7.  Business registered and/or licensed  
2.8.  Levels and regularity of income  
2.9.  Trading fees, levies etc.  
2.10.  Production and/or supply chains  
2.11.  Formal-informal economy linkages  
2.12.  Competition and/or collaboration 
with other businesses 
 
2.13.  Symbiotic relationship with adjacent 
properties 
 
2.14.  Service provision  
2.15.  Customer base and dependency   
2.16.  Credit facilities  
 
 
Map the extent of one product  




PhD Phillip Lühl: Informal Economy Survey Guide  Date/time:  
3. Social Structure 
3.1.  Customer relationships  
3.2.  Landlord relationships  
3.3.  Business owner-employee 
relationships 
 
3.4.  Business-competition relationship  
3.5.  Business-formal business 
relationships 
 
3.6.  Business-authorities relationships  
3.7.  Cultural specificity of trade  
3.8.  Time spent economic activity vs 
organizing 
 
3.9.  How do traders get recruited?  
3.10. Why / how arrived at HM? How did 
they find out? Through which social 
structures? 
 
3.11. Who decided where structures can 











4. Spatial Relationships 
4.1.  Space or structure occupied  
4.2.  Display mechanisms and/or 
specialized equipment 
 
4.3.  Supporting spatial and/or 
infrastructural factors 
 
4.4.  Relationship to surrounding 
neighborhood 
 
4.5.  Security arrangements  
4.6.  Relationship to customer movement: 
pedestrians, cars, mobile 
 
4.7.  Maintenance: who is responsible, 
how does it impact on trade? 
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PhD Phillip Lühl: Informal Economy Survey Guide  Date/time:  
Ask permission to take photos of structures inside & out 
Map/sketch the structure to scale 1 unit + 1m 
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PhD Phillip Lühl: Informal Economy Survey Guide  Date/time:  
5. Timeline of Daily Activities 
When What Where With whom 
05:00    
05:30    
06:00    
06:30    
07:00    
07:30    
08:00    
08:30    
09:00    
09:30    
10:00    
10:30    
11:00    
11:30    
12:00    
12:30    
13:00    
13:30    
14:00    
14:30    
15:00    
15:30    
16:00    
16:30    
17:00    
17:30    
18:00    
18:30    
19:00    
19:30    
20:00    
20:30    
21:00    
21:30    
22:00    
22:30    
23:00    
23:30    
24:00    
00:30    
01:00    
01:30    
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Interview guide for spatial professionals 
 
  
PhD Phillip Lühl: Interview Guide Professionals 
1. Describe your background: where did you grow up, study, practice? 
 
2. Where do you currently live and how would you describe your neighbourhood? 
 
3. Where do you work? 
 
4. How would you describe your professional practice? What kind of work do you do, would 
you like to do? 
 
5. What kind of commissions have you worked on? (Focus on non-private clients)  
 
6. Describe your design process of a project. 
 
7. What are the important aspects that a well-performing city has to achieve in your view?  
 
8. How would you explain urban informality to non-architects/urbanists? 
 
9. Have you worked on issues to do with urban informality? Describe the projects? 
 
10. Do you distinguish between users and clients? 
 
11. Is there relevance of user’s inclusion in design processes? How can they be engaged? 
 
12. How do you see the role of authorities (municipality, government agencies etc.)? 
 
13. What would need to change in Namibian architectural/urban practice to facilitate the 
engagement with urban informality?  
 
14. What would you change in your own practice if you could? Do you have any reference of 
participatory work that you think is interesting/relevant? 
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